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ABSTRACT 
 
CULTURAL LEADERSHIP AND PEACE:  AN EDUCATIONAL RESPONSE TO 
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 
by 
B. David Rowe 
 
This study is a philosophical inquiry into violence as the consequence of 
dysfunctional meaning-making processes. It establishes a theory of leadership 
development which requires, catalyzes, and sustains a reinvigorated relationship between 
education and religion in order to create more pacific ways of making meaning on 
interpersonal, organizational, institutional, societal, and global levels. 
The inquiry articulates an understanding of leadership as drawing on educative 
and religious processes for the deployment of power in order to make meaning with or on 
behalf of groups of people at various levels of social complexity. The analysis 
demonstrates that leadership is informed by and can inform institutional patterns of 
behavior and signification. Examination of leadership style on a developmental 
continuum of more and less violent modes of deploying power simultaneously offers 
insight into the origin of violent social relationships and into a process for creating more 
pacific ways of making meaning. Therefore, providing a path of personal cognitive and 
moral development along this continuum for organizational, institutional, societal, and 
global leaders offers one approach to influencing the development of social institutions 
which, in turn, influence the development of other leaders, along a mutually formative 
path toward interpersonal and global peace. 
The examination of leadership as energy deployment for the purpose of making 
meaning offers an opportunity to consider religion as an institution which encodes 
meaning making processes for society and individuals alike and to consider education as 
an institution which encodes behavior and norms attendant to the explication of reality. 
Rehabilitating religion and education in order to play these respective social roles more 
effectively requires more sophisticated leaders who deploy energy in less violent ways. 
Conversely, leadership development is constrained and empowered by these institutions 
which are in need of such growth themselves.  
This philosophical inquiry, therefore, synthesizes a new theory capable of framing 
new questions for leadership development and institutional growth with personal, 
organizational, societal, and global implications. The theory creates the category of 
Cultural Leadership which becomes a model for making meaning in less violent ways 
while providing a pathway for personal and social growth toward sustainable peace. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CULTURAL LEADERSHIP AND PEACE: 
AN EDUCATIONAL RESPONSE 
TO RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 
by 
B. David Rowe 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the  
Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Educational Policy Studies 
in  
the Department of Educational Policy Studies 
in  
the College of Education 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Atlanta, GA 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Ben David Rowe 
2007 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
My wife, Jodi, will quickly correct me when I tell someone that I have been 
working toward this degree for seven years. She is keen to remind me that I took my first 
doctoral level course in 1997 at Emory University while working at Oxford College as 
that school’s director of development. It was not until the Spring of 2000, after joining 
the staff of LaGrange College as vice president for advancement, however, that I 
embarked on a formal degree-seeking program at Georgia State University which 
required a great deal of commitment and sacrifice on the part of countless supporters who 
nurtured me and encouraged me along the way.  
 
I am aware of how much has changed in my life over the course of these seven 
years and how much has changed in the lives of those upon whom I have depended 
during this time. Jodi and I have become parents. She and God blessed me with the two 
most wonderful children on the planet, Carter and Philip. They have never known a father 
who was not going to school or, in the latter years, working on “daddy’s book.” Raising 
them is my deepest joy and one I struggle to express adequately. I am simultaneously 
grateful to them and deeply sorrowful each time they grudgingly let me go out the door to 
the library or allowed me to sit quietly with my laptop or book in my chair as they played 
elsewhere. I pray that I have enough life left for them to cash in all the IOUs I offered in 
response to their recurring plea, “but I just want to spend time with you, daddy.”  
 
Starting and raising a family is no passing obligation. Jodi has had to devote more 
than her share of creativity, love, and frugality to make up for my physical, mental, and 
sometimes emotional absences. Never counting the cost, only investing more of her time, 
energy, and deferred personal dreams into my education, Jodi compelled me to persist 
during the moments I considered scaling back on the program or abandoning the goal 
altogether. Without her, I would not have the privilege of putting these words on paper 
right now. I am indebted to her and to her network of family and friends who surrounded 
her with love and support, especially when she suddenly and sadly lost her daddy.  
 
Most of the world will never know, and even I may never fully appreciate, what it 
took for my family to support me over these years. They were not alone in making this 
dissertation possible, however. It was my three-time boss, mentor, and friend, Stuart 
Gulley who also served as a role model for me. He embarked on his doctoral program 
while we were colleagues at Emory University. He encouraged me to consider starting 
the program myself over the years. And then, when he hired me at LaGrange College, he 
made it possible for me to actually commit. LaGrange College’s generosity in providing 
tuition and fees reimbursement covered most of the financial burden of the program. For 
that I am most grateful. Stuart’s patience, tolerance, and first hand understanding of my 
 ii
 experience made him a supportive supervisor who, no doubt more than once, refrained 
from adding assignments or expectations that would interfere with my schoolwork and 
who surely forgave many oversights and mistakes caused by my dedication to the 
program and to this project.  
 
Along with Stuart, I appreciate my other LaGrange College colleagues. In 
particular, Lydia Wheitsel, a long time mentor, friend, and former boss, along with Carla 
Rhodes, both executive secretaries to the president, helped protect my time and often 
directed my attention to pressing priorities. My colleagues on the president’s cabinet, 
Quincy Brown, Jay Simmons, Linda Buchanan, Phyllis Whitney, Bob Boozer, and Kim 
Myrick offered encouragement and advice along the way. In fact, my student in 
seminary, Quincy Brown, became my teacher at LaGrange College. My counselor and 
confidant, he guided me emotionally and spiritually even during his own ordeal of 
needing and receiving a kidney transplant. Through his experience he showed me the 
transformative impact of liminal experiences, which inevitably demand to be appreciated 
and used for personal growth. He also served as an intellectual advisor teaching me about 
the hold that myth and story have on our lives.  
 
Similarly, I thank Linda Buchanan who on more than one occasion loaned a book 
with a spoonful of advice, reminding me that I only had an audience of four committee 
members and that when it comes to writing dissertations “done” beats “perfect” any day. 
She, along with Stuart, Toni Anderson, and in the latter years, Sharon Livingston, joined 
me in forming the core of what is affectionately known as “Philo University.” All of us 
are products of the Georgia State University higher education program which, as a result, 
has influenced immeasurably the operations of our common employer, LaGrange 
College. To varying degrees, we are indebted to Philo Hutcheson for our academic 
journeys. Philo has become an intellectual father to me, offering me latitude to explore 
topics not traditionally encountered in higher education programs while also instilling in 
me an appreciation for rigorous and focused scholarship. He and my other dissertation 
committee members, Susan Talburt, Doug Davis, and Thee Smith patiently, and often 
skeptically, held me accountable to my discipline while permitting nontraditional 
approaches to understanding the intersection of education and religion. Their influence 
joins that of Mary Beth Gasman and Ben Baez in helping me gain self-confidence as a 
scholar.  
 
Other colleagues also provided invaluable services and encouragement. Catherine 
Kostilnik edited my dissertation. Any errors herein result from my failure to correct the 
mistakes she and Philo identified. The staff of the Banks Library, especially Arthur 
Robinson, who can locate through inter-library loan any volume on the planet, provided a 
resource-rich cloister for research, rumination, and writing. Fellow students and friends 
Meredith Curtin Siegel and Rodney Lyn helped me formulate my ideas in the earliest 
stages. Andy Fleming deepened my understanding of the work of Brian and Elva Hall. 
My friend and fellow Oikos co-founder, Mark Davies inspires me to relentlessly believe 
all of us can and should work to make this world a better place.  
 
 iii
 LaGrange College is fortunate to have one of the finest advancement staffs 
anywhere. Their dedication and hard work more than compensated for the many times 
school, research, and writing rendered me unavailable. They, too, exhibited an immense 
amount of understanding and patience. They tolerated early departures from work to 
attend class and long absences for research and writing. It is a tribute to their competence 
and professionalism that the College’s external relations and fundraising efforts have 
flourished during this time period. They gave me confidence to share with them my 
leadership responsibilities for the division in ways that transformed my own notions of 
management and influenced greatly the chapter in this dissertation I devote to leadership 
styles and development. They can attest to the gulf that exists between my theory and my 
practice when it comes to my personal and professional inadequacies.  
 
While the entire advancement team made this dissertation possible, I wish to pay 
particular tribute to the division’s directors. Tammy Rogers and Martha Pirkle have 
endured this process from the beginning. Dean Hartman, and more recently, Shirley 
Harrington, have ably led their areas while also allowing me the space and time I needed 
to press forward toward completion. Others have come and gone during this time, but, in 
their own way made this accomplishment possible. Kristen Brooks, Natalie Shelton, 
Pride Hawkins, John Riley, Kathy Pirrman, Jennifer Hull, Renee Ferguson, Pam Barnes, 
and Terri Bassett served in various roles over these years offering personal and 
professional assistance in this process while my attention was divided among work, 
family, and school.  
 
Janet Hughes, however, deserves special mention. Like Einstein’s brain, her 
genial disposition, quick wit, patience, understanding, perseverance, and support ought to 
be preserved for posterity and examined by scientists in succeeding generations who 
might be able to understand what is, at this point in time, inexplicable. Janet devoted a 
great deal of time, energy, and knowledge to help me complete this dissertation. She 
jealously guarded the hours and days I needed to work for extended periods while not 
letting any priorities slip by without my attention. Borrowing time from her family, she 
kept me on task and spent hours late at night and on weekends to help me format and edit 
the final product. There is no telling what else she has done to make sure that I finish this 
program without losing my job, my staff, or my family. Like a compass, Janet always 
knows true north, directing (often re-directing) my focus to what is truly important in life 
as well as what is most pressing at the moment.  
 
The past seven years make up my formal doctoral program, but my education has 
been a lifelong adventure. That reality has become clearer and clearer to me with each 
page I have written. My mom and dad, Joyce and Ben Rowe, have provided a living 
model of interfaith relations. A Missionary Baptist and Roman Catholic married in 1960, 
they showed through their love for one another and for my sister, Jana, and me how to 
resolve conflicts that emerge from deeply ingrained differences. Their efforts to educate 
Jana and me in both traditions introduced me to early mentors whose influence I feel 
today. Gene Wilkes, my youth director while working on his Ph.D., was the first person I 
recall knowing who combined ministry and research-based scholarship. Similarly the 
Jesuits, who taught me in high school, lived out a model of scholastic ministry.  
 iv
  
Clearly this work is, for me at least, an intergenerational product and a 
community effort. I inherit a legacy of love and support from many who have surrounded 
me recently and throughout my life. Without such a foundation and network, I would not 
be in the position today to make this contribution to a world in great need of that same 
love and support. Mindful of the footsteps in which I follow, I endeavor to make a path 
equally worthy for future generations. It is for this reason, that I dedicate this dissertation 
to my closest link to tomorrow, to the two persons whose world I hope to make more 
peaceful. To Carter and Philip, with love, I offer this work. For you ground me in joy and 
teach me to hope. It is in you and through you I most clearly see the image of God. 
 
 
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. ix 
 
Preface...............................................................................................................................x 
 
Introduction.......................................................................................................................1 
 
Chapter 
1 RELIGION, CULTURES, AND MEANING ...........................................17 
 The Search for Meaning.............................................................................20 
  Naked Existence..........................................................................25 
  Cannibalism ................................................................................26 
  Deceptive Dreaming ...................................................................28 
 The Making of Meaning ............................................................................30 
 
2 MEANING, POWER, AND VIOLENCE.................................................37 
 Institutional Moral Meaning ......................................................................38 
  Organizational Crisis Raises Institutional Questions..................43 
  From Is to Ought.........................................................................49 
  Meaning as Synthesis..................................................................53 
   University Ritual.............................................................56 
   Church Ritual ..................................................................56 
   Shared Ritual...................................................................57 
   University Ritual Response.............................................57 
  Society Building and Culture Formation ....................................60 
  The Multiplicity of Cultural Life ................................................62 
 Moral Meaning Matrix...............................................................................69 
 
3 RELIGION AND VIOLENCE..................................................................78 
 Religion .....................................................................................................81 
 Western Hegemony....................................................................................83 
 Religion in the United States .....................................................................85 
 Christian Violence .....................................................................................88 
 
4 EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND VIOLENCE........................................95 
 Touching Transcendence ...........................................................................95 
  Mimesis: Mars and Minerva .......................................................99 
  Mimesis: Faith and Knowledge ................................................103 
  From Rivalry to Sacrifice – Faith and Knowledge ...................107 
  From Rivalry to Sacrifice – Mars and Minerva ........................109
 vi
  
  God-making and Integrity at the Dawn of a New Century.......111 
 Colleges at War........................................................................................115 
  Universities as Mimetic Rivals .................................................120 
  Nation-building and Utilitarianism...........................................122 
 The Moral Purpose of Education .............................................................126 
 
Chapter 
5 LEADERSHIP AS MEANING-MAKING .............................................130 
 Leadership and Authority ........................................................................131 
 Routine Charisma.....................................................................................136 
 Meaningful Leadership ............................................................................142 
 The Ritual of Meaning Making................................................................144 
 Communitas and Meaning .......................................................................147 
 Charisma and Communitas ......................................................................151 
 
6 LEADERSHIP AND VIOLENCE ..........................................................156 
 Hall’s Taxonomy .....................................................................................157 
 Leadership and Mimetic Rivalry .............................................................159 
  Authoritarian as Dominant Rival ..............................................160 
  Paternalist/Maternalist as Object of Desire...............................162 
  Manager as Scapegoater ...........................................................163 
  Facilitator as Victim..................................................................167 
  Collaborator as Hero .................................................................168 
  Servant as Transformer .............................................................170 
  Visionary as Strange Attractor..................................................173 
 
7 CULTURES AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS...........................177 
 The Social Fractal ....................................................................................178 
 Network and Complexity Theories..........................................................179 
  Network Theory ........................................................................183 
  Complexity Theory ...................................................................188 
 Halachic Learning....................................................................................193 
 Network Consciousness ...........................................................................196 
  Learning and Reasoning ...........................................................199 
  Signification..............................................................................204 
 Thermodynamics of Closed and Open Systems ......................................206 
 
8 THE VIOLENCE OF CLOSED SYSTEMS ...........................................212 
 Closed Systems Leadership ....................................................................218 
 Charismatic Energy..................................................................................225 
  Scapegoating a Manager ...........................................................232 
   Cuts that Make Sense....................................................235 
   Cutting Sensitively........................................................238 
   Making Sense of the Cuts .............................................239 
 Dominating a Rival and Elevating a Hero ................................245 
 vii
    Ontological Change ......................................................247 
   Normative Failure .........................................................250 
   Ontological Change and Normative Shifts ...................255 
 Initiated Leaders.......................................................................................258 
 
Chapter 
9 OPEN SYSTEMS CULTURES ..............................................................262 
 Education and Religion............................................................................263 
 Elements of Open Systems Myths ...........................................................267 
  Coming Together ......................................................................272 
  Recalling and Sharing ...............................................................275 
  Transformation..........................................................................276 
  Inter-subjectivity .......................................................................278 
  Community ...............................................................................279 
 Opening Systems .....................................................................................281 
 
10 CULTIVATING CULTURAL LEADERSHIP.......................................286 
 Writing Her Ass Off for Peace.................................................................287 
  Middle East College..................................................................288 
   Profile of a Prophet .......................................................289 
   Inter-faith Violence and Education...............................291 
  Brenda’s Path ............................................................................292 
  Abuna as Visionary Strange Attractor ......................................294 
   Attractor as Symbol and Model ....................................297 
   Writing as Transformative Praxis .................................298 
 Oikos ...................................................................................................301 
  Generative Commitment...........................................................307 
  Activities ...................................................................................310 
   Content..........................................................................310 
   Capacity ........................................................................311 
   Community ...................................................................313 
  Systemic, Sustainable, and Scalable .........................................314 
 Cultural Leadership and Peace.................................................................315 
  
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................319 
 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................327 
 viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure  Page 
 
1 Ontological Schema .............................................................................49 
 
2 Normative Schema...............................................................................53 
 
3 Signification Schema ...........................................................................53 
 
4 Meaning Schema..................................................................................60 
 
5 Synthetic Schema.................................................................................60 
 
6 Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified .........62 
 
7 Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified .........69 
 
8 Moral Meaning Matrix.........................................................................77 
 
9 Development Map..............................................................................159 
 
10 Moral Meaning Matrix.......................................................................193 
 
11 Leadership Posture Grid ....................................................................219 
 
12 Moral Meaning Matrix as Network ...................................................247 
 
13 Ada Bell’s Protest vs. Business as Usual...........................................249 
 
14 Harvard Hiring Practices vs. Bell’s Protest .......................................252 
 
15 Moral Meaning Matrix as Network ...................................................294 
 
16 Social Institutions as Dimensions of Moral Meaning........................303 
 
 
 
 v 
 
  
PREFACE 
 
Religion is at the center of – or wrapped around – many of the world’s most 
violent conflicts. Unfortunately this has been true for some time and is true today. The 
pervasiveness of religion-related conflicts is illustrated by the fact that seven stories 
detailed religious conflicts in the December 2006 issue of The Economist alone. In 
Palestine, Islamist Hamas is on the brink of a civil war with secular Fatah. Hamas leader 
Ismail Haniyeh pledged that the “Palestinians would ‘continue the jihad [against Israel] 
until Jerusalem had been liberated,’” but it is the specter of Islamist and secular 
Palestinians spilling each other’s blood that seems to be the most imminent threat.1 
Moving East, in an in-depth discussion of Pushtunwali, the tribal code of the Pusthun 
people in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the journal distinguishes the tribal code from the 
almost equally pervasive sharia or Islamic law. The distinctions fade, however “in times 
of duress, when a standard is needed to rally their fractious tribes and sub-tribes: then 
they have tended to hoist the flag of jihad.”2  
Moving to the west of Palestine in the article “Wars of Religion,” the magazine 
details the schism, less bloody than legal, in the “American Episcopal Church over the 
ordination of gays and women.”3 Large Virginia parishes occupying expensive property 
                                                 
1 Unknown Author, “The Palestinians: How Not to Win a State” and “Palestine: The Spectre of Civil War,” 
The Economist, December 23, 2006, 14, 65.  
2 Unknown Author, “Pushtunwali: Honour, Murder and an Ancient Tribal Code,” The Economist, 
December 23, 2006, 38. 
3 Unknown Author, “Episcopalians: Wars of Religion,” The Economist, December 23, 2006, 43. 
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and with rich historic ties to the founding of the United States are seeking communion 
with Anglican bishops in the developing world, especially Africa, who have “taken to  
ordaining American bishops in order to lead the Episcopal church back to its ‘biblical 
foundations.’”4
For all of the conflict it seems to engender, religion as a social phenomenon is not 
going away, according to The Economist. In “Christianity Reborn,” Peter Berger, to 
whom the magazine refers as the “dean of sociologists of religion” draws on Max 
Weber’s observations about the links between Protestantism and capitalism to explain the 
role of emerging Pentecostalism particularly in the southern hemisphere.5 
“Pentecostalism, like Puritanism before it, is an instrument of modernization,” claims the 
magazine.6 Churches “teach people to speak in public, organize meetings and as they 
become more successful manage large organizations. The bookshops in the mega 
churches are full of tomes on management.”7
A force of modernization, perhaps, but religion holds and conveys deep mysteries 
as well – mysteries only truly understood by believers and often incredible to non-
believers. Take the phenomenon of jinn, for instance, as described in The Economist’s 
article, “Born of Fire.”8 Descriptions of jinn or genies range from shape-shifting spiritual 
beings to whispers of thought. Real or not the effects of the belief in jinn are palpable. 
In August [2006], for instance, Muslims in the Kikandwa district of 
central Uganda grew feverish over reports of jinn haunting and raping 
women in the district. So when a young woman stumbled out of the forest 
one day, unkempt and deranged, she was denounced as jinn. Villagers beat 
her to death. Police finished the job with six bullets at close range. The 
                                                 
4 Ibid.  
5 Unknown Author, “Pentecostals: Christianity Reborn,” The Economist, December 23, 2006, 50. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Unknown Author, “Jinn: Born of Fire,” The Economist, December 23, 2006, 63. 
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young woman called out for her children in her last moments. An 
investigation revealed her to be from a neighboring district. She had spent 
days without food or water, searching for her missing husband.9  
 
In this instance, at least, the connection between religious belief and bloodshed is clear. 
But it is only an example of the numerous local and global correlations between religion 
and violence, but there seems to be another factor involved as well, education. 
The article which demonstrates a link between religion and violence also 
correlates belief in jinn with education levels. Comparing Somalia and Afghanistan, the 
correspondent reports that “jinn belief is strong in both countries” which are “war-
ravaged and have rudimentary education systems.”10 The article suggests that “illiterate 
rural women are more open to jinn” while “to more scholarly clerics jinn are little more 
than energy, a pulse form of quantum physics perhaps.”11  
This interplay among religion, violence, and education has at least an anecdototal 
correlation with global wars as well. The Economist asserts that “factions in Somalia and 
Afghanistan have accused their enemies of being backed not only by the CIA but by 
malevolent jinn” while a Pakistani jihadist cleric claims that United States missiles “will 
be misdirected by jinn.”12 Similarly, “Ahmed Shah Masoud, the commander of 
Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance … [who was] assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives on 
September 9, 2001” was said to have “jinn on his side” thus making Osama bin Laden an 
enemy of jinn in the eyes of many of Masoud’s followers.13
This one issue of one magazine is only one example of the pervasiveness of the 
apparent relationship between religion and violence in the world. Further, is there, as The 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 63-4. 
12 Ibid., 64. 
13 Ibid., 64. 
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Economist suggests, a causal relationship between religion, coupled with its potentially 
violent effects, and education? This dissertation attempts to answer that question, moving 
from the anecdotal to the analytical in hopes of charting a path away from violence and 
toward deploying the rich resources of religion and education for the purpose of creating 
a more peaceful world. 
 xiii
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Religion, Violence, and Education 
What is it about religion that places it so squarely in the company of conflict and 
violence? Answering this question requires an examination of the nature of religion and 
the way it functions in societies. In order to do this, I must separate the notion of religion, 
at least temporarily, from theological content and examine it functionally as a component 
of any society, even a society for which secularism, patriotism, or some sort of civil 
tolerance of multiple faiths serves this function. Similarly I will look at education 
functionally and the role it plays in societies and how education functions relative to 
religion. Understanding the functional relationship between education and religion will 
allow me to ask whether religion is the problem generally, or whether it is theology that 
is the problem. In other words, is it that people believe or what people believe or some 
combination of both that creates such a strong correlation between religion and violence? 
Further, is there a problem with education relative to religion? Can education have an 
effect on religion that minimizes its correlation with conflict? If so, is it how education 
functions that is important, what is being taught and learned that is important or, again, 
some of both? 
 1   
 2
To get at the relationship between education and religion and how they interact 
with respect to violence, I must develop a thorough understanding of the role of religion 
and education in societies. My research reveals that analyzing religion, education, and 
society requires that I develop a theory of culture against which to examine religion and 
education in functional terms.  
Once understood in the terms I will establish, cultures, as conveyors of meaning, 
avail themselves to the influence of leaders as meaning makers who, in turn, are shaped 
by the culture. Understanding this mutually constitutive relationship of leaders and 
cultures is key to an understanding of social change that begins to map a vector away 
from violence by deploying the best tools that religion and education have to offer. So the 
second project of this dissertation is to develop a theory of leadership, and specifically a 
theory of leadership development, that demonstrates its interrelatedness to my theory of 
culture.  
The theories of leadership and culture, when taken together, raise questions about 
how groups of people make meaning. This exercise of signification processes requires a 
type of cultural energy that I will explore more fully. The third part of this dissertation, 
therefore, establishes the theoretical underpinnings for appropriating physical science for 
social analysis by developing a theory of thermodynamics of culture and leadership.  
These three theories permit a new construct, one I term Cultural Leadership. It is a 
self-aware, socially aware, intentionally developing cultural leader that will understand 
his or her role in the social construction of cultures and societies. This self-understanding 
permits, if not requires, an awareness of the ways in which cultures and leaders become 
or remain violent. Cultural Leadership provides the theoretical framework and the tools 
    
 3
to reverse violent trends and engage in the creation and sustaining of peaceful social 
arrangements.  
 
Method 
My development of Cultural Leadership as a theoretical model on the 
organizational, institutional, societal, and global levels will draw on theoretical constructs 
in the fields of anthropology, sociology, theology, literary criticism, human development 
theory, education theory, leadership theory, network theory, physics, and complexity 
theory. The questions I am posing are broad-reaching and require an interdisciplinary 
approach.1 My presupposition is that asking the questions I am posing against any one of 
these theoretical frameworks alone would reveal the respective inadequacies of each 
discipline to understand, let alone answer, these questions. As philosopher Michael 
Scriven notes, echoing Ludwig Wittgenstein’s admonition, “when you get to the 
foundations of the subject, you cannot use the methodology of that subject, since you 
haven’t yet established the legitimacy of the subject or the methodology.”2 Therefore I 
use philosophical inquiry to synthesize a new theory capable of framing new questions 
with implications for social change as well as personal growth. The very absence of such 
a frame necessitates its exploration and development prior to investigation by any other 
                                                 
1 In order to approach these questions in a systemic way and in a manner that acknowledges that any one 
particular theoretical approach is situated in a larger field of epistemological discourse, it is necessary to 
integrate “multiple paradigms of knowledge” as suggested by James L. Paul and Kofi Marfo, “Preparation 
of Educational Researchers in Philosophical Foundations of Inquiry,” Review of Educational Research 71 
(Winter 2001), 540. 
2 Michael Scriven, “Philosophical Inquiry Methods in Education,” Complementary Methods for Research 
in Education, ed. Richard M. Jaeger (Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association, 
1988), 145. 
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means.3 My approach to argumentation throughout this dissertation takes a rather 
positivist approach. I assemble empirical evidence to support my claims and to identify 
causal relationships between and among various social phenomena. 
 
Culture 
One of the relationships I examine in this dissertation is that between religion and 
violence. I do so in multiple ways. In chapter one I start with Samuel Huntington’s 
analysis of the role that religion plays in exacerbating violence in the world.4 
Huntington’s work suggests that the reason religion is often identified so closely with 
violent conflict is that it offers those persons in conflict a meaningful identity to 
differentiate one group from its enemy while generating alliances that transcend other 
lines of identity and distinction such as national boundaries. Huntington’s claim that 
religion can offer shared meaning among people who do not share the same nationality, 
for instance, raises questions about the relationship between meaningful identity and 
culture. Clifford Geertz offers a framework in which to understand culture in terms of 
shared and transmitted meaning.5 Huntington and Geertz, when taken together, suggest 
the possibility that persons can operate in multiple cultural contexts at the same time. 
While nationality may be a prerequisite for culture in one sense of the term, Huntington’s 
“civilizations” imply the existence of (at least nascent or provisional) cultures that 
transcend nationality as well as divide people from one another within nations. 
                                                 
3 “Such subtle arguments from paradigms and analogies are not, therefore, to be thought of in any way as 
weak sisters (or weak brothers) of hard-core empirical research. They provide the foundations on which 
any worthwhile empirical research must be based….” Ibid. 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996), 40-8. 
5 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (USA: Basic Books, 1973), 89. 
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 Thinking of cultures in the plural and as scalable and thinking of cultures 
fundamentally as having to do with meaning will lead me next into an analytical 
reflection on the nature of meaning and the ways persons and groups of persons make 
meaning. Viktor Frankl’s account of perilous survival in Nazi concentration camps offers 
a vivid description of meaning-making on the personal level. When placed in 
conversation with Peter Berger, Frankl’s account also offers images of how groups of 
people make meaning in ways that are consistent with the meaning-making mechanism 
Geertz describes. Geertz suggests that making meaning is simply reconciling the way 
things are with the way things ought to be.6
 This reconciliation seems to occur on large and small scales. Huntington suggests 
that religion functions to create those shared meanings both within and beyond national 
boundaries, for instance, creating what he calls civilizations. If shared meaning 
constitutes culture in Geertz’s terms, then on some level Huntington’s proposition 
suggests the emergence of cultures within cultures. This seems to be borne out by the 
example of the dual Pushtun allegiance to Pushtunwali and sharia described above. 
Likewise, reading Frankl and Berger in light of Geertz’s framework demonstrates 
relationships between the personal and collective enterprises of making, preserving, and 
transmitting meaning.  
 Geertz’s meaning-making mechanism, a synthesis between the ontological (the 
way things are) with the normative (the way things ought to be), then can be thought of as 
scalable from the personal accounts of Frankl to the global analysis of Huntington. In 
order to test the scalability of Geertz’s proposition, in chapter two I will examine an 
organizational decision-making crisis about two men requesting the use of a campus 
                                                 
6 Geertz, 126-7. 
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chapel for their wedding at Emory University. My analysis will allow me to elaborate 
how Geertz’s mechanism works for various levels of social complexity. My investigation 
into the Emory crisis also will reveal how social institutions, as described broadly by 
Robert Bellah and his co-authors of the Good Society (particularly education, religion, 
and the government in this case), create different meaning-making paradigms for people 
involved in the same crisis. In addition, my examination of the way these institutions 
influence how actors make sense out of this ordeal illustrates another property of social 
institutions. Namely, institutions mediate the scalability of Geertz’s mechanism. That is, 
they form a bridge between personal meaning-making processes and collective meaning-
making processes. I will illustrate the way meaning making (or signification) occurs at 
the various levels of social complexity in a table I call the Moral Meaning Matrix. As a 
theoretical model, this table offers a functional description of the ways persons and 
groups of persons reconcile the normative and the ontological from the personal to the 
societal. It interpolates arbitrary levels of complexity in between those levels in order to 
demonstrate the mediating role of social institutions. It also extrapolates beyond the 
societal level, indicating the potential that societies can project their socially-constructed 
meanings into claims of universal truth. This universal projection is particularly useful 
when thinking about the functional role that religion plays. Note that throughout the 
dissertation the term universal refers to such a projection. The idea that anything can be 
described as universal is certainly a contested notion. I do not intend to make claims of 
universal fact or truth or to articulate a particular theology or metaphysics, but I do claim 
that through the process of social construction of reality and knowledge, described in 
greater detail below, societies create, share, and respond to a projection and perception of 
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realities (or of reality) that transcend(s) the most complex levels of social organization 
comprehensible to the projecting and perceiving group.   
 Once I establish the relational arrangements among various social institutions and 
demonstrate their roles in meaning making which is an important component of culture 
creation, I will begin to look at the role that energy plays in the signification processes 
that form, perpetuate, and transmit cultures. Understanding how energy is deployed as 
power in order to create culture at various levels of social complexity as illustrated in the 
Moral Meaning Matrix begins to illuminate the relationship between culture formation 
and violence. Paolo Freire’s descriptions of oppression and liberation illustrate the 
insidious ways power is used to oppress people by exporting norms from one social 
context and imposing them on another. Those who transfer norms in this way must have 
power in order to impose those foreign norms. The imposition of the norms preserves and 
advances that power. This is violence in Freire’s terms even if blood is not shed. As 
Freire points out it is often the revolutionary reactions to that initial violence which are 
bloody, but the initial violence was already in place via the imposition of non-native 
norms in what might be described as an imperialistic or colonizing signification or 
enculturation effort.  
 With the link between meaning making or culture creation and violence 
established and with a glimpse at the role that social institutions play in the signification 
process, I will turn, in chapter three, to an in-depth discussion of the function of social 
institutions in US society in terms described by Robert Bellah and his coauthors of The 
Good Society. Institutions play a dual role. They mediate between the personal and 
collective levels of social complexity and, as the Emory case demonstrates, they preserve 
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and transmit different meanings even in the same society. With this dual function of 
social institutions as a backdrop, I will examine religion as a social institution in the 
United States in particular detail. Aside from the primacy Huntington has placed on 
religion in violent global conflicts, both Geertz’s description of culture and Berger’s 
analysis of the creation of society give religion a third role in the maintenance of 
societies. They both identify religion itself with signification or meaning. Religion on the 
broader societal scale functions as the social institution which prescribes how societies 
arrange the synthesis of the normative and the ontological. In that way it encodes the 
culturally-proper relationship between the is and the ought for other social institutions. If 
a culture’s religion, functionally speaking, privileges the normative over the ontological, 
for instance, which Freire demonstrates is oppressive, then education, law, and economy, 
for instance, will follow suit. Since each social institution will have a different set of 
norms, each will be capable of making a different sense out of reality than the other 
institutions, but the normative privilege will be the same for all to the extent that the 
functional religion of the society influences them in that way.  
The extent of that influence is questionable, however. Bellah et al.’s observation 
is that religion in the United States, at least, has been relegated to what they call the 
private sphere. This diminishes its relationship with other social institutions and inhibits 
religion’s ability to be a robust public participant in the meaning-making processes of 
society. This confounding problem of the institution which encodes signification being 
distanced from the other institutions’ processes of meaning-making leaves religion 
stagnant as a social force, if not in a state of atrophy while at the same time leaving the 
other social institutions dependent on an ailing signification code for cues as to how the 
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normative and the ontological ought to relate in a society that purports to cohere. So my 
argument calls for a revival of the role of religion in public life. Such a revival, however, 
is not without potentially violent consequences. 
 To understand fully and more explicitly the potentially violent consequences and 
to offer a case upon which to test the effects of this functional understanding of religion, I 
will depart the functionalist framework and look at a particular theology or belief system. 
Christianity, as broadly understood and practiced in the United States and Western 
Europe, influences these societies' meaning-making processes in ways that create and, in 
a sense sacralize violence according to René Girard’s theory of mimetic rivalry and 
sacrificial violence. Girard judges that contemporary Christian theology, broadly 
speaking, represents a misreading of the Christian Gospel. This misreading encodes 
violent modes of meaning-making. So to the extent that meaning-making processes of the 
other social institutions in the United States and Western Europe are indirectly (and 
sometimes directly) dependent upon this misreading of the Gospel then meaning-making 
processes in these globally influential societies will continue to find violent ways to use 
power for the sake of forming, maintaining and transmitting culture. So reviving 
religion’s role in public life, or at least Christianity’s role in US society, could have 
(some would say even more) devastating consequences not only on United States society, 
but on the world. It is also possible, however, that Christianity, is in fact already 
influencing these violent modes of signification and the so-called privatization of religion 
is only a one-way shield, allowing religion’s influence to pervade society without 
accepting any influential shaping from other social processes. So my call for the revival 
of religion in public life is much more about a revival of discourse about religion and a 
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more open and critical engagement of the meaning-making processes it encodes for other 
social institutions.  
Chapter four examines the relationships among the various social institutions in 
detailed case studies. Carol Gruber’s analysis of colleges and universities during World 
War I illuminates Girard’s thesis on an institutional scale. Dysfunctional relationships 
among education, religion, and government contributed to major changes in institutional 
identity and those changes, in turn, contributed to what could arguably be described as 
uncritical and hyper-bellicose attitudes among educational and religious leaders.  
 I will also examine more recent events at three universities in the Middle East.  
These studies also demonstrate how education allowing itself to be co-opted for 
economic and governmental ends can directly lead to the involvement in violent conflict. 
Chapter four concludes with a call for education to re-examine and rehabilitate its own 
sense of moral purpose outside those freely assigned to it by economic and governmental 
influences. Religion can function to help education make meaning in its own terms and to 
begin that process of rehabilitating its moral purpose, but religion needs education to 
reverse its devolution into violent meaning-making patterns.  
   This is a call for a religious and educational reformation, and the agents upon 
whom I call for this reformation are a group I term, broadly, as leaders, not religious 
leaders alone, but leaders of groups large and small who influence the various social 
institutions in societies. 
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Leadership 
So what constitutes a leader? Because of the way in which we as modern humans, 
particularly in the United States and Western Europe, have divided up functions in an 
attempt to create efficiencies or, at least, loci of control, we have organized our 
relationships with one another into groups of persons acting together ostensibly for 
common purposes. Within these organizations, there is often a person or group of persons 
who relate to the entire group or to a large portion of the group at once. Often we call this 
person or group a leader or leadership team. Classically, Max Weber establishes 
categories for analysis for leadership. His ideal types prove useful in understanding the 
ways authority is regarded as legitimate by groups of persons. In chapter five, I will turn 
to Weber as a starting point in developing my theory of leadership. 
Various notions of leadership have surfaced over the centuries. Perspectives 
which influence the study of leadership are closely tied with the way one understands 
reality in general and how people know what is real and what is not real. On one end of a 
continuum of these notions of leadership is that “leadership is ‘real;’ it can be measured 
in a relatively objective manner and has generalizable and law-like relationships waiting 
to be discovered.”7 On the other end of the continuum is an understanding of reality as 
socially constructed, an understanding I will develop out more with the help of Peter 
Berger and others. This understanding views “reality as a projection of human 
imagination, with a transcendental metaphor.”8 From this perspective, “leadership reality 
                                                 
7 James G. Hunt, “What is Leadership,” The Nature of Leadership, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2004), 23. 
8 Ibid., 24 
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is a projection of individual consciousness and may be accessible only through 
phenomenological modes of insight.”9
No matter how problematic it is to settle on a fixed notion of leadership and even 
if leadership is understood as only a socially-constructed reality, the concept of 
leadership itself is useful if only to aid in the identification of what is wrong with the 
acquisition and use of power by particular individuals or groups of individuals. It also 
may serve to identify myths about the use of power, myths that reinforce power 
differences - myths that need to be exposed, understood and managed. Even if our object 
is to deconstruct the nature of leadership, to do away with the concept altogether, or to 
reveal its utility for harm or for good, it would serve us well to be more specific about the 
meanings of the terms leadership and leader. Chapter five explores multiple examples 
and discussions of leadership and concludes that leadership is fundamentally a meaning-
making activity and, therefore, a fundamentally cultural activity.  
I appropriate Weber’s and subsequent analysts’ development of the concept of 
charisma to describe how leaders actually facilitate the meaning-making process for 
groups. Charisma enables leaders to evoke a willingness of others to move beyond the 
security of the status quo through an uncertain middle state and into a new set of 
structures and norms. But charisma is more than the ability to persuade others to endure 
such transitions; it is the ability to establish a new order on the other side of those 
transitions. Victor Turner’s research in liminality and communitas provides a language 
for describing this meaning-making process. 
As a cultural activity in the United States and in Western Europe, at least, 
leadership is informed by the institution of religion insofar as Christianity functions to 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
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encode the processes of meaning-making. As such leadership as meaning-making activity 
is subject to the same rivalry and violence embedded in the misreading of the Christian 
Gospel described by Girard.  
A theory which suggests a path for the development of leaders toward using 
charisma to make meaning in ways that are less violent is essential at all levels of social 
complexity. Unfortunately, pacific leaders on the organizational level will be inhibited by 
the lack of pacific patterns allowed within a particular organization’s institutional 
framework. Likewise, the institutional framework is unlikely to have the capacity for 
such patterns if the society is incapable of legitimating such ways of interacting. 
Developed leadership, then, at the societal, institutional and organizational levels is 
important to effect the mutual transformation of institutions and organizations as well as 
that of institutions and society. 
Developmental theories focus primarily on the personal, interpersonal and, 
increasingly, on the organizational level. But few, if any, have answered the call of The 
Good Society to examine institutional development in a way that effects changes at the 
societal level.10 To that end, I propose to use this framework to create a theory of how 
leadership development can effect the growth of social institutions. 
In chapter six, I will construct such a theory on the basis of the developmental 
work done by Brian Hall by reading his leadership styles in light of the relationship 
Girard establishes between religion and violence. In so doing, I will illustrate that most of 
Hall’s leadership styles exhibit some degree of violence in the way they deploy energy 
and use power to synthesize the normative and the ontological. In fact my argument will 
                                                 
10 Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven M. Tipton, The Good 
Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Press, 1991), 303. 
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demonstrate alignment between the leadership styles and the violent Christian myth that 
Girard exposes. Girard’s call for a transformative re-reading of the Gospel narrative is 
embodied in only the two most developed of Hall’s seven leadership styles.  
 
Thermodynamics of Culture and Leadership 
While Hall’s work deals primarily with organizational leaders, my examination of 
Hall’s theories in light of Girard’s framework is an inquiry about leadership in general. 
So how do leaders effect society beyond the group they lead? This requires a re-thinking 
of the way the levels of social complexity represented within the Moral Meaning Matrix 
relate to one another. In chapter seven, I will look at the simultaneous interconnectedness 
of multiple levels of social complexity using the emerging ideas of chaos, network, and 
complexity theories. These theories open up the Moral Meaning Matrix into a more fluid 
and evolving framework that belies its rigid structural representation. The fluidity, I will 
demonstrate, is more in keeping with the actual ways signification processes change and 
adapt over time thereby converting the Moral Meaning Matrix from a descriptive model 
demonstrating the various relationships among components of signification processes 
into a model of a dynamic learning system. Theologian Richard Voyles’s adaptation of 
halacha or Jewish Law to a Christian context offers a paradigm for understanding the 
importance of the contextual and ontological portions of the matrix as entry ways for new 
data that will be synthesized as meaningful at various levels of social complexity.  
The interjection of chaos, network, and complexity theories will reveal more than 
a contrast between a structural model and a dynamic model. More importantly it 
illuminates the difference between leadership models which deploy energy as if social 
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systems are closed and insulated from external influences and leadership models which 
tap into a freely available energy that Mark Taylor terms negentropy. The latter approach 
openly embraces new experiences and relationships for the sake of constantly reforming 
and re-shaping signification processes. This contrast will give us the language to speak in 
developmental terms about something as large and amorphous as a social institution. 
Comprehending social institutions as learning systems suggests that social institutions 
grow and learn as well as regress and retrench. My analysis will show that the 
disintegration of Bellah et al.’s social institutions and particularly the diminution of 
religion and education relative to the market economy and the state cause the institution 
of religion, which encodes signification mechanisms for societies, to regress, at least in 
the United States. This regression subsequently encodes less and less developed modes of 
signification which ultimately privilege past meanings made over new information, new 
data, and new meanings. This developmentally regressive cycle, complexity theory 
demonstrates, can feed on itself until the system fails altogether, exhausting all past 
meanings, creating a real sense of meaninglessness for entire societies. Mapping the 
developmental regression in Girard’s terms, the modes of signification become 
increasingly violent. The more the sense of meaninglessness is perceived, the more social 
institutions will turn to violence to thwart it.  
The authors of The Good Society call for  “a third democratic transformation…to 
renew a serious public conversation and to strengthen the institutions that nurture and 
extend it.”11 In light of my analysis, Chapters nine and ten detail what that transformation 
might look like. As Bellah at al. indicate: 
                                                 
11 Bellah et al., Good Society, 293. Here Bellah et al. draw on Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). In fact, The Good Society attempts to describe what the 
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We need clear standards to help us regain our environmental health, and 
we also need clear standards to regain our institutional health: indeed, we 
cannot repair the damaged environment unless we also repair our damaged 
social ecology.12
 
Any set of standards for this transformation that takes my assessment seriously 
must be educational in nature. That is it must think of itself as an open learning system, 
always changing and adapting, privileging contextual reality over generalized norms in 
order to remain vital, progressive and, ultimately, non-violent. The set of standards I 
propose reconnects social institutions and provides the tools within which leaders can 
grow beyond the mythical constraints of regressive meaning-making systems, in order to 
participate in the creation of new signification processes. I argue for a new way to think 
about culture generally and cultures specifically and a way to understand how persons 
and groups of persons create, sustain and transmit those cultures. More than that, it is a 
way to de-alienate persons from the signification processes in which they participate but 
which they often see as reified factuality acting upon them. The re-enfranchised actors 
who take responsibility for these constantly reforming meaning-making processes are, by 
definition, leaders of a very specific type. They are cultural leaders.
                                                                                                                                                 
institutional framework of the such a democratic transformation might look like. The first two democratic 
transformations refer to the democratization of the Greek city-states and the assertion and protection of 
individual rights in the US republic respectively. 
12 Bellah et al., Good Society, 292. 
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RELIGION, CULTURES, AND MEANING 
 
On the heels of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Edward Said, in The Nation, 
excoriated the seemingly prescient thesis put forward five years prior by Samuel 
Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order that religion 
plays a role in creating and delineating emerging lines of demarcation among broad 
transnational entities, which Huntington describes as civilizations.13 While nation-states 
persist in shaping civilizations, conflict between or among geographically defined 
political jurisdictions is less of a concern for Huntington than the divisions and wars that 
occur between and among these larger global factions which are held together by 
significant internally coherent affinities. 
A civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest 
level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes 
humans from other species. It is defined by common objective elements, 
such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the 
subjective self-identification of people.14
 
Huntington identifies six and possibly seven “major contemporary civilizations:” Sinic, 
                                                 
13 Huntington, Clash, 40-8.  
14 Ibid., 43. 
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Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American, and African (possibly).15 “Religion 
is a central defining characteristic of civilizations….Of [social theorist Max] Weber’s 
five ‘world religions,’ four – Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism – are 
associated with major civilizations.”16 The centrality of religion for civilizations is not 
inconsequential for the divisions which distinguish one civilization from another, 
especially when a division escalates to the level of violent conflict.  
In the course of war, multiple identities fade and the identity most 
meaningful in relation to the conflict comes to dominate. That identity 
almost always is defined by religion. Psychologically, religion provides 
the most reassuring and supportive justification for struggle against 
“godless” forces which are seen as threatening. Practically, its religious or 
civilizational community is the broadest community to which the local 
group involved in the conflict can appeal for support. If in a local war 
between two African tribes, one tribe can define itself as Muslim and the 
other as Christian, the former can hope to be bolstered by Saudi money, 
Afghan mujahedeen, and Iranian weapons and military advisers, while the 
latter can look for Western economic and humanitarian aid and political 
and diplomatic support from Western governments.17
 
For Huntington, then, religion is the most meaningful identity in global groupings 
defined by what he terms cultural identity. Said rebuffs Huntington for using overly 
broad categories to describe millions of people with complex and intertwined histories in 
monolithic terms for the sake of drawing convenient distinctions or, more insidiously as 
Said and others would argue, for the sake of naming and identifying post cold-war 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 44-47. Huntington acknowledges that many scholars do not view Africa as a single and separate 
civilization. Rather different regions within Africa belong to other more influential transnational groupings. 
Northern Africa, for instance is more a part of the Islamic civilization whereas other parts of Africa may 
have more in common with European culture or the Western civilization. In addition, Huntington concedes 
that tribal identities are important throughout the continent and that there is an emerging coherent African 
identity. Sub-Saharan Africa, in fact, could form its own civilization. Ethiopia, historically, has also 
constituted its own civilization as well.  
16 Ibid., 47. 
17 Ibid., 267-8. Huntington appeals to specific examples, some of which are outdated. The potential for 
Afghan mujahedeen in such a scenario may be quite different following the US military action in 
Afghanistan after September 11, 2001. Still, the example is illustrative and makes the point that others in 
the world not party to a particular conflict may provide tangible and useful support to combatants based on 
religious affiliation even if other similarities or affiliations are lacking. 
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enemies only to shore up or preserve an artificially constructed identity labeled 
“Western.”18 Yet even in his critique, Said demonstrates at least part of Huntington’s 
thesis as he retreats to the ease of generalities himself when distinguishing between 
Westerners and Muslims and when discussing conflicts among Muslims, Christians and 
Jews:  
There is still no decent history or demystification of the many-sided 
contest among these three followers—not one of them by any means a 
monolithic, unified camp—of the most jealous of all gods, even though 
the bloody modern convergence on Palestine furnishes a rich secular 
instance of what has been so tragically irreconcilable about them.19
 
In a 1993 article which pre-dates Said’s criticism of 2001, Huntington challenges 
his critics to explain the complexity of global relations in a world without competing 
superpowers. He rejects as unreal a “one-world paradigm that a universal civilization 
now exists or is likely to exist in the coming years” because there is no centralized 
universal power. Likewise he dismisses the suggestion that states be regarded as 
controlling civilizations. Lacking an alternative to belonging to spheres of influence 
during the cold war, states are increasingly identifying with civilizations - not the other 
way around, according to Huntington.20 Huntington defends his position with an 
emphasis on religion as key to forming the cultural identity which links transnational 
civilizations. “What ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic 
                                                 
18 Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, October 22, 2001 [journal on-line]; available from 
www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said; Internet; accessed April 13, 2007. and John Trumpbour, “The 
Clash of Civilizations: Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the Remaking of the Post-Cold War World 
Order,” The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, Emran Qureshi and Michael Sells, eds. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 89. 
19 Said, on-line. 
20 Samuel P. Huntington, “If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington Responds to His Critics,” 
Foreign Affairs November/December 1993 [journal on-line], (accessed 13 April, 2007), Internet.  
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interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they 
will fight and die for.”21
Such an identity is powerful so its nature needs to be better understood. What, 
then, would make a religious identity a cultural identity, and what would make such an 
identity meaningful to individuals and to large groups? To pursue these questions about 
culture and meaning, I turn to cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz in The 
Interpretation of Cultures. Culture, for Geertz is “an historically transmitted pattern of 
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic 
forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge 
about and attitudes toward life.”22 Geertz’s understanding of culture is a “semiotic one. 
Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance that 
he himself has spun, [Geertz takes] culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be 
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning.”23  
 
The Search for Meaning 
Cultures are webs of significance and the analysis of cultures is a search for 
meaning. If cultures, as Huntington suggests, can both transcend nationalities and divide 
persons from one another within nations, then cultures must exist at various levels of 
social complexity from interpersonal relationships to Huntington’s global civilizations. 
Therefore my analysis of cultures, that is the search for meaning, must take place intimate 
and broad scales alike. It will start with the former and move to the latter. For a look at 
                                                 
21 Huntington, Responds, on-line. 
22 Geertz., 89. 
23 Ibid., 5. 
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cultures on the interpersonal scale, I turn to the work of psychiatrist Viktor Frankl, in his 
aptly titled book Man’s Search for Meaning, which chronicles his experiences as a 
prisoner in Nazi concentration camps for three years and articulates his resultant theory, 
which he calls logotherapy.24 His account and reflection give detail to the search for 
meaning, and thereby contribute to a richer understanding of the project of cultural 
analysis and of culture itself. Although his book is highly personal in nature, I will break 
down his search for meaning as a process that I will later apply to broader cultural scales 
as well. 
 In reflecting on his own experiences and in his observations of others during and 
beyond those three years, Frankl suggests that “three phases of an inmate’s reaction to 
camp life become apparent: the period following his admission; the period when he is 
well-entrenched in camp routine and the period following his release and liberation.”25 
For each phase, Frankl identifies a characteristic “symptom.”26 The symptom of the first 
phase is shock; the second, apathy, and the third, depersonalization.27
 Recounting his arrival at Auschwitz, Frankl describes the hurried set of 
instructions he followed and the instantaneous decisions that guards made, which he later 
learned literally carried the weight of his fate. He and his fellow inmates suffered from a 
sense of delusion, he recalls, that at some point they would gain reprieve and be 
reacquainted with their lives which had been so starkly interrupted. His delusion came to 
an end when he realized that he would have to surrender the manuscript of his book, 
which he had smuggled into the camp at great risk. The shock of the first phase, perhaps, 
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is the surprise at how quickly a person can be dissociated from any semblance of life as 
he or she knew it, but perhaps more profoundly, the astonishment comes at the value of 
what is left even when everything else was gone. After the relief of verifying that the 
showerheads in the buildings to which he was initially led dripped water and did not 
effuse deadly gas, Frankl took note of his and his fellow inmates’ crowded surroundings 
as well as of his own quickly and profoundly altered state, physically and existentially: 
While we were waiting for the shower, our nakedness was brought home 
to us: we really had nothing except our bare bodies-even minus hair; all 
we possessed, literally, was our naked existence. What else remained for 
us as a material link with our former lives? For me there were my glasses 
and my belt; the latter I had to exchange later for a piece of bread.28   
 
Frankl’s first phase, characterized by shock, delineates in stark terms the disruption of 
status quo for an individual or for entire classes of persons at once. 
 Soon horror at the horrors of the camps gave way to the emotional blunting of the 
second phase. No longer surprised or even moved enough by the incessant and 
unjustifiable scourges of fellow inmates, for instance, the prisoners, and Frankl among 
them, began giving over their lives to the fate which seemed to control them. Focused on 
survival, they were content to surrender any responsibility for decision-making or the 
consequences of their actions and let destiny takes its course. Frankl discloses that toward 
that end, he answered all questions posed of him truthfully, not knowing how to outwit 
the system to survive one moment to the next. Whatever the consequences of his 
responses may have been, he was prepared to endure them.29
 The apathy was deepened by a sense that people were no longer people but 
numbers. Names, professions, and even states of health became unimportant as 
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accountant-like guards and privileged inmates were only concerned with the numbers of 
prisoners being transported from one place to the next, for instance, and whether or not 
the prisoners’ assigned numbers matched the specific numbers on the accompanying 
manifest.30
 The lack of personal responsibility, primal self-preservation, and dehumanization 
compounded the apathy into an utter disregard for self and others. As Frankl discovered, 
he narrowly escaped the consequences of such a profound lack of feeling. 
Months after, after liberation, I met a friend from the old camp. He related 
to me how he, as camp policeman, had searched for a piece of human flesh 
that was missing from a pile of corpses. He confiscated it from a pot in 
which he found it cooking. Cannibalism had broken out. I had left just in 
time.31
 
Frankl’s second phase, marked by apathy, demonstrates the consequences of a cultivated 
lack of feeling. He attributes the insensitivity to the survival instinct of the prisoners. It 
was, he contends, “a very necessary protective shell.”32
 Liberation, Frankl’s third phase, constituted a separation of a different sort. A 
reversal of the excision from society made in the first phase, the day the camp gates 
opened, thousands of prisoners (re-)entered yet another wholly unfamiliar environment. 
As Frankl noted about his and his fellow prisoners’ first unforced steps beyond the 
fences, “We did not yet belong to this world.”33 Comparing the release of the “mental 
pressure” of incarceration to the ascension of caisson workers whose bodies undergo 
enormous changes upon returning to the surface too quickly, Frankl suggests that rapid 
attempts to acclimate to the outside world could cause the psychological equivalent of the 
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“bends.”34 Such rapid release of pressure caused a “moral deformity” in some who 
wished to oppress others in the way they had been oppressed as well as bitterness and 
disillusionment.35 The disillusionment was both the cause and the symptom of the 
depersonalization. Dreams had served a specific anesthetizing role in camp. Now the 
dreams-come-true were difficult to grasp.  
“Freedom”- we repeated to ourselves, and yet we could not grasp it. We 
had said this word so often during all the years we dreamed about it, that it 
had lost its meaning. Its reality did not penetrate into our consciousness; 
we could not grasp the fact that freedom was ours. 
 
Lack of belief that a dream was real was less injurious than the reverse, discovering that a 
dream would never come true.  
When we spoke about attempts to give a man in camp mental courage, we 
said that he had to be shown something to look forward to in the 
future….Woe to him who found that the person whose memory had given 
him courage in camp did not exist any more! Woe to him who, when the 
day of his dreams came, found it so different than all he had longed for!36  
 
Depersonalization, the symptom of the third phase, consists of a lack of continuity 
between one’s dreams and reality. Whether unable to distinguish reality from dream or 
confronted with the dissonance between reality and dream, the lack of continuity between 
the two makes dreams in this phase deceptive. 
 From naked existence to cannibalism to deceptive dreams, Frankl chronicles the 
bleak psychological journey he and millions of other camp prisoners endured. Yet his 
book and my analysis are about the search for meaning, and Frankl provides a path for 
discovering personal meaning even in these most primal of circumstances. But the 
personal process is applicable to larger scales. Peter Berger theorizes about meaning and 
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religion on a broader societal scale. Reading Frankl’s journey in light of the work Peter 
Berger has done on how entire societies make meaning begins to show the similarities 
between personal and collective meaning-making processes.  
 
Naked Existence 
Not only was Frankl standing unclothed in the bath house with other prisoners, in 
Berger’s terms Frankl’s abrupt removal from the world he had come to know and help 
create likely created another sense of profound vulnerability. He argues,  
To be separated from society exposes the individual to a multiplicity of 
dangers with which he is unable to cope by himself, in the extreme case to 
the danger of imminent extinction. Separation from society also inflicts 
unbearable psychological tensions upon the individual, tensions that are 
grounded in the root anthropological fact of sociality. The ultimate danger 
of such separation, however, is the danger of meaninglessness.37
 
Berger, who draws on both Max Weber and Emile Durkheim to describe 
explicitly the relationships among religion, society, and meaning-making, understands 
society as “the guardian of order and meaning.”38 It establishes what Berger terms a 
“nomos” that creates and secures this sense of order and meaning. The separation from, 
or the breakdown of, the nomos results in what Berger refers to, in an Anglicization of 
Durkheim’s term, as “anomy.”39  The prisoners’ abrupt confrontation of their naked 
existence and the shock they experienced at the senseless acts of power and brutality they 
witnessed correspond to Berger’s appropriation of the concept of “anomic terror.” 
Anomy is unbearable to the point where the individual may seek death in 
preference to it. Conversely, existence within the anomic world may be 
sought at the cost of all sorts of sacrifice and suffering-and even the cost 
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of life itself, if the individual believes that this ultimate sacrifice has 
nomic significance.40  
 
Even Frankl, who contemplated suicide along with his fellow inmates, understood 
the preference of death over life. He chose not to “run into the wire” of the electrified 
fence not because it was not preferable but because there was no “point” in it – no 
meaning. He calculated the odds, and he was just as likely to be spared the trouble of 
committing suicide by the rate at which prisoners were dying or being killed anyway.41
 
Cannibalism 
Humans will fight anomy, according to Berger. In fact this is the genesis of 
society, which he describes as a human product that acts back on its producer.42 In the 
face of anomic terror and, especially in the cases in which the persons experiencing such 
terror have very little perceived or actual control such as in the concentration camps, 
humans will create social constructs which enable them to deny or disclaim their 
participation in that very social construction. The dialectical relationship between human 
being and society is denied. The world is seen as objective fact acting on the individual.43 
This process, “whereby the dialectical relationship between the individual and his world 
is lost to consciousness” is “alienation.”44
In the stark realties of the concentration camp, one could argue that the inmates 
had very little role in or responsibility for the world around them. In fact, this was very 
much the case. Others created the environment into which these persons found 
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themselves involuntarily thrust. However, even Frankl acknowledges a sense of agency 
over small matters with consequences of significance. One such story contrasts one 
prisoner-cook with others: 
He was the only cook who did not look at the men whose bowls he was 
filling; the only cook who dealt out the soup equally, regardless of 
recipient, and who did not make favorites of his personal friends and 
countrymen, picking out the potatoes for them, while the others got watery 
soup skimmed from the top.45
 
Even given the facts which were beyond their control, the prisoners still participated in 
creating a world within a world. Reaction to the realities with which they were 
confronted was in fact their participation in social construction.  
 Nevertheless, Frankl’s description of the second phase of camp life is rich with 
description of fate taking its course and of prisoners allowing it to do so. Frankl himself 
refused to try to interject his own agency, choice, or preferences into the mix of variables 
which could, from day to day, determine whether he lived or died. This surrender to a 
force greater than oneself and beyond one’s control caused Frankl and others to lose 
emotion as well as any sense of culpability for the horrors that surrounded them or in 
which they participated. He reports, 
After [a typhus patient] had just died, I watched without any emotional 
upset the scene that followed, which was repeated over and over again 
with each death. One by one the prisoners approached the still warm body. 
One grabbed the remains of a messy meal of potatoes; another decided 
that the corpse’s wooden shoes were an improvement over his own, and 
exchanged them. A third man did the same with the dead man’s coat, and 
another was glad to be able to secure some-just imagine-genuine string.46
 
Beyond alienation, the perfunctory approach to one’s actions and the moral decay, 
which Frankl observed at its depth in the account of cannibalism can also be attributed to 
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what Berger terms “bad faith.”47 This is a disruption of personal awareness of the 
dialectical tension, not with the outside world, but with the inside world, the social 
realities which the actor had, over time, internalized. So a prisoner or any person for that 
matter, experiencing both alienation and bad faith is isolated by a “false consciousness” 
from society and socialization.48 Berger illustrates this isolation with the observation that 
“the faithful executioner may tell himself that he has ‘no choice’ but to follow the 
‘program’ of head-chopping, suppressing both emotional and moral inhibitions 
(compassion and scruples say) to this course of action, which he posits as inexorable 
necessity for himself qua executioner.”49 In the alienated/bad faith world of the apathetic 
second phase of camp life, cannibalism is a possibility, perhaps one even legitimated by a 
provisional social order in which the social actors are able to distance themselves from 
their roles in world-creation and from their socialized selves.  
 
Deceptive Dreaming 
The distancing from roles of the prisoners’ lives in the world joined another 
distancing – a distancing from the role of the world in their lives. In part attributable to 
the task of enduring the plight of a concentration camp prisoner, Frankl emphasized the 
importance of the freedom of the imagination,  
I did not know whether my wife was alive, and I had no means of finding 
out…but at that moment [while digging a ditch under duress in frozen 
soil] it ceased to matter. There was no need for me to know; nothing could 
touch the strength of my love, my thoughts, and the image of my beloved. 
Had I known then that my wife was dead, I think that I would still have 
given myself, undisturbed by that knowledge, to the contemplation of her 
                                                 
47 Berger, Canopy, 93 
48 Berger, Canopy, 93. 
49 Ibid. 
    
29 
image, and that my mental conversation with her would have been just as 
vivid and just as satisfying.50
 
The deception of the dream was useful to at least distract Frankl from the harsh realities 
he faced. Even the deceptive quality of the content of the dream itself, if known, would 
not have interrupted the efficacy of the dream. The deception was intentional, and the 
illusory was preferable to the real. Upon liberation, the dream world which had replaced 
or become contiguous with reality confronted reality for which the dream’s service was 
no longer needed or no longer effective. Again moving from one social reality to another, 
the released prisoners experienced an anomic situation. Dreary as it was, camp life had 
formed its own nomos, in Berger’s terms. And now that that nomos was disrupted by 
liberation; the inmates experienced anomy once again.  
 The dreams were temporarily contiguous with reality in prison, because they had 
been reality – a reality socially constructed by each prisoner individually and the 
prisoners collectively. Their false consciousness – bad faith and alienation – was exposed 
upon release. The alienated bad faith which served to stave off the previously 
encountered anomy was no longer sufficient to comprehend the new world, but perhaps 
for the first time its usefulness could be fully understood as an artifact of camp life. 
Such alienation can be a most effective barrier against anomy. Once the 
false unity of the self is established, and as long as it remains plausible, it 
is likely to be a source of inner strength. Ambivalences are removed. 
Contingencies become certainties. There is no more hesitation between 
alternative possibilities of conduct. The individual “knows who he is”- a 
psychologically most satisfactory condition…the individual who seeks to 
divest himself of bad faith institutionalized in his situation in society is 
likely to suffer psychologically and in his “conscience” quite apart from 
the external difficulties he will probably encounter as a result of such 
“unprogrammed” ventures.51
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 Frankl’s stages, which I have named Naked Existence, Cannibalism, and 
Deceptive Dreaming, are characterized by the symptoms, in his terms, of shock, apathy, 
and depersonalization respectively. Berger’s social analysis explains the root cause of 
these symptoms as anomy, alienation, and bad faith respectively. 
 
The Making of Meaning 
Having named Frankl’s stages, their symptoms, and their root causes, I will now 
turn to the project of examining meaning making in each stage, respectively, in order to 
gain purchase on the nature of signification processes generally. Each of Frankl’s stages 
presented a different challenge to Frankl and his fellow inmates as they struggled with 
what Frankl identifies as a human’s “primary motivation,” that is “a search for 
meaning.”52 The shock of naked existence resulted from the anomy of the prisoners being 
dislodged from a social existence in which they were able to make sense of the conditions 
of most realities which they had previously encountered. The current situation, most 
dramatically illustrated by the initial shower in the camp, had no referent in social sense-
making. The situation was so radically different from anything the prisoners had 
experienced before, there was no way to comprehend what was going on. The reality, 
which the soldiers imposed on the prisoners, was so different than what any of the 
prisoners thought life ought to be that many, in shock, denied the reality of the reality. 
Clinging to his latest written volume, Frankl did the same. It was not until Frankl realized 
how out of place his book was and how life-threatening his possession of it was, that he 
truly accepted the new reality in which he found himself. And it was not until he 
awakened to the harshness of his new reality that he was able to begin making meaning 
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again. He held onto and hid his book in the shower, a meaningless act. His notion of what 
ought to be was located in a past life, a society that was not operative in the prison camp. 
His choice, then, was to deny the new reality, his new existence, or his new is, in Geertz’s 
terms, in favor of living as if the former ought would never permit such an existence, or 
to accept that his new life, his new is was so different that making sense of it in terms of 
his old life was impossible.53   
Meaninglessness in the Naked Existence stage of Frankl’s journey emerged from 
an inability to accept the new reality. Meaning came with an acceptance of the new life. 
Frankl and the prisoners who found meaning resisted the temptation to equate the 
thought, “this shouldn’t be” with “this isn’t really happening.” Meaning was found in 
recognizing that something that should not be happening truly was happening. While the 
is and the ought of Frankl’s new life and his old society were in conflict, meaning came 
from identifying the tension, the very strained tension between his is and his ought. 
Meaninglessness would have persisted had he failed to clearly identify the 
incompatibility of the two by denying the reality of his new reality. So the anomy of 
Naked Existence is made meaningful by an acknowledgement of the tension between the 
is and the ought and by accepting the new is as real. 
The interplay between the is and the ought is of interest for meaning-making in 
understanding the alienation of the apathetic Cannibalism stage as well. In Naked 
Existence, prisoners were more acquainted with old norms than new realities and the 
temptation was to deny the new realities. After the reality of camp life set in, 
comprehension of old norms began to fade away. In fact, for most prisoners, norms 
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altogether evaporated. There was no ought by which to judge any particular is. Behavior 
was driven by a survival instinct that eventually had very little regard for the dignity of 
other persons. With no ought to counterbalance or make sense of the is, life was 
meaningless.  
Meaning-making in the Cannibalism stage emerged for Frankl and/or for the cook 
in the story of the ethic of soup-serving. Whether or not the cook actually had developed 
and followed an ethic of fairness in the way he did not favor his friends with more than 
just the watery portions, we do not really know. He could have just been suffering from 
apathy in the extreme – not even caring about his friends and countrymen. In some ways, 
however, the cook’s disposition is irrelevant. The fact that Frankl imputed upon the 
cook’s actions a value of fairness indicates that at least Frankl had begun to develop, or 
had managed to adapt, a normative referent that helped camp life make sense. In other 
words, after all norms were stripped in the Naked Existence stage, meaning could only 
re-emerge as prisoners were able to reconstruct camp norms, that is some relevant ought 
with which to hold their awful is in tension. By so doing, Frankl and the other prisoners 
who managed to make meaning resisted the pervasive alienation by reclaiming 
responsibility for their behavior and their sense-making processes. They did not abdicate 
the power of social construction to their captors but retained it, at least to some degree, 
for themselves.  
This kind of norm-referencing behavior matured over time in the camp. In fact it 
outgrew the reality in which the prisoners found themselves. It did so in the stage and the 
process I refer to as Deceptive Dreaming. For the prisoners, alienated from the collective 
process of shared meaning-making, personal dreams and illusions served in place of a 
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shared set of values or ethics. Meaninglessness was derived in the Naked Existence stage 
by a discontinuity between the present is and the past ought. Meaninglessness in the 
Cannibalism stage resulted in a discontinuity between the present is and the (non-
existent) present ought. The Deceptive Dreaming stage created a future ought that was 
incongruous with the new (liberated) is. 
Deceptive Dreaming seemed, in Frankl’s account, serviceable for survival right 
up until the camp gates opened for the final time. Upon re-entry into the outside world 
the dreams dreamed by the prisoners were tested against the unexpectedly harsh realities 
of the return to non-prison life. When daydreams and illusions failed to stand up to the 
veracity of outside life, meaninglessness set in from a different direction. This time, the 
prisoners, lost in their imaginations, were almost entirely influenced by a necessarily 
well-developed ought or ideal (even if imagined) state of affairs that allowed them to 
deny or ignore the harshness of the camp-life is. When confronted with a new reality, the 
prisoners were simultaneously challenged by the uselessness and irrelevance of their 
personal concept of what life ought to be like. Clinging to that ought, in fact, was 
damaging. So meaninglessness upon release came as a result of being consumed by an 
ought that was in no way relevant to the current is. In many ways, it was the same 
phenomenon of Naked Existence, in that the provisional nomos of camp life was 
inadequate to make sense of life outside the fences of the prison. In Naked Existence, 
however, the nomos that Frankl and the others left at the door of the shower was the 
collectively-constructed nomos of a society many shared. The dreams of freedom 
prisoners carried with them beyond the gates were highly personalized illusions that 
served as much to deny reality as make sense of it. To remain lost in such dreams would 
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have been to remain anesthetized to life. What was needed for the re-establishment of 
personal and collective meaning was a shedding of the bad faith, a rejection of alienation, 
and a re-engagement in the collective work of producing shared norms in a post-war 
recovering society.  
The shock of anomy produced the meaninglessness of Naked Existence by 
dissociating society’s ought from the camp life is. Meaning making resulted from 
acceptance of the new is and seeing the radical discontinuity between it and everything 
the new prisoners knew to be normal. Acceptance of the is and forgetting one’s role and 
responsibility for meaning making led to the apathy of Cannibalism which thwarted 
meaning making by failing to provide an adequate ought with which to make sense of the 
is. Finally, the Deceptive Dreaming produced a sense of depersonalization as privately 
constructed oughts, created in bad faith to cope with harsh prison life, were tested against 
shared meaning-making processes beyond the camp walls. Meaning re-emerged for those 
able to discard the personal illusions and re-engage the public process of meaning-
making in society. Whether an ought was in need of an is, an is in need of an ought, or a 
private ought was in need of a shared ought, meaninglessness resulted from the 
dissociation of the ought and the is, and meaning was found only when the tension 
between the two was enlivened and engaged. Frankl’s search for meaning was a search 
for different components of society-making at different times. In times when he was 
stripped of social moorings, meaning-making became more of a private act. As he 
integrated and re-integrated into camp life and Austrian life respectively, he located that 
meaning-making process in the context of shared norms. In Berger’s terms, society-
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creation is a shared act and Frankl’s dislocation from shared sociality created the various 
levels of private angst discussed above. 
However, whether on a private scale or shared scale, it was always a search for 
reconciling reality with a set of norms that could make sense of that reality, and it was a 
search for a reality that could give life to and ground a relevant set of norms as well. If 
successful in the quest, the search for meaning creates a vibrant tension between reality 
as experienced and shared norms. It seeks a dialectical tension between and synthesis of 
the is and the ought on a continuum, marked in Frankl’s case and Berger’s analysis of 
private and shared meaning respectively. 
Frankl and Berger bear out Geertz’s description of meaning-making process as 
the synthesis of the “is” and the “ought.” In Geertz’s terms, the meanings resulting from 
those syntheses, to the extent that those meanings are shared, constitute cultures which 
pattern and transmit those meanings. In Huntington’s terms civilizations are cultural, that 
is transnational groups that make meaning together. They make sense of the way things 
are relative to the way things ought to be in similar and shared ways. Religion, 
Huntington claims, offers the common identity that unites the signification processes. 
Religious identity is powerful enough, apparently, to unite meaning-making processes 
across geographic boundaries and to disrupt other commonalities that, say, warring 
factions might otherwise share. Differences in the way religions offer meaning to large 
groups seem significant enough to defend with life and impose with murder. 
 From Frankl to Huntington, the same process of making - apparently very 
precious - meaning obtains. The meanings made constitute cultures on large and small 
scales to the extent the meanings are shared. Religion causes those cultural meanings to 
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cohere, even across global expanses. To understand why and how that occurs, I must first 
establish a model through which to understand the link between the personal and the 
global, so I will probe in further detail how cultures are scalable and therefore how the 
synthesis of the is and the ought occurs at various levels of social complexity. Further, I 
will examine what the implications of that scalable mechanism are for the willingness of 
human beings to advance and defend with violence one version of meaningful life over 
another. 
    
 CHAPTER TWO 
MEANING, POWER, AND VIOLENCE 
 
As Frankl, Berger, and Geertz demonstrate, meaning is found in the synthesis of 
the is and the ought, i.e. the ontological and the normative.54 While Frankl offers insight 
into meaning making on a personal level, Berger’s analysis begins to show the 
implications of the search for and creation of meaning on a societal level as well. More 
complex than persons and less complex than an entire society is the organization. I turn 
now to this intermediate level and examine an organizational crisis of meaning-making 
which is analogous to, but not equal in severity to, Frankl’s crisis. Nevertheless, this 
crisis offers additional insight into meaning making on an intermediate level of social 
complexity. I look at an organizational crisis, however, not so much to ask a question 
about how organizations mean, but rather to ask a more fundamental question. Namely, 
upon what sources do organizations draw when making sense of reality? I will suggest 
that social institutions are influential on organizational meaning making. This particular 
organizational crisis offers a window into the signification processes of the more socially 
complex level of institutions as well as into the specific meaning-making processes of the 
persons and groups of persons within or related to the organization itself. As a window 
into more and less complex levels of society (institutions and persons), this example 
gives me the analytical language to elaborate Geertz’s model of meaning making or 
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culture creation on at least three levels of social complexity and to explicate how culture 
creation occurs on large and small scales. Once I establish a vocabulary for discussing 
culture-creation processes at various levels of social complexity, I will be able to examine 
the appropriation of energy at those various levels, energy that fuels the culture-creation 
process. Understanding how energy is appropriated as power for culture formation will 
provide a framework to begin discussing the connection between culture creation and 
violence in greater detail. In subsequent chapters, I will examine the role of social 
institutions in preserving and transmitting the link between violence and culture creation, 
so this present investigation into institutional meaning making is foundational. 
 
Institutional Moral Meaning 
 Can social institutions participate in the meaning-making process described by 
Frankl, Berger, and Geertz? What would it mean to say “Institutions mean?” The authors 
of The Good Society define institution as “a pattern of expected actions of individuals or 
groups enforced by social sanction, both positive and negative.”55 When activities are 
organized or patterned they can be made to work toward some purpose thereby giving 
meaning to the pattern as well as to each activity. When or if the activities are organized 
simply for their own sake or for the sake of the pattern, the activities, although 
institutionalized, are meaning-less unless of course they derive some meaning 
intrinsically or extrinsically - perhaps from some other institutions of which they may 
simultaneously be a part. So to say that one of the things that institutions do is to mean, is 
to say that institutions are capable of organizing activity for purposes greater than 
themselves. To the extent that the purposes of institutions can be characterized 
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normatively, that meaning is moral in nature. The term, moral, is not a normative 
assessment of institutions generally or an institution particularly. That is, I do not mean 
that one institution is qualitatively right and another wrong – moral or immoral. Rather 
the influence institutions have on the lives of persons is moral in nature. That is they 
convey a set of socially-constructed norms and standards that help form character and 
expectations about what is right and what is wrong. As Bellah at al. clarify, 
Institutions are patterns of social activity that give shape to collective and 
individual experience. An institution is a complex whole that guides and 
sustains individual identity, as a family gives sense and purpose to the 
lives of its members, enabling them to realize themselves as spouses, 
parents, and children. Institutions form individuals by making possible or 
impossible certain ways of behaving and relating to others. They shape 
character by assigning responsibility, demanding accountability, and 
providing the standards in terms of which each person recognizes the 
excellence of his or her achievements.56
 
 Institutions must claim or define and continually reclaim or redefine their 
purposes so as not to lose moral meaning. Institutions themselves are abstractions and 
they exist insofar as their activities are real and their patterns are perceived by and 
embodied in actors. The inter-action of actors, then, creates and re-creates the institution. 
Once actors have created an institution, the institution then can act back upon the actors 
who, in the first place, gave the institution the wherewithal to enforce sanctions. As 
Bellah et al. argue, 
In short, we are not self-created atoms manipulating or being manipulated 
by objective institutions. We form institutions and they form us every time 
we engage in a conversation that matters, and certainly every time we act 
as a parent or child, student or teacher, citizen or official, in each case 
calling on models and metaphors for the rightness or wrongness of action. 
Institutions are not only constraining but enabling. They are the substantial 
forms through which we understand our own identity and the identity of 
others as we seek cooperatively to achieve a decent society.57
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 Actors are not necessarily limited to navigating the context of only one institution. 
In fact the division of labor has created an institutionally differentiated modern society in 
which actors often navigate the contexts of more than one institution. Because actors 
navigate more than one institutional context they develop over time an understanding of 
how various institutions pattern activity, enforce sanctions, and mean. 
 While this free movement between and among various institutional contexts lines 
is inevitable and provides rich resources for making meaning, there is a risk to navigating 
multiple meaning-making contexts. Emile Durkheim described that risk when he 
observed that the increased fragmentation of society that coincides with an increased 
division of labor. Without a moral glue, he suggests, to hold the fabric of society together 
he feared it would deteriorate into a highly fragmented anomic culture. What Durkheim 
called organic solidarity, which he initially hypothesized would arise spontaneously from 
an increasingly complex economic order once the actors realized their fundamental 
interdependence with one another, would be that glue.58
 With that understanding in mind, it easy to comprehend how individuals can 
move between and among various institutions coherently. But what happens when that 
glue does not hold or does not spontaneously arise?59 What happens when understanding 
turns into con-fusion, i.e., two or more moral understandings fused with one another? 
Extrapolating Durkheim’s argument in light of Berger’s process of the social construction 
of reality leads to the conclusion that in the case of the confusion described above, actors 
are no longer able to discern one institutional context from another and thereby no longer 
know what activity to expect of themselves or others. They become alienated from 
                                                 
58 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1933, 1984), 85. 
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conscious participation in and thereby the re-creation of the institution and also from the 
understanding of the purpose of the activity patterning. That is they become alienated 
from the meaning.  
 If enough actors have fused understandings of otherwise differentiated 
institutional contexts and act therefore in a confused manner within any given institution, 
then the institution itself, which after all is a socially constructed product of the confused 
activity and disintegrating expectations, begins to lose patterning, and it dissociates from 
its original meaning or from meaning altogether.  
 In Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and his co-authors discuss the moral 
confusion that makes it difficult for individuals to relate themselves to one another and to 
institutions. Indeed the authors of Habits found not only a growing distance between 
individuals and between social classes but they also noted a tendency to overlook that 
growing disparity by using a moral language that occluded the problem of modernization 
presenting problems with which individuals, alone and collectively, had to deal, and the 
primary tool at their disposal was the understanding of the individual as the actor of 
primary concern. The individual understood himself or herself as atomized and unrelated 
in any meaningful way to the other actors around him or her.60
 Habits of the Heart diagnosed the gulf between atomized individuals and larger 
social bonds or patterns, and The Good Society attempts to offer a way forward, a 
theoretical model for understanding individuals as fundamentally connected in and 
through social institutions. The authors describe the symptoms of the gulf between 
individuals and social institutions as a “malaise [which] is palpable: a loss of meaning in 
                                                 
60 Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven M. Tipton, Habits of the 
Heart (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Publishing, 1985, 1996), 277-81. 
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the family and job, a distrust of politics, [and] a disillusion with organized religion.”61 Is 
this evidence of the disintegration that Durkheim feared? If so, the salvation from this 
disintegration is a new moral paradigm that can act as the glue which holds together this 
highly divided and diverse culture. That paradigm, claim the authors of The Good 
Society, is one of “cultivation.”62 It should replace the current moral paradigm available 
to most individuals and institutions, namely an inherited transmission of Lockean 
individualism. 
 The Good Society develops the need for a new paradigm by looking at four central 
institutions against the backdrop of this pervasive moral paradigm of individualism, the 
progress of modernity, the concomitant division of labor, and the peculiar circumstances 
of United States history. The four institutions are, in the authors’ terms, Education, the 
Political Economy, Government, Law, and Politics, and The Public Church.  
 In Habits of the Heart, the authors show the pervasiveness of individualism, both 
utilitarian and expressive in the formation of self-understanding.63 In The Good Society, 
they parlay that understanding into a diagnosis of the problem leading to a crisis in the 
relationship between individuals and institutions, stating that 
 the culture of individualism makes the very idea of institutions inaccessible to 
 many of us…Americans often think of individuals as pitted against institutions. It 
 is hard for us to think of institutions as affording us the necessary context within 
 which we become individuals; of institutions as not just restraining but enabling 
 us; of institutions not as an arena where our character is tested but an 
 indispensable source from which character is formed.64
 
 The inability to understand the role of institutions and the relationships between 
institutions and self creates a crisis of meaning or moral confusion, hampering 
                                                 
61 Bellah et al., Good Society 50 
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63 Bellah et al. Habits, 45-8. 
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individuals’ quests to make sense of their lives. When something goes wrong, it is 
interpreted as a failing of the individual or as institutional constraints on individual 
liberty. I will now turn to an example of a crisis involving two of the institutions 
described above, I will show the role that moral confusion plays in preventing actors 
from clearly being able to differentiate between two different social institutions. They 
thereby fail to understand the way others involved in the same crisis make meaning in 
this context. 
 
Organizational Crisis Raises Institutional Questions 
 In April of 1997, an employee of Oxford College of Emory University reserved 
the Day Prayer Chapel on the Oxford Campus for a wedding.65 When the dean of the 
college learned that the reservation was for a wedding of two men, he consulted the 
president and general counsel of the university. He asked whether or not the university’s 
equal opportunity policy would cover the issue at hand. He was told no.66 His 
consultations resulted in his letter to the employee, which, in part, read: 
 Your request for the use of our facilities for this ceremony has raised weighty 
 questions for this institution to consider. You must know that unions between 
 persons of the same gender are not recognized by the United Methodist Church67 
 as holy marriages, they are not given legal status as marriages in this state and are 
 uncommon in our local community and on this campus. To break with 
 convention on this sensitive matter by permitting this ceremony to occur would 
 require much conversation, engaging individuals in our community with various 
                                                 
65 Some have used the term “commitment ceremony.” I choose to use the term wedding, because it was 
described that way in the request for use of the chapel. Later stories in the media indicated that the 
employee and his partner understood their union to be a marital one and the ceremony to be a wedding. 
66 I was personally present for this telephone conversation . The conversation was also recounted on the 
world wide web page maintained by the Emory University Office of Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual 
Concerns. 
67 Emory University was founded by the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1836 and the University was 
chartered as an organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church South again in 1917. Emory claims in its 
literature to be affiliated with the United Methodist Church, but exactly what that means was part of the 
subject of the debate to follow. 
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 perspectives and ensuring that issues of justice and freedom were considered 
 alongside of theology and tradition.68
 
 Pending further discussion, the dean refunded the employee’s money and 
canceled his reservation for the chapel and the reception hall. The dean felt the need to 
act. His choice was between permitting the ceremony to go forward as planned or not. 
The dean’s letter recounts his search for a precedent which might inform his activity. He 
found none, and he listed the possibilities he had considered. His letter did not evaluate 
the employee’s request as absolutely out of order; it simply declared a lack of precedent 
thereby highlighting a moral dilemma at the level of practice or activity, i.e., what to do. 
The letter even goes further to acknowledge the significance of any activity on the dean’s 
part, “I trust that you expect us as an institution to set precedent and policy on important 
matters only after due consideration.”69 It also states what would be necessary to permit 
the wedding to occur: “I would need to undertake deliberations with others in the College 
and the University with an interest in policies governing campus facilities use.”70
 It is possible to extract from this letter some necessary ingredients to moral 
decision making on the level of practice. I will show that precedent is important to 
making decisions about new activity. Think about precedents as being organized into 
categories by the actor in question. In this case, the category of marriage between two 
men in the context of the United Methodist Church, the law, and on the campus had no 
precedent. What would the precedent search have yielded if the operative category was 
not wedding or marriage? What if the president and general counsel had indeed advised 
the dean to use the category of equal opportunity instead? In the richness of this crisis, we 
                                                 
68 William H. Murdy to Christopher Hightower, May 13, 1997: Personal correspondence in my possession 
and available upon request. 
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have the answer to that question when the president, without acknowledging his 
conversation to the contrary with the dean, reversed his private position on this point 
upon releasing this public statement. 
 Owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding of the meaning and authority of the 
 University’s Equal Opportunity Policy (formally adopted by the Board of 
 Trustees in 1993) a member of the Emory employee community and his partner 
 were recently denied, inappropriately, the use of a university facility on the 
 Oxford campus in which they had sought to solemnize their commitment which 
 they deemed a marital one, to each other.71      
 
In the public statement, the president was, after all, asserting equal opportunity as the 
operative category, and the precedents are the various previous usages of facilities by 
employees. The idea of a marital ceremony is subordinated as a facilities use within the 
category of equal opportunity. 
 Here we see the importance of category in selecting precedents to bring to bear on 
a particular situation. Different categories call upon different precedents and therefore 
lead to different outcomes. 
 Another example of the same type of precedent search is offered by the authors of 
The Good Society. They discuss the decision that school district administrators had to 
make about whether or not to allow a child with AIDS to attend school in the district. The 
question was resolved to allow the child to attend school when they found “the right 
metaphor, seeing the child primarily as a human being in need of special compassion 
[rather than] primarily as a source of dangerous contamination.”72 What the authors call 
“metaphor,” I call category. Both children in need and health threats are metaphors or 
categories available in the school district’s vocabulary, but the outcome in this case 
                                                 
71 William M. Chace, “A Statement from the President,” June 2, 1997: Correspondence between Chace and 
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depended upon the choice of one over the other. There were precedents for caring for 
children and for isolating health risks. The authors go on to quote Mary Douglas, “’the 
most profound decisions about justice are not made by individuals as such but by 
individuals thinking within and on behalf of institutions.’”73
 Category selection, then, is institutionally prescribed, but wedding is a category 
defined by Religion (or Public Church) in the Emory case. It was understood as holy 
matrimony as opposed to civil marriage. Equal opportunity is a term borrowed right out 
of civil rights legislation or Government/Law/Politics as an institution. How is it that 
these two categories were selected for a debate within an educational organization? 
 Emory was founded by the Methodist Church and is religiously affiliated. 
Likewise it exists as a publicly chartered corporation under the laws of the State of 
Georgia and thereby the United States. I will draw on organizational theorists to help 
understand the relationship between organizations and institutions. DiMaggio and Powell 
theorize three mechanisms for what they call institutional isomorphism: coercive 
isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative pressures.74 I will focus on the first as a 
potential mechanism for confusing the dialogue at Emory in this case. 
 “Coercive Isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted 
by other organizations upon which [organizations are] dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society within which organizations function.”75 In this case, the 
United Methodist Church has control over the approval of trustees and provides a 
relatively significant amount of financial support for Oxford College. Likewise, it could 
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be argued that founding an organization creates a dependency akin to that between parent 
and child. Similarly, the university operates with an extraordinary amount of government 
funding for research and must comply with restrictions such as Title IX and procedures 
for recording income and expenses. 
 So, if the university were to appropriate, or indeed incorporate, into its vocabulary 
the categories from other institutions, the theory of coercive isomorphism helps explain 
why the categories of religious and political/legal institutions might be likely candidates. 
However, remember that the individuals involved in making the decisions, the 
constituents, internal and external to the university but related to it, also navigate in other 
institutional realms as well as religious and political. The ways of operating in those 
arenas have, over time, been imported to the arena of education as embodied at Emory. 
 So, institutions select the categories which order precedents and inform decision 
making on the level of practice. Institutions also, however, reflect a worldview beyond 
the institution itself. Organizational theorists Roger Friedland and Robert Alford posit 
this as one of the principles of their New Institutionalism. “Institutions must be 
reconceptualized as simultaneously material and ideal, systems of signs and symbols, 
rational and transrational.”76 Clifford Geertz identified the ontological assumptions of a 
culture as “worldview.”77 Emory’s president articulated the category of equal opportunity 
and a corresponding worldview as mediated through the institution of education and the 
institutionalized organization of Emory:  
  
 
                                                 
76 Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, “Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional 
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we endeavor to make Emory a just and good place.  
  In so doing we recognize that a university is a place within the larger 
 society that does not seek to purge differences but seeks to live among them. For 
 that reason, adherence to our policy of equal opportunity is an obligation to be 
 met by all of us for reasons rising from the very nature of educational aspirations 
 that ultimately bind us together.78
 
 A resolution proposed by the Bishop’s cabinet of the North Georgia Conference 
of the United Methodist Church connected the religious category of wedding within the 
context of the church with the Church’s corresponding worldview. In their own terms, 
they affirmed “the sanctity of the marriage covenant that is expressed in love, mutual 
support, personal commitment, and shared fidelity between a man and a woman.”79 
While not as all-encompassing as the worldview articulated by the president, it does offer 
an ideal type for marriage and hints at the centrality of covenant in the Christian 
understanding of ultimate reality and the conception of Church. But unlike the president’s 
remarks, it forgoes linking education in this case as an institution that embodies some 
portion of what ultimately exists. 
 So, in acting, institutional actors draw upon precedents ordered by an appropriate 
category prescribed by the laws or nomos of that institution. The nomos, in turn, reflects 
a given worldview. I represent the ontological components of scalable meaning making it 
what I call the Is dimension of the signification process as the Ontological Schema in 
Figure 1. My use of the word “Is” is not meant to convey a notion of universal truth about 
reality or to suggest that such a universal truth can exist, although in a socially 
constructed reality a group of people may regard or perceive a particular understanding of 
reality (or the Is)  as universally true. This dimension, which Geertz’s analysis will cause 
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me later to put in conversation with a corresponding normative (or ought) schema, begins 
to form the building blocks of culture creation on various levels of social complexity. In 
the present form it offers insight into the Emory decision-making process. To the extent 
the decisions were made inductively, the figure shows the relationship among the 
components from right to left as Activity, Precedent, Category, Nomos, and Worldview. 
When read from left to right, the schema shows relationally how activity can be deduced 
from worldview through Nomos, Category, and Precedent. 
Figure 1: Ontological Schema 
Is Worldview Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
 
 
From Is to Ought 
 Geertz understands that “worldview,” represented in Figure 1 as a part of the 
ontological schema, complements what he calls “ethos” or the normative aspects of a 
culture. “The ethos is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way 
of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the worldview describes, and the 
worldview is made emotionally acceptable by being presented as an image of an actual 
state of affairs of which such a way of life is an authentic expression.”80 Institutions are 
normative in that they select categories that, through precedent, allow, prescribe, and 
proscribe certain activities. Since, however, activities in institutions are patterned and, if 
an institution is to have meaning, then, it must be patterning activity toward an end or a 
purpose. This meaning, in Geertz’s terms is “stored” in symbols.81 For Friedland and 
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Alford, institutions “have non-observable, transrational referents.”82 Symbols in 
“institutionalized organizations” may be as straightforward as the “formal organization” 
of a corporation or as mystical as a cross or a crescent in religious organizations.83 In a 
corporation, the “formal organization” informs how the corporation ought to act or ought 
to appear to act.84 The nature of the content of symbols, then, is normative. 
 In the Emory case, the important symbols for the position that the president 
articulated were, among others, employee - conceived as a member of the Emory 
community, and chapel - conceived as multi-purpose space. The term multi-purpose 
space is disarming in its reflection of utility. Nevertheless, it has moral content. Multi-
purpose space is the place where various kinds of activity are permitted. This concept is a 
key to the president’s position, and the meaning of the term unfolds in a document 
prepared by the Emory trustees as they began to grapple with this crisis.85
 The trustees also develop the symbol of consecrated or sacred space in an attempt 
to characterize the church’s understanding of church building and chapel. For the church, 
then, chapel as sacred space or at least worship space is a symbol as was marriage - 
conceived sacramentally. 
 As the trustees, president, and church officials talked about this crisis, they 
attempted to relate their symbols to the crisis. The parties were unable to talk with one 
another, in large part, because their relevant symbol sets were different. The president 
and trustees, for instance, began with and grounded their arguments in the university’s 
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equal opportunity policy whereas the church began with and grounded its arguments in 
the nature of marriage. So when they spoke with one another they were fundamentally 
speaking different languages. Sociologist and The Good Society co-author Steven Tipton 
discusses the two languages operative here: republicanism and biblical religion. He calls 
these languages traditions. In conversation with Jeffrey Stout and Ralph Potter, he agrees 
that there are four moral languages seeking to “interrelate self, society, the natural order 
and ultimate reality.”86
  Each moral tradition does indeed make an effort to encompass selfhood, 
 society, nature, and ultimate reality in its own terms as Potter contends. Each 
 moral tradition has a holistic, universalizing nature. 
  …Thus for example, the biblical tradition enables us to envision how to 
 love and obey God not just in worship but in business, politics, and family life. 
 So these activities, too become worship in their fundamental meaning, and the 
 church becomes the central institution in the believer’s life if not in the society’s 
 structure. The republican tradition enables us to extend principled concern for the 
 common good and reasoned dialogue regarding it to the whole of life seen as a 
 forum, not just the academy and the town hall.87
 
 Thus, equal opportunity and marriage enter this crisis as categories from different 
moral languages. Equal opportunity is a category found in the vocabulary of civic 
republicanism and marriage from that of biblical religion. The American understanding 
of equal opportunity as a category (not as policy) is as a pre-condition for freedom. Free 
markets, free inquiry, free speech, and academic freedom depend upon actors who are 
free to participate.  
 From the New Testament image of Christ being the bridegroom of the church to 
the marriage of Abraham and Sarah, Christian and Jews alike have understood marriage 
as a covenantal relationship upon which the fulfillment of God’s promises depends. The 
early church also sets aside marriage as a means by which God dispensed grace. 
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Although the strict meaning of sacrament was modified or rejected by the various 
Protestant reformations, marriage was at least understood as means by which one could 
experience or participate in the grace of God. In the biblical tradition, a wedding, if not 
marriage itself, is considered to be worship of God. 
 The category of wedding or marriage can be found in civic republicanism as a 
civil ceremony sealing the covenantal or contractual relationship of marriage. Similarly, 
categories like equal opportunity can be found in the language of biblical religion in 
theological articulations such as “the priesthood of all believers” or “God’s grace freely 
given to all.” This exemplifies the kinship of these two languages. In linguistic terms the 
similarities can be thought of as cognates, evidence that individuals may use parts or all 
of both languages and import vocabulary from one to another. But in different 
institutional contexts the cognates take on different meanings.  
Tipton’s conversation partner on the notion of moral languages, Jeffrey Stout 
points out that the multiplicity of languages and the variable meanings of seemingly 
similar categories do not disrupt cultural coherence:  
 The languages of morals in our discourse are many and they have remarkably 
 diverse historical origins, but they do not float in air and their name is not chaos. 
 They are embedded in specific social practices and institutions - religious, 
 political, artistic, athletic, economic and so on. We need many different moral 
 concepts because there are many different linguistic threads woven into any fabric 
 of practices and institutions as rich as ours.88   
 
 Languages such as biblical religion and republicanism arise out of and are 
perpetuated by shared experiences. In the stories of lives lived together, the recounting of 
named practices, people piece together narratives that contain a history. The history is 
constructed only when practices are understood in relationship to one another and 
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practices can only be understood and identified when they are named. Here the normative 
stream of our understanding meets the lived experience of the ontological stream. In 
every day life, that which ought to be is reconciled with that which is through words.  
So, in naming actions with words, actors draw upon shared stories or narratives 
which are structured and organized by a language communicated in a symbol system 
which reflects an overarching ethos. This constitutes the normative component, or Ought 
dimension of  the signification process which, in Figure 2, shows the inductive 
relationship, from right to left, of Word, Narrative, Language, Symbol, and Ethos and, 
which when read from left to right shows relationally how Word can be deduced from 
Ethos through Symbol, Language, and Narrative.  
Figure 2: Normative Schema 
Ought Ethos Symbol Language Narrative Word 
 
Juxtaposing Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Figure 3 illustrates the rudiments of the 
signification process which I now have scaled from the general, represented by ethos and 
worldview, to the particular, represented by word and activity.  
 
Figure 3: Signification Schema 
Ought Ethos Symbol Language Narrative Word 
Is Worldview Nomos Category  Precedent Activity 
 
Meaning as Synthesis 
 As discussed above, it is in the union of the Is and the Ought that creates meaning, 
generally and particularly and at every point in between. While Figure 3 separates the is 
from the ought to isolate the components, in meaningful life the two are intertwined. In 
the Emory president’s letter to the community, the normative and the ontological 
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synthesis is represented in his statement that he and his colleagues seek to “do good.” He 
did not separate the two by seeking to do something that may or may not lead to a good.89 
The is-ought combination at the level of word-activity particularity can have moral 
content. Stout calls this moral content “internal goods…that can be realized only by 
participating in the activity well, as judged by its standards of excellence….One can 
know little about internal goods without acquiring experience and linguistic competence 
in the relevant activity.”90 Here Stout underscores the role of moral language as well as 
that of experience or precedent. The ontological and the normative are intertwined in 
meaning. Figure 3 demonstrates the elements that are intertwined at various levels along 
the general to particular continuum.  
 My earlier investigation of meaning-making, however, suggests that there is more 
than a juxtaposition of the ontological and the normative along this continuum. There is, 
in fact, a synthesis of the is and the ought. In order to name the syntheses at each point 
along the continuum, I posit a new vocabulary that distinguishes the synthesis from its 
constituent elements. This new schema names the meaningful activity to which Stout 
refers above. It is neither simply reality nor simply value. It is both together. In short, this 
new schema describes what is meaningful about life on the continuum from general to 
particular and as such offers a glimpse into what conveys, expresses, and creates cultures 
at each of those levels. I turn to Geertz again to help me establish this vocabulary. I will 
begin with the often conflated terms of ritual, myth, and symbol and make distinctions 
among them because I wish to use them in slightly different ways from within the schema 
that I am developing. The distinctions, I draw however, I draw in Geertz’s own terms. 
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Meanings can be “stored” in symbols: a cross, a crescent or a feathered 
serpent. Such religious symbols, dramatized in rituals or related in myths, 
are felt somehow to sum up, for those whom they are resonant, what is 
known about the way the world is, the quality of the emotional life it 
supports, and the way one ought to behave while in it.91
 
Geertz goes on to say that symbols relate the normative and ontological to one another. 
This leads me to conclude that he understands ritual and myth as types of symbols. The 
distinction I wish to draw in his terms, however, is an understanding of myth as relating 
symbols, and rituals as dramas using the symbols. In this sense, normative symbols relate 
to the ontological and the normative when mediated through myth and ritual. 
 Again, I turn to organizational theorists. Meyer and Rowan explain how myths 
can express general notions of structure that frame organizational rituals. Myths, they 
claim, are “rationalized and impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes 
as technical ones.” They take on such importance that they are presupposed as legitimate 
and are not evaluated by their effect on work output.92 When such an organization 
experiences a conflict between the prevailing myth and production, it dissociates the two 
by “decoupling” structure from activity, by looking the other way and handling 
responsibilities informally. Attempts to reconcile production with formal structure expose 
the inefficiency.93
 Myth, then, in Myer and Rowan’s neo-institutionalist94 framework translates an 
ideal type organization as normative. Institutionalized organizations with such myths, 
then, must work to reconcile the myth with reality especially in the face of inefficiency 
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and conflict. This is accomplished through ritual, and in Meyer and Rowan’s terms, the 
“rituals of confidence and good faith.” The examples they give are “delegation, 
professionalization, goal ambiguity, elimination of output data, and maintenance of 
face.”95
 The Emory chapels dispute was a debate over category selection. This was 
symptomatic of the president and the church invoking two different moral languages in 
order to choose the appropriate category. The languages relate to different symbol 
systems, reflecting different normative convictions as illustrated in the two relevant 
myths, the story of God’s relationship with the world and the story of improvement of 
individual participation in common life. Each of these myths have corresponding rituals 
which had to be followed in this case if the outcomes were to be perceived as legitimate. 
Here I will sum up the prelude of activity that conformed to mythologically legitimated 
and institutionally necessary ritual. This prelude led up to what I think is the most 
exemplary ritual activity in this conflict - the chaplain’s process. 
 
University Ritual 
1. The Oxford dean consulted with legal counsel and the president before acting. 
2. The dean used ambiguous language in his letter reflecting the internal moral confusion 
while maintaining the legitimacy and authority of the university. 
3. The president issued a public letter articulating equal opportunity and the myth of 
higher education. Despite the reversal of an administrative decision, the letter contains 
language that attempts to make sense of the inconsistency and attempts to offer face-
saving shelter for the dean. 
 
Church Ritual 
1. The bishop drafted a resolution which was endorsed by his cabinet and submitted for 
consideration at Annual Conference. 
2. After passing through conversation, debate and limited revision in the Committee on 
Resolutions, it was sent to the conference floor.  
                                                 
95 Ibid., 58. 
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3. The conference delegation, one-half lay and one-half clergy, debated the issue 
according to parliamentary procedures and passed the resolution calling on the trustees to 
reverse the president’s decision.96
 
Shared Ritual 
1. The president’s letter refers to the connection with the United Methodist Church but 
subordinates its importance in determining university policy to that of the president and 
trustees. It also makes a point to expose the church’s own division on issues related to 
homosexuality. 
2. The UMC resolution used language from the university’s charter and leveraged the 
bishop’s position as trustee in an attempt to redefine the university in terms of the 
language of the church. 
 
University Ritual Response 
1. The trustees’ statement of June 19, 1997 asserted the final authority of the trustees in 
making decisions regarding university policy. 
2. Before distinguishing between the two United Methodist Churches owned by Emory 
and the campus chapels, the trustees affirmed anew their commitment to both the Equal 
Opportunity policy and the relationship with the United Methodist Church. They used 
conciliatory language and legal references to make their points. They sought to legitimate 
their argument within the context of the church, the university, and the law.  
 
 The trustees’ first statement laid out an agenda for work. The chairman of the 
Board appointed the university chaplain and the Oxford College chaplain to work out a 
policy governing use of the chapels. What they came up with was different from what the 
church, president, and trustees each had called for. So how was it unanimously accepted 
by the Board? 
 The answer was in the legitimating power of ritual, germane to the university’s 
governing myths as well as those of the church. The operative processes were input and, 
to a lesser extent, research. Never did the chaplains evaluate the policy with regard to 
technical efficiency or production. Those measures were apparently irrelevant. In 
recounting the process, the chaplains describe the hundreds of conversations they had 
with various groups including the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church, 
                                                 
96 The fact that the church uses such democratic procedures and town hall like debate is in itself an 
interesting study in institutional isomorphism. Methodism essentially grew up with American polity. That 
is reflected by trans-institutional influences and affinities in both political and church life. 
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the research they did into the history of the relationship of the two institutions, and the 
letters and petitions they received. Finally they summed up the all-important qualitative 
aspects of the process with these words: 
This process has been comprehensive and open. Integrity and honesty 
have undergirded this process because of the character of those involved. 
We have appreciated coming to know the community in a deeper way. 
The covenantal relationship between the University and the Church has 
been more deeply understood and respected. We are grateful for having 
been given this task, which has enhanced campus wide respect and 
understanding.97
 
Who could argue with integrity, honesty, respect, understanding, and covenant using 
republican or biblical language? No one. The process was legitimate in both worlds. That 
legitimacy would inhere, then, in their proposal. Even if they had come up with an 
objectionable proposal, at this point, critics would have to indict the process and maybe 
even the judgment or integrity of the chaplains in order to challenge the product. 
 Organizations engage the meaning stored in symbol sets by enacting ritual 
legitimated by the institutional myth. In order to be cogent, however, the ritual must 
engage the particular realities of the actors, participants, and organization members. 
These realties are described and characterized in a particular moral language. The 
chaplains skillfully used vocabulary from each operative moral language. Consider the 
use of the word covenant. This choice of words deploys the power, rather than trips over 
the inadequacy, of cognates. Biblical language tells the story of covenant. The story is 
recorded in the Bible but also in the codes of the church. Likewise, republicanism records 
its covenantal story in United States history, the constitution, philosophy, and law, 
forming a grand narrative tradition. Tradition of this sort unites language and category. It 
                                                 
97 “Report of the Process,” no author indicated and undated: Report distributed to members of the Emory 
community in my possession and available upon request. 
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is in the transmission and recording of stories, codified and informal, that the moral 
language links available categories into coherent meaningful units. The way the tradition 
is understood and deployed, how it orders and values the categories, influences category 
choice and subsequently precedent selection. 
 Tradition emerges straight from the collective memory of individuals and, 
collectively from community customs. In communities where minority opinion is valued 
and preserved, categories can recall precedents even if they have been rarely used. Even 
rare precedents can be given legitimacy in the memory of the community. Custom, as 
collective memory, then, holds together personal and communal narrative and precedent. 
The act of remembering stores precedent in narrative.  
 The narrative itself, of course, is made up of words which name activity. 
Unreflective activity can go unnamed and un-enacted words never materialize. This 
reflective activity I, and others, call praxis. Friedland and Alford show how Mary 
Douglas uses this term to describe the whole set of relationships I have been describing, 
even though I will locate it in the emerging schema on the level of activity and word.  
 Douglas argues that both rational and irrational decisions are influenced by the 
 “hold that institutions have on our processes of classifying and recognizing” 
 (1986:3). Society is thought as it is enacted, and social solidarity depends upon 
 the extent to which “classifications, logical operation and guiding metaphors” are 
 held in common. Douglas argues that institutions require a cognitive base that 
 naturalizes and rationalizes the conventions which constitute the institution. Thus 
 systems of classification are forms of social praxis.98
 
At all levels, the Is and the Ought are synthesized as Geertz said was necessary for 
meaning making. When the ontological is compatible with the normative, actions are 
meaningful. 
                                                 
98 Friedland and Alford, 251-2. 
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So, in named action or praxis, actors draw upon storied precedents or custom 
which are structured and organized by a lexicon of tradition, enacted by the ritual drama 
between the nomos and symbol, which enlivens an all-encompassing myth. This 
constitutes the meaning component, or Synopsis dimension, that is the is and the ought 
are seen together, of the signification process which in Figure 4 shows the inductive 
relationship, from right to left, of Praxis, Custom, Tradition, Ritual, and Myth and, which 
when read from left to right shows relationally how Praxis can be deduced from Myth 
through Ritual, Tradition, and Custom. 
 
Figure 4: Meaning Schema 
Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
 
In order to demonstrate the synthetic nature of culture, I place the schema represented in 
Figure 4 between the Normative and Ontological schema in Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Synthetic Schema 
Ought Ethos Symbol Language Narrative Word 
Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
Is Worldview Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
 
Society Building and Culture Formation 
The horizontal continuum represented in the Synthetic Schema, Figure 5, is more 
than the span from general (left) to particular (right). It can also represent the levels of 
social complexity along which cultures are able to scale. The synthesis of ethos and 
worldview to create myth is not only a way to generalize about what happens with 
multiple rituals (or symbol-nomos syntheses) and on down the line, it also represents the 
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degree to which meaning-making is shared among a broad grouping of social actors. The 
group that shares myth is broader than the group that shares ritual and that group broader 
than the one that shares tradition, custom, and praxis respectively.  
 Reading the schema from right to left corresponds more closely to the process of 
world-construction in which humans are engaged. Persons interact on a daily basis. To 
the extent that interaction is named and made meaningful, the interaction is praxis. As 
multiple people begin to interact and engage in multiple, sometimes conflicting praxes, 
customs develop to record the praxes. These customs are a shared store of precedents 
which the group makes sense of using common stories or an overarching narrative. As 
customs develop among even broader groups, the multiple customs form traditions as 
relations become more organized; precedents are categorized and made intelligible in a 
shared language. Multiple traditions created in and through multiple organizational 
contexts give life to ritual patterns which interpret the grounded traditions in light of 
universalized truths by relating the ordered categories to shared symbol. The ritual 
patterns create myth that offers a coherent sense of meaning for societies which share the 
same worldview and ethos together.  
 Praxis, then, constitutes culture on an interpersonal level; custom, group level; 
tradition, organization level; ritual, institution level, and myth on the level of society. 
Societies use their myth to project an understanding of universal meaning by exhibiting 
synoptic reconciliation of the is and the ought. This is the role of religion, according to 
Berger in The Sacred Canopy:  
Religion is the enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is 
established….Religion implies the farthest reach of man’s self-
externalization, of his infusion of reality with his own meanings. Religion 
implies that human order is projected into the totality of being. Put 
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differently, religion is the audacious attempt to conceive of the entire 
universe as being humanly relevant.99
 
Cultures form at each of these levels of social complexity. As Berger points out, both 
society and culture are products of human (or social) construction of what we perceive as 
real. Society is an artifact of culture, but society is also the necessary condition for 
structuring and maintaining culture.100  
 This articulation identifies the columns across the schema as levels of social 
complexity and the rows as dimensions of reality. This additional level of organization is 
demonstrated in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified 
Universe Society Institution Organization Group Interpersonal 
Ought  Ethos Symbol Language  Narrative Word 
Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
Is Worldview  Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
 
The Multiplicity of Cultural Life 
 Figure 6 shows our moral meaning framework, as persons and as institutions. This 
schema can be read from left to right or right to left. An example of the former in 
religious terms would be to understand that God created and then humans acted. An 
example of the latter would be to understand that humans acted and created a projection 
of God. What matters, in this example from religion, is God’s relatedness to human 
activity and human activity’s relatedness to God. The two are in a dialectical relationship 
of mutual formation according to Figure 6. Of course, we are not simply religious persons 
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in the modern world. We are political, social, working, consuming, and educated persons 
as well. We live in multiple institutional environments. Navigating the various 
institutional contexts gives us a repertoire of understandings and tools to approach new 
and challenging situations. We can import and export symbols, categories, or languages 
across institutional lines and can do so in a way that actively and consciously construct 
new social realities without devolving into anomic alienation as long as we are able to 
distinguish among the various institutions influencing us and avoid the moral confusion 
described above by Durkheim and Habits of the Heart. In fact, Friedland and Alford 
attribute a good degree of institutional change to this ability to act as subjects in multiple 
institutional contexts, carrying along with us the cultural tools of other institutional 
contexts. In conflict, people reinforce and defend symbols as well as use symbols from 
other contexts to transform institutions.101  
 The framework described in Figure 6 is a web. The content of one cell cannot 
change without affecting other cells. This interconnectedness and the lack of awareness 
of the significance of that interconnectedness is the fundamental problem outlined in The 
Good Society. The most pervasive and destructive example the authors of The Good 
Society offer of this problem is the aforementioned affinity for the moral language of 
Lockean individualism. Like all moral languages, this one had an institutional context. It 
became separated from that context - namely its theological framework and its 
institutional supports such as education, local participation in politics, and an agrarian 
economy. The language survived, however, and began to take on life within institutions 
which history had transformed. The result was a massive bureaucratic state infused with a 
political ethic of utilitarian individualism. Our moral discourse about political as well as 
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economic institutions revolves around Lockean understandings of the individual, yet the 
Economy and the Government have grown so far away from direct democratic control 
that they are indeed most un-Lockean.102
We have the illusion that we can control our fate because individual 
economic opportunity is indeed considerable, especially if one starts with 
middle-class advantages; and our political life is formally free. Yet 
powerful forces affecting the lives of all of us are not operating under the 
norm of democratic consent. In particular, the private governments of the 
great corporations make decisions on the basis of their own advantage, not 
of the public good; and even the government agencies that are supposed to 
regulate them are usually ineffective or in collusion with those they are 
supposed to regulate. The federal government has enormously increased in 
power, especially in the form of the military-industrial complex, in ways 
that are almost invulnerable to citizen knowledge, much less control, on 
the grounds of national defense. We have gotten the strong state that the 
Jeffersonians opposed on the basis not of Hamiltonian design but of 
national security. The private rewards and the formal freedoms have 
obscured from us how much we have lost in genuine democratic control of 
the society we live in.103
 
 When languages, such as the dislodged Lockeanism described above, live long 
enough in an organization, they become symbolic and take on formal normative 
characteristics in our institutions. The ethos of the society begins to change and the 
mythology which holds the ethos and worldview together may require re-engineering. 
 Normative persistence such as this, however, is no more influential than 
ontological persistence. The ontological circumstance of slavery, for instance, was a fact 
with which slaves had to live. Over time, we see the development of normative theologies 
of freedom, spiritual and physical. This translates today into liberation theologies of all 
sorts which have affinities with individualism to be sure, but which are at least as much 
attributable to ontological circumstance as normative language. Over time norms can be 
dislodged from reality only to influence or make sense of other unrelated realities as 
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symbols. Likewise, realities can become dislodged from their normative framework and 
give life to nomoi or understandings of the way reality is ordered. These nomoi, in turn, 
give life to new symbol systems and make sense of other unrelated realities. These nomoi 
and symbols are embodied in social institutions. 
 While Stout and Tipton as well as Tipton and his co-authors of Habits of the 
Heart and The Good Society focus on the influential effects of language and tradition, 
The Good Society, neo-institutionalists, and Stout discuss the influences that institutions 
have on one another. They think about one another and with one another because they 
share constituents who move among institutions and who must maintain moral coherence 
themselves. All underscore the role persons play as participants in institutions and 
thereby in the construction of culture. Likewise, they all call for conscious engagement in 
that co-creation.  
 Because institutions think about one another, the symbol systems, nomoi and 
rituals they embody are contingent in some manner on a larger social ordering which 
permits multiple institutions to make sense of life in myriad ways without disrupting the 
coherence of a society. For instance, United States society, Stout claims, requires a 
provisional telos which subordinates any concepts of the good that would dominate any 
other concept of the good. This provisional telos moves us to reach for the “highest good 
achievable under the circumstances.”104 In terms of my framework, he is talking about 
the myth or myths that make symbol systems and thereby multiple co-existing institutions 
possible. Myths about teloi that claim singular dominance threaten social cohesion. The 
content of the provisional telos myth amounts to what many term civil religion which 
calls for religious civility or tolerance of many faiths. It is both civil and religious but it 
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allows, ultimately, for the dominance of no one religion any more than any one civil 
authority. It formally builds into the US Constitution disestablishment and free exercise 
of religion alongside checks and balances among the three branches of government.  
 Projects to shore up, save, create, or strengthen social cohesion depend upon a 
myth that allows for various institutions, but the institutional languages have to be similar 
enough to allow for inter-institutional communication. Moral languages inform activity. 
Conversely, shared activity is equally formative of shared customs, traditions, and, 
ultimately, languages. 
 It is in part a consequence of the division of labor that Emory and the United 
Methodist Church had to struggle to find a common category in the crisis under scrutiny 
here. The rift is symptomatic of a lack of discourse and a lack of shared activity between 
the two. The policy proposed by the chaplains and adopted unanimously by the Board of 
Trustees takes a step in the direction of creating a shared language as well as providing 
for shared activity in the future. The solution uses religious language but in an 
educational context. It leaves intact the competing institutional identities and their related 
symbol systems. It focuses on practice. 
 Drawing on United Methodism’s own tradition, it finds categories of ecumenism 
and campus ministry. Drawing from Emory’s parlance, it asserts the category of religious 
group. The chaplains fuse the categories of worship and activity into “religious activity.” 
They give authority to campus ministers and chaplains which is legitimate in both 
traditions and give jurisdiction over their activities to the respective ordaining church 
judicatories. However, the university, in the end, has jurisdiction over the approval of 
religious groups. 
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 Under these circumstances, the categories mentioned above engage a number of 
precedents of religious practices that violate Methodist polity. Roman Catholics celebrate 
Mass in campus chapels without communing Methodists. Jewish worshipers have prayed 
for the first coming of the Messiah in these places of worship. These precedents can be 
characterized as activities approved by the religious institutions who have extension 
organizations with credentialed clergy on campus. It follows, then, that if an approved 
organization’s related church allows same sex marriages - just as it might allow closed 
communion - then a same-sex marriage would be permitted.105  
 Those, including, perhaps, the president, who had argued for “equal opportunity” 
as a category, have found disappointment in the fact that this category was not engaged 
here although same-sex ceremonies are not prohibited per se under this policy. Church-
related opponents to same-sex marriages are disappointed in the possibility that a same-
sex ceremony might occur.106 To object to the outcome, however, would require ignoring 
or arguing against parts of one’s own moral language(s). Neither Methodists nor 
members of the Emory community have to agree with the chaplains. That is not what I 
am arguing. Nevertheless, the chaplains did skillfully constructed a way forward that 
prescribed activity that would be legitimate in the language of an educational 
organization and a religious organization. To take issue with the decision would require 
more than asserting the outcome was illegitimate; it would take equally skilful 
deployment of the respective moral languages in order to attempt to socially delegitimize 
the conclusions the chaplains drew. 
                                                 
105 “Procedures for Use of the University Chapels,” no author indicated and undated: Report distributed to 
members of the Emory community in my possession and available upon request. 
106 Interestingly enough, the couple whose requested use of the chapel precipitated this debate would not be 
permitted to marry on campus under this policy. Their denomination is not recognized on campus, nor is 
their minister related to Emory in an official capacity as required by the policy.  
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 Subsequent to the crisis, the representatives of the two institutions engaged in 
mending the torn fabric. They are joining again in the enterprise of culture building 
through their own institutions, by interpreting the other institution relative to their own. 
They import each other’s language. In their words: 
 Emory University is a highly complex, multicultural institution of higher learning. 
 The faculty and students represent values and traditions from the global 
 community. Emory University is not the church and is more diverse than most of 
 our congregations. Many in the university community have significant 
 disagreement with our United Methodist position on homosexuality. 
 
 -Bishop G. Lindsey Davis107
 
 Emory is related to the United Methodist Church through the Southeastern 
 Jurisdictional Conference. The church through the conference has a legitimate 
 and appropriate interest in the character of Emory as an institution expressing the 
 values and principles of the church. 
 
 -Emory Board of Trustees Chairman Bradley Currey, Jr.108
  
A deeper crisis would have been if these two institutions did not care enough about their 
purposes or each other’s purposes and meanings to debate this issue, or if the hegemony 
of one institution disallowed debate and discourse altogether. This particular moral 
dilemma was one of differing languages and traditions. The organizations had to re-visit 
their respective institutional self-understandings and their understandings of the other to 
make sense of it and in order to know how to act. Institutions can mean; they mean 
differently, yet they mean together and that meaning is tied intimately to what 
organizations do and how they do it. 
 
                                                 
107 G. Lindsey  Davis, “An Open Letter to United Methodists,” Wesleyan Christian Advocate 162, 17 
(November 21, 1997), 2. 
108 Bradley Currey, “Emory Board of Trustees Issue Paper on School’s Relationship with Methodist 
Church,” Wesleyan Christian Advocate 162, 17 (November 21, 1997), 9. 
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Moral Meaning Matrix 
Institutional meaning making holds a central place in the synthetic schema I have 
been discussing. The Emory example demonstrates the way a single organization can 
draw on multiple institutional referents to make meaning. Further, it demonstrates the 
scalability of the processes Frankl and Berger outlined. I attempt to represent that 
scalability along the horizontal axis of the schema. Interpersonal and shared meaning 
making is represented in its various dimensions of reality and levels of social complexity 
by Figure 7 below (a reproduction of figure 6 above) which is an artificial construct 
intended to aid understanding and social analysis. The first row is made up of column 
headings which become increasingly complex from right to left. These headings represent 
levels of social complexity. The first column represents the dimensions of reality which 
weave together to form culture at each level of social complexity. 
Figure 7: Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified 
Universe Society Institution Organization Group Interpersonal 
Ought  Ethos Symbol Language  Narrative Word 
Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
Is Worldview  Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
 
 The normative dimension (Ought in Figure 7) describes human and cultural 
values. Generally this refers to what we think, know, or feel we ought to do or ought to 
be at the interpersonal, group, organizational, institutional, and societal levels. The 
ontological dimension (Is in Figure 7) refers to the way things are from what we 
experience in daily life to what we project to be true about the way the universe works. 
The latter exposes our worldview. The meaning dimension (Synopsis in Figure 7) 
represents the ways we synthesize meaning in the world and make meaning in our lives. 
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This is an extrapolation of Geertz’s proposition that meaning-making is the result of such 
a synthesis.109 It is also an extrapolation of educator Paolo Freire’s model of praxis, 
discussed below. While Geertz speaks of the ontological and normative in general terms, 
on the levels I call Universe and Society, Freire’s model focuses more on the primacy and 
particularity of context and interpersonal relationships. The figure attempts to fill in the 
gaps between the levels described as Universe and Interpersonal. This span also 
demonstrates the mutually informative and constitutive relationship between private and 
shared meaning as discussed above.  
 Leaving the horizontal axis for a moment, I will now discuss the vertical 
relationships in the schema. Geertz explains the relationship between the ontological and 
the normative in his discussion of the double sense of the word model. A model can be a 
model “of ‘reality’” or a model “for ‘reality.’”110 He explores symbols and theories as 
models in the example of how a theory of hydraulics can describe how a dam works. The 
theory is the symbolic system which describes the non-symbolic reality of water flow 
(model of). Yet the symbolic or theoretical can be deployed to construct a new dam in a 
new context. The symbolic can be used to manipulate another non-symbolic reality 
(model for). He translates the phenomenon into social terms: 
For psychological and social systems, and for cultural models that we 
would not ordinarily refer to as “theories,” but rather as “doctrines,” 
“melodies,” or “rites,” the case is in no way different. Unlike genes, and 
other non-symbolic information sources, which are only models for and 
not models of, culture patterns have an intrinsic double aspect: they give 
meaning, that is, objective conceptual form to social and psychological 
reality both by shaping to it and by shaping it to themselves.111  
 
                                                 
109 Geertz, 126-7. 
110 Ibid., 93. 
111 Ibid. 
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While Geertz understands symbols as storing meaning and as relating an 
“ontology or cosmology to an aesthetics and a morality,” I locate symbol in the 
normative rather than the meaning dimension of my matrix because the meaning can only 
be expressed or realized when mediated, when “dramatized in rituals or related in 
myths.”112 In the same way that words describe actions, symbols describe a fundamental 
order of reality. Geertz describes the relationship between symbol and order in Paul 
Radin’s case study of how the Oglala regard the circle. Everything “good” in nature, the 
sun, the moon, and the earth are circles.113 The observable world is “named” in a sense by 
the circle. Because of its association with good phenomena in the observable world, it 
takes on a moral dimension. The circular form, then, becomes the basis of ritual, 
celebrating the relationship between the observable and the moral. The world is given 
moral meaning in such rituals, and moral meaning is connected with an empirically 
verifiable reality in the same rituals. This normative-ontological connection and 
expression is powerful. The model of becomes the model for. Tipis and other structures 
are built as circles, not for practical reasons, but for meaningful ones. The ordinary 
participates in the synthesis or synopsis (i.e. they are seen together) of the normative and 
ontological.114 For Geertz, 
ethos [the normative] is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to 
represent a way of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the 
world view [ontological] describes, and the world view is made 
emotionally acceptable by being presented as an actual state of affairs of 
which such a way of life is an authentic expression.115
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 This vertical relationship among the components of the schema operates at all 
levels of social complexity represented by the horizontal axis of the schema. While 
Geertz discusses the way particular circumstances are given universal significance, 
represented on the left side of the schema, Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
concentrates on efforts described by the right side of the schema demonstrating how 
universal conceptions can be imposed on particular realities. It is important to keep 
separate the operation of the two axes of the matrix, one distinguishing the universal from 
the contextual or particular (left to right) and the other distinguishing between the 
normative and the ontological (top to bottom). The struggle for liberation, in Freire's 
analysis, is contextual and involves action and reflection. The oppressed’s “discovery [of 
oppression] cannot be purely intellectual but must involve action; nor can it be limited to 
mere activism, but must include serious reflection: only then will it be a praxis.”116 Freire 
underscores the necessity of praxis in emancipatory education. 
The insistence that the oppressed engage in reflection on their concrete 
situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflection-
true reflection-leads to action. On the other hand, when the situation calls 
for action, that action will constitute an authentic praxis only if its 
consequences become the object of critical reflection.117
 
As noted above, action without reflection for Freire is pure “activism.” Similarly, words 
without action is pure “verbalism.”118 Rather than making the sharp distinctions between 
ontological and normative as I attempt to do in my schema, Freire coins the term “true 
word” which is work and reflection at the same time and which when spoken is 
tantamount to transforming the world.119 In the Synthetic Schema, I isolate the reflective 
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element in a term I call “word” and the work in my term, “activity.” Conceptually, words 
can exist for Freire without action, thus verbalism, so the synonym for Freire’s “true 
word” is praxis both in Freire’s work and in my Synthetic Schema.120  
 Freire holds praxis out not simply as a theoretical construct to be considered but 
as a pedagogical method to be employed in order to begin seeing that reality is 
constructed by humans and that all people, even – and especially for Freire – the 
oppressed have a role in constructing that reality. This critical consideration of reality is 
one way of understanding Freire’s concept of “critical consciousness.”121
 Freire describes what he calls the “banking model of education” as a contrast to 
praxis. The banking model regards reality as a static objective reality which must be 
transmitted from teacher to student and which perpetuates a single notion of what reality 
is. This, ultimately, is dehumanizing, according to Freire.122 This process moves against 
people’s “ontological vocation to be more fully human.”123 Praxis, then, illuminates 
“reality as a process” and is thereby humanizing and liberating.124 Practically, praxis 
requires teachers and students to inquire together rather than participate in the falsely 
conceived relationship of a knowledgeable teacher transferring knowledge to the empty-
vessel student.125 The role of the teacher is not dispensable, however. Freire is not 
arguing for independent learning, but for mutuality between the student and the teacher. 
Freire insists that students cannot be self-taught, but that praxis, and therefore learning, 
occurs in relationships.126
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 This reveals the need for a new dimension to the schema – a dimension of reality I 
refer to as the dynamic. The normative-ontological synthesis necessary for meaning-
making and culture construction at every level of complexity is a dialectical relationship. 
The two poles held in tension with one another require a source of energy. Relationships 
provide the energy that holds together word and action to give life to praxis. When 
energy is balanced between the two poles, then the energy exchange is in a state of 
equilibrium. If, however, the normative is imposed upon the ontological, then the 
equilibrium of the dialectic is disrupted. In contrast to the balanced dialectic, the 
imposition of the normative on the ontological is endothermic. The process requires 
energy to be put into the system. In other words it takes work to shape the “what is” into 
the “what ought to be.” On the interpersonal level, the energy required is an unbalanced 
relationship. One person has the power and is able to conflate one description of reality 
with reality itself.  
 This is the problem with the banking model of education, as described by Freire. 
He elucidates the power cooption that must go on for a teacher’s words to be allowed to 
be the only understanding of what reality is. Freire advocates, therefore, an equal 
relationship between teacher and student, terming it: “teacher-student with students-
teachers.”127 Learning, or meaning-making, takes place as a “co-intentional” 
enterprise.128
 Understanding the power dynamics in pedagogical and social relationships is at 
the heart of Freire’s work. Undoing the power structure which maintains an oppressive 
order is the goal of emancipatory education. Those who hold and wield the power to 
                                                 
127 Ibid. 
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oppress may understand emancipation and liberation as an upsetting of equilibrium, but 
Freire reproves those who would confuse status quo with equilibrium. Liberation and 
emancipation are often associated with violent revolution, for instance. Freire points out 
that a revolution of freedom is not the initiation of violence; it is the response to it. “Any 
situation in which some individuals prevent others from engaging in the process of 
inquiry is violence.”129 This is a tough charge to levy on traditional notions of pedagogy 
and on social power relationships on a grander scale. Exhibiting the principles of the 
conservation of energy discussed above, Freire posits that “consciously or unconsciously, 
the act of rebellion by the oppressed [is] (an act which is always, or nearly always, as 
violent as the initial violence of the oppressors).”130 Rebellion, emancipation, and 
liberation are exothermic processes. Energy is released. Furthermore, the more energy 
pumped into the unequal relationship to shape reality in terms of one normative 
viewpoint - namely that of the dominant class - the more energy that will be released 
when emancipation occurs. But Freire’s goal is not a re-imposition of a new power 
structure but the establishment of equality or equilibrium. Revolution for the sake of 
seizing power over the original oppressors is simply activism which may release energy 
that will eventually have to be returned to the system when the oppressed and oppressors 
change roles and a new static notion of single-normed reality is forced into place.131 This 
can happen at any level of social complexity. Myths, for instance, identify power sources 
for entire societies. 
Such a monopoly [over all ultimate definitions of reality] means that a 
single symbolic tradition maintains the universe in question. To be in the 
society then implies acceptance of this tradition....In such a situation the 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 85. 
130 Ibid., 56. 
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monopolistic tradition and its expert administrators are sustained by a 
unified power structure. Those who occupy the decisive power positions 
are ready to use their power to impose traditional definitions of reality on 
the population under their authority. Potentially competitive 
conceptualizations of the universe are liquidated as soon as they appear-
either physically destroyed…or integrated within the tradition itself.132
 
Within societies, institutions define and appropriate jurisdiction as described in the 
Emory disagreement; tradition builds up and legitimates authority as the chaplain’s 
decision demonstrated; custom accounts for an accumulation of cultural and other 
resources in the way that it stores precedents in narrative, and, as Freire demonstrates, 
reality is lived in and through relationships. Taking into account the role this energy plays 
in synthesizing the normative and the ontological leads me to add one more dimension to 
the Synthetic Schema. I call this new dimension the dynamic dimension. Note the 
relationship between the dynamic and meaning dimensions of reality. They are mutually 
constitutive. Meaning defines what is and is not powerful in a society’s culture and power 
preserves and protects a particular set of meanings made.  
The ways energy is manifested in the dynamic dimension of reality at the various 
levels of social complexity, when integrated into the synthetic schema, completes the 
model for society building and culture formation in a figure that details signification at 
various levels of complexity. I call this figure the Moral Meaning Matrix. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
132 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966, 1967, 1990), 121. 
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Figure 8: Moral Meaning Matrix133
Dimension Universe Society Institution Organization Group Interpersonal
Normative Ought Ethos Symbol Language Narrative Word 
Meaning Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
Ontological Is Worldview Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
Dynamic Energy Power Jurisdiction Authority Resource Relationship 
 
My analysis suggests, especially after the introduction of the dynamic dimension, 
that the very process of meaning-making at any level of social complexity, from Universe 
to the Interpersonal, has the capacity to be oppressive or emancipatory but in each case 
violent. Paying attention to the role of power in signification or culture-building 
processes reveals that the process of synthesizing the normative and the ontological in 
and of itself can make meaning at the expense of peace, justice, and life.
                                                 
133 I published an earlier version of The Moral Meaning Matrix in a slightly different form in David Rowe, 
“Does Allah Matter at Your Alma Mater? Religiously-affiliated Colleges, Social Transformation and 
Violent Inter-cultural Conflict,” Journal of College and Character, December, 2001 [journal on-line]; 
available from http://www.collegevalues.org/articles.cfm?a=1&id=618; Internet; accessed October 1, 2004. 
   
 CHAPTER THREE 
RELIGION AND VIOLENCE 
 
The Moral Meaning Matrix makes possible an analysis of meaning making at 
various levels. Further, it draws into focus the relationship between meaning making and 
the use of energy to make that meaning. So the Moral Meaning Matrix becomes a tool for 
analyzing the violent use of energy to make meaning at the various levels of social 
complexity. Societies and interpersonal relationships have a common mechanism for 
meaning-making, the synthesis of the ontological with the normative. That meaning-
making process can be, by the mechanism demonstrated in chapter two, inherently 
violent. Societies and interpersonal relationships also share in the influence of a particular 
level of social complexity that mediates the relationship between the general and the 
particular. This level of social complexity is the level described in the Moral Meaning 
matrix (Figure 8) as institution.  
 I have already discussed the significant influence of institutions on organizations 
in the Emory example, now I will deepen and broaden the analysis of the nature of that 
influence. Institutions play a significant role along each axis of the Moral Meaning 
Matrix. They are represented in one level of social complexity, like any other, seeking 
vertical integration of the dimensions of reality in the matrix, but it is also a level which 
can offer horizontal integration of the matrix as well, connecting the universe with the 
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interpersonal. This integrative function demands a more thorough examination of the way 
in which I am using the term institution. 
Social institutions, which the authors of The Good Society define as “normative 
patterns embedded in and enforced by laws and mores (informal customs and 
practices),”134 mediate the connections between interpersonal relationships and global 
social arrangements. With this understanding of institutions they examine the impact of 
modernity and increasing individualism on four institutions in the United States: The 
Political Economy; Government, Law, and Politics; Education, and the Public Church.135
Noting that the social sciences have methods for studying individuals and 
organizations, The Good Society authors ask,  
But how does one study institutions? Simply studying organizations is not 
enough. It runs the risk of confusing the organizations with institutional 
patterns that define their purpose and meaning….A social science with a 
commitment to address institutions would be a substantial contribution to 
a renewed public philosophy.136
 
 Bellah et al.’s understanding of institutions as patterns thereby distinguishes them 
from organizations which are discrete manifestations of those more pervasive and 
enduring patterned expectations. Institutions, in other words, define what organizations 
are, or what they can be in the first place.137 Common understandings of the term 
institution often overplay the role of small and large organizations which operate in 
broader institutional contexts as described by Bellah et al. Conversely, common 
references to expected patterns of behavior often downplay their significance by referring 
to them as custom or tradition without acknowledging the pervasive influence of the 
                                                 
134 Bellah et al., Good Society, 11. 
135 Ibid., 82, 111,145, 179. 
136 Ibid., 302. 
137 Ibid., 10. 
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myriad tacit rules which govern behavior within any given society. Lack of clarity about 
the influence of institutions, particularly in the United States, leads to a lack of 
appreciation of their role and to inattention to the relationship between the health of 
institutions and the health of interpersonal (and inter-civilizational) relationships.  
 Given the increasingly dominant role of the United States in the world, our 
society and the health of United States social institutions will inevitably influence not 
only Western societies or “civilization,” in Huntington’s terms, but also the other patterns 
of expected behavior in other societies throughout the world.138 As the United States has 
grown, some of its social institutions have grown with it, but growth is not always 
healthy and positive. In fact Bellah et al. attribute a good deal of our confusion about the 
role of social institutions in our lives to the fact that “some of our institutions have indeed 
grown out of control and beyond our comprehension. But the answer is to change them, 
for it is illusory to imagine that we can escape them.”139
 So horizontally on the matrix, institutions connect the personal with the global as 
“patterns of social activity which give shape to collective and individual experience.”140 
Vertically in the matrix, particular institutions such as the ones described and discussed 
by Bellah et al. each convey meaning. As patterns, it is possible to understand institutions 
as influencing the shape of the societies we construct because they define how the 
particular is connected to the general. They also are patterns which are meaningful in 
their own right too. They influence the shape of cultures by conveying patterns for the 
meaning-making activity itself to constituent organizations and beyond just as education, 
religion and government/law/politics all influenced Emory as an organization. In this 
                                                 
138 Huntington, Clash, 40-8. 
139 Bellah et al., Good Society, 6. 
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double role, institutions both define societies and participate in the project of culture 
creation. 
 
Religion 
 With an understanding of institutions as meaning makers which influence 
meaning making on large and small scales, it is now possible to take a closer look at the 
role and function of the social institution with which I initially associated the problems of 
conflict and global violence. In order to investigate this institution in greater detail, I will 
look at its function in the United States. Beyond the functional analysis, though I will 
also examine Christian theology in particular because of its pervasiveness in the United 
States. Limiting my investigation in this way still offers the opportunity to look at the 
issue of religious violence on a global scale because of the influence of Christianity in the 
United States and the influence and, transitively, because of the United States in the 
world. I will examine later the mechanism by which that influence is translated into 
larger and smaller contexts.  
 Bellah et al. identify Public Church as a US social institution, and Huntington 
observes that religion is the one of the most tenacious of cultural identities relative to 
war. So when it comes to the phenomenon of global violence, the conversation that I 
have constructed among Geertz, Bellah et al., and Huntington gives religion the 
distinction of being the most meaningful meaning-making institution, pervasively 
influencing the ways people and groups make meaning on large and small scales.  
What is it about religion that distinguishes it from other institutions? Like other 
social institutions, it has the double role of making meaning and influencing broader 
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patterns of meaning making, yet I want to suggest a third role for religion which 
differentiates it from other social institutions. In terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix, it is 
the meaning dimension. Praxis, Custom, Tradition, Ritual, Myth, and Synopsis describe 
the activity of religion at various levels of social complexity. This is not to suggest that a 
particular religion or religious denomination or its theological content suffices to describe 
what occurs in this dimension of reality, nor is it to suggest – and I shall show later that 
such is not the case in the United States at least – that religion always (if ever) succeeds 
in balancing syntheses of the normative and ontological, but this is to suggest that in 
societies meaning is made by seeing the is and the ought as combined into one. This 
gives coherent meaning to shared life in a way that we can describe generally as 
religious. Such a concept of the term religious is a functional one. It implies no particular 
theology or religious practice, not even a god. It simply identifies the meaning dimension 
of reality with the activity of making sense of the normative and the ontological together. 
A fully developed meaning system or religion would project universal claims (this is 
where theology would re-enter) as well as deepen contextual commitments (this is where 
religious practice would re-enter), thus connecting the general with the particular. As 
Geertz argues, 
The religious perspective differs from the common-sensical in that, as 
already pointed out, it moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider 
ones which correct and complete them, and its defining concern is not 
action upon those wider realities but acceptance of them, faith in them. It 
differs from the scientific perspective in that it questions the realities of 
everyday life not out of an institutionalized skepticism which dissolves the 
world’s givenness into a swirl of probabilistic hypotheses, but in terms of 
what it takes to be wider, non-hypothetical truths. Rather than detachment, 
its watchword is commitment; rather than analysis, encounter. And it 
differs from art in that instead of effecting a disengagement from the 
whole question of factuality, deliberately manufacturing an air of 
semblance and illusion, it deepens the concern with fact and seeks to 
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create an aura of utter actuality. It is this sense of the “really real” upon 
which the religious perspective rests and which symbolic activities of 
religion as a cultural system are devoted to producing, intensifying, and so 
far as possible, rendering inviolable by the discordant revelations of 
secular experience.141
 
While other perspectives explicate one cultural dimension, religion is concerned with all 
dimensions of culture and in holding them together with integrity, synoptically. It 
endeavors to make meaning out of otherwise unrelated or even contradictory experiences 
and knowledge. Religion is meaning making and meaning making is religion. I use 
religion, here, in a functional way. This is not to imply that a theology per se is necessary 
for meaning, but insofar as the ontological and the normative are synthesized into 
something meaningful, that synthesis, even if expressed as atheism, functions as a 
religion functions. Insofar as other institutions in a society engage in meaning making in 
the manner discussed above, they engage in a religious practice of sorts. As an institution, 
religion, then, encodes meaning-making for societies. Through its myth, it encodes the 
meaning-making patterns for other social institutions in those respective societies. These 
religious patterns, therefore, influence thoroughly the degree to which meaning-making 
activity in a society’s constituent cultures are endothermic or exothermic; oppressive or 
emancipatory; violent or pacific.  
 
Western Hegemony 
 In an apparent contradiction of the claims I just set forth, only two of 
Huntington’s seven contemporary civilizations are named for world religions: Hindu and 
Islamic. Despite the role he suggests religion plays in civilizational conflict, there are 
other characteristics which distinguish civilizations from each other. Although 
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Huntington does not discount the role that Christianity has played in defining the 
civilization he terms the West and the role that Christianity has played historically, and in 
recent times, in wars with non-Christians, particularly with Muslims, he also describes a 
macro scale conflict between the West and the rest of the world whose causation, on the 
surface, depends very little on Christian identity. 142 “The West, and especially the United 
States, which has always been a missionary nation, believe that the non-Western peoples 
should commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited 
government, human rights, individualism, the rule of law, and should embody these 
values in their institutions.”143 In short the West is attempting to impose its norms on 
other societies around the globe. In terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix, the West is 
trying to make meaning globally by imposing its notions of the universally normative in 
foreign contexts, that is on various and particular incarnations of the ontological. This is 
the global version of what Freire fought in the banking model of education. It is 
endothermic. It requires energy to be pumped into the system and is oppressive. It is 
experienced by non-Western societies as “imperialism,” according to Huntington.144 This 
sort of imposition of the normative on the ontological is only possible with sufficient 
resources in the dynamic dimension of the matrix. In this case, the power is economic.  
The West is, for instance, attempting to integrate the economies of non-
Western societies into a global economic system which it dominates. 
Through the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and other international 
economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and 
imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. The 
lethal extension of economic power and this zeal to impose norms, or 
resist such imperialism, is the proliferation of “nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons and the means to deliver them….The diffusion of 
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military capabilities is the consequence of global economic and social 
development.145  
 
 On the surface, this discussion of economics, political values, and military might 
seems to contradict the definitive role of religion in global inter-civilizational conflict. 
But if religion is the process of meaning making itself, then it is incumbent upon us to dig 
a little deeper and ask the question, what is it about conflicts between the West and the 
balance of the globe that is similar to conflicts which are more obviously defined by 
religious difference? What has happened in the West, particularly in the United States, 
one of the core states of the West, to create a society with a culture prone to conflict, if 
not violence?146   
 
Religion in The United States 
The answer (or part of it at least) rests in the relationship between religion and the 
other dominant institutions in the United States. The authors of The Good Society suggest 
that the welfare state and the market economy have grown to overshadow other 
institutions in the United States. What they see in the relationship among these four 
institutions in the Untied States may be akin to what sociologist Emile Durkheim feared 
from modernity’s push toward a division of labor. The developing complexity he saw in 
the economic and social order could deteriorate into a fragmented anomic culture if an 
“organic solidarity” does not arise spontaneously for persons when they realize their 
fundamental interdependence with one another.147 This fragmentation, Bellah et al. 
suggest, arises because people in the Untied States are profoundly influenced by an 
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eighteenth century interpretation of John Locke’s notion of individual freedom and 
autonomy.148 The incongruity between the Lockean language and ideals on the one hand 
with the reality of our un-Lockean social institutions on the other creates institutions that 
have grown to the point to which they no longer connect individuals, but seem, rather, to 
stand apart from and exist independently of individuals and interpersonal relationships. 
This, they suggest, is the source of a cultural “impasse.”149 We are “trying to live by the 
Lockean language of individualism in an institutional world it can no longer describe, and 
yet the Lockean language still seduces us at every turn.”150
 As a result, the authors of The Good Society observe that religion has become 
increasingly individualized or privatized and, therefore, devoid of engagement in public 
life. For Bellah et al., “‘public’ in their discussion of the Public Church does not mean 
governmental but is a contrast term to it.”151 With the disestablishment of religion in the 
United States, the distinction between public and government is at once easy to 
comprehend and hard to develop as a concept. It is easier to comprehend because the 
United States takes great pains not to privilege or create disadvantages for particular 
religious groups by explicit use of law. It is harder to develop this concept of religion as 
public, however, for precisely the same reason. Public and governmental are often 
conflated. Reacting to the desire to preserve disestablishment and free exercise, religion 
is often relegated to the realm of the private. Religion also has succumbed to the 
“Lockean consensus” that “led to an expressive individualism that complements rather 
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than questions the dominant utilitarian mood.”152 The authors ask whether religion “can 
offer a genuine alternative to tendencies that we have argued are deeply destructive in our 
current patterns of institutions, or whether religious institutions are simply one more 
instance of the problem.”153 As far as these authors are concerned, in order for religion to 
be part of the solution rather than the problem, it must “contribute to the search for the 
common good,” and it will only be able to do that insofar as it is able to “understand and 
respect different-faith communities in our pluralistic society.”154 In general, the authors 
see the potential of religion assuming a transcendental role in overcoming the problem of 
increasing fragmentation and individualization by “orient(ing) the quest to create a world 
community in which individual dignity can be realized and not crushed by military, 
political or market forces.”155  
But The Good Society’s current diagnosis is that religion in the United States 
disorients society, contributes to destructive tendencies, and reinforces utilitarianism. In 
their analysis, religion in the United States is a destructive, rather than constructive force. 
Though it has the potential to be constructive, it is not currently behaving relative to the 
other social institutions in a way that builds up society. Functionally destructive is not 
necessarily the same as violent. In order to investigate the potentially violent dimensions 
of religion in the United States, I turn to the particular example of Christian theology, not 
that it represents religion in its entirety in the United States, but that it offers us one lens 
through which to understand how theology and religious practice combine with social 
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functionality to have an even more profound impact on culture. For this discussion of 
Christian theology, I turn to French literary critic René Girard. 
 
Christian Violence 
Girard’s observations about human nature and social order are informed by his 
work in the field of literary criticism.156 Positing that recurring themes in great works of 
literature, especially in religious myth, both reflect (model of) and inform (model for) 
human social relationships, Girard detects a mechanism that shapes relations between and 
among individuals and within entire societies. This mechanism goes largely undetected, 
and, in fact, elements of it must be imperceptible or at least misinterpreted if they are to 
be effective.157
 The basic premise of this mechanism is that humans imitate one another. This is 
fundamental to our learning processes and to our development of interpersonal 
relationships. Girard uses the term mimesis to describe this process in a manner that 
dissociates it from the idea of one-sided mimicry. In so doing he underscores the 
reciprocity and mutuality of the imitation.158 In the simplest case, mimesis involves two 
individuals who are imitating one another. They even imitate the mutual imitation, so 
“each becomes the imitator of his [or her] own imitator and the model of his [or her] own 
model.”159
                                                 
156 James G. Williams, The Girard Reader, ed. James G. Williams (New York: The Crossroad Publishing 
Company, 1996), 1-6.  
157 René Girard, “Mimesis and Violence: Perspectives in Cultural Criticism,” Berkshire Review 14 (1979), 
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 Mimesis, in and of itself, is not problematic for Girard. In fact, one can 
understand the process as one which creates an intimacy between two parties. In the 
extreme, knowing oneself is knowing the other, and knowing the other is knowing 
oneself. Girard complicates mimesis and theories of imitation by interjecting the notion 
of acquisition or appropriation.160 If one of the parties caught up in the mimetic process 
desires to acquire or appropriate a particular object, his or her imitator will then also 
reflect that desire. Mimesis intensifies the desire to appropriate that object simultaneously 
and reciprocally in both parties, who are now trading roles as model and imitator for one 
another. Eventually the urge to appropriate the object develops into the need to prevent 
the other from acquiring that object. “Violence,” says Girard, “is the process itself when 
two or more partners try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all 
desire through physical or other means.”161 Girard refers to the “partners” as “rivals” and 
the process as “mimetic rivalry.” Similarly, he refers to the imitated and modeled desire 
for an object as “mimetic desire.”162
The intensity of the rivalry which develops between and among people leads, if 
left unchecked, to the ultimate action of preventing another actor from acquiring the 
desired object. That ultimate action is murder of the rival. According to Girard, in order 
to avoid mutual (imitated) murder, the rivals will channel their violent energy to a third 
party, to which they will assign all the guilt and aspersions otherwise assigned by one 
rival to the other. The sacrifice or scapegoating of the third party (victim/scapegoat), or 
scapegoat, relieves the violent desires of the relationship and re-establishes order. At that 
point the previous rivals recognize the sacrificed victim as being responsible for re-
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establishing order, and they celebrate the power that the victim wields to create unity and 
social stability.163
A closer look at what Huntington identifies as the predominant religion of the 
West, Christianity, in light of Girard’s thesis offers insight into how this meaning-making 
institution makes meaning and establishes violent patterns of meaning-making. While 
Girard contends that Christianity, as presented in the Gospel in particular, actually 
contradicts the mythic mechanism of scapegoating and sacrifice as a way to diffuse 
violence, he acknowledges that a classic misreading of the Gospel in terms of these 
greater and longer enduring myths of humanity is possible and, indeed prevalent.164 The 
misinterpretation involves understanding Christ’s death as sacrificial and, therefore, a 
perpetuation of the myth and a reinforcement of social acceptance that avoiding violence 
requires a sacrifice. While Girard claims that the Gospel in fact disrupts the myth in 
several important ways, such as making explicit the innocence of the victim, in this case 
Christ, he laments theology which understands Christ as taking away sin (and thereby 
violence) with his death. Girard argues that the Gospel and Christ rather than taking away 
sin through sacrifice, actually expose the sin of sacrifices altogether.165
So in spite of itself, according to Girard, Christianity actually conflates into and 
conforms with the great myths of humanity that not only prescribe scapegoating and 
sacrifice as a way to mitigate interpersonal and collective violence, but it goes a step 
further. It makes such sacrifice and scapegoating a holy act.  
 This discussion foreshadows a consideration of religion – and Christianity in 
particular – as having the capacity to reinterpret itself in a way that Girard sees as more 
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authentic and non-sacrificial. But the need for such a reinterpretation demonstrates 
precisely that Christianity actually makes meaning in sacrificial and violent ways.  
 So Christianity, as an expression of religion or Public Church in the United States 
or the West, actually makes meaning for itself in a violent way. Since religion is the 
meaning-making institution which encodes meaning-making patterns for other social 
institutions, this sacrificial interpretation of Christianity informs the meaning-making 
processes of US society generally and thereby each of the other three institutions more 
particularly. 
Reading The Good Society against a Girardian backdrop reveals on the level of 
society that market patterns thrive on mimetic rivalry and state policies channel the 
inevitable violence by legitimating forms of scapegoating and sacrifice. Further, and on 
an institutional level, education’s subordination generally places it in service to the 
market economy, inculcating and perpetuating patterns of rivalry while the increasingly 
privatized church, in Bellah et al.’s terms, simultaneously exhibits and sanctifies the 
scapegoating practices of the welfare state.166
   The diminution of religion, which perhaps legitimated its own scapegoating on a 
societal level, in the United States could very well explain both why Huntington 
describes Western influence in secular terms and why the West’s conflicts with the rest of 
the world are as stark as those more marked by religious identities. The market economy 
and the political ideals actually make meaning in ways which are informed wholly by a 
particular interpretation of Christianity, even if that interpretation no longer requires a 
fully participatory religious institution on the societal or global scene. So the economic 
influences in the West seek to engage more of the world in a mimetic rivalry – a rivalry 
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which it now dominates, while the political institutions legitimate and celebrate acts of 
scapegoating, such as sacrificial military engagements. The post September 11, 2001 US-
led strikes in Afghanistan, for example, exhibited mimetic rivalry to the extent they were 
retaliatory, and the hunt for Osama bin Laden was an elaborate exercise that had the same 
unifying effect of rallying a large disparate group at the expense of a scapegoat even 
though bin Laden’s admissions and other evidence would disqualify him as a scapegoat 
which is otherwise presumed to be innocent. The unsatisfactory (lack of sacrificial) 
resolution of that hunt helped energize the war against, and later the search for, capture, 
and execution of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.167  
 Religion, the institution of meaning, has encoded its fellow institutions with a 
pattern of meaning-making which legitimates mimetic rivalry and scapegoating. The 
Public Church, Education, The Political Economy, and Government/Law/Politics make 
meaning in sacrificial ways as they shape the webs of significance that constitute the 
cultures of society in the Untied States. Western civilization is greatly influenced by these 
webs, and US citizens are surrounded by them, with few other, if any, resources for 
synthesizing the is and the ought to make life meaningful. 
 Individuals are disconnected from one another not because of the lack of social 
institutions to connect them, but because social institutions have grown so big that they 
dwarf individuals and communal life. The meaning-making patterns embedded by the 
sacrificial web of significance finds a victim-rich society of Lockean-defined mimetic 
rivals. Finally, the most devastating symptom of this syndrome is the absence of religion 
in public life. Without religion or a Public Church there is no place in which to engage in 
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a common conversation about reconstituting the meaning-making processes themselves. 
Since religious discourse is marginalized, then, public conversation about the meaning-
making processes it encodes are taboo subjects or at best private matters. There is no 
public forum in which to question or reformulate the meaning-making patterns 
themselves. Rivalry and sacrifice seem permanently encoded.  
So Christianity in the United States makes meaning in violent ways. As a major 
religion in the Untied States it functions to encode violent meaning-making mechanisms 
in other social institutions. It can have this effect on other social institutions but because 
of the private place to which religion has enabled United States society to relegate it, the 
influence is not reciprocal. Public discourse about religion is minimized in United States 
society, leaving other social institutions to synthesize meaning according to patterns that 
are seemingly beyond the reach of reform. The role of social institutions in defining 
interpersonal and global relationships makes this circumstance particularly toxic in the 
United States and, given the role of the United States, in the world. The condition creates 
a global environment in which the violence of sacrifice and scapegoating, even if 
germane to other cultures as well, takes on hegemonic proportions. Reviving public 
discourse about religion (at least in the United States), it would seem, is a pre-condition 
for understanding and reforming a violent global culture. Until such a discourse takes 
place, religion will continue to influence other institutions with its violent patterns for 
meaning making. One of the institutions it influences is education. It is also education, as 
a social institution which can provide the means to revive public discourse about religion. 
In chapter four I will examine the way religion influences education and the way the two 
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institutions are related historically and currently. In chapter five and beyond I explore 
how the interdependence of education and religion illuminates a path for mutual revival. 
 
   
 CHAPTER FOUR 
EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND VIOLENCE 
 
One of the social institutions that religion’s apparently regressive and increasingly 
violent patterns continue to influence is that of education. But specifically how and what 
are the consequences of that influence? To investigate the mechanism by which religion 
can influence education and education, in turn, global violence, I offer two examples 
from the turn of two different centuries. By counter-example, these case studies suggest a 
particular moral purpose for education in the milieu of social institutions. These studies 
also simultaneously offer insight into why religion and education have had little to do 
with one another in the US since World War I and why it is imperative to bridge that gulf 
as we move into the twenty-first century. 
 
Touching Transcendence 
In Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of Higher Learning in 
America,168 Carol Gruber describes what, on the surface, seems to be a struggle for the 
right relationship between Minerva, the Roman goddess of wisdom and Mars, the Roman 
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god of war for US academics.169 However, I investigate the possibility that Gruber’s 
account of higher education during World War I in fact demonstrates the advent of the 
broad celebration of the values each of these deities represents in American life rather 
than an Olympian feud. Gruber’s account reveals the monsters and giants that were 
created by the commingling of gods and mortals by showing how the otherwise 
transcendent ideal of service to society was conflated by academics with the relatively 
truncated telos of serving the state.   
In her book, Gruber uses the crisis of World War I as a window into the 
increasingly close relationship between academic institutions in the United States and the 
United States government. The changing nature of this relationship influences and is 
influenced by the way academics regarded their roles and the role of scholarship in 
society. Her analysis traces what she judges to be a compromise in academic integrity as 
scholars increasingly devote their work to the needs of the government as a wartime 
exigency with lasting implications for the relationship of the academy and the state 
In a pursuit Gruber casts as a seemingly desperate search for relevance, scholars 
in the United States struggled to realize (make real) the ideal of service to society and, to 
the extent they were successful, they indeed touched the transcendent, bringing the 
normative to bear on the ontological.170 A precept valued because of its ability to outlast 
any particular historical circumstance, institution or individual, the ideal of service in 
American higher education ceased to be a transcendent goal. In the grasp of academics, 
the notion of society was artificially limited to the notion of state, and service became an 
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day Roman theologies. 
170 Gruber, 120. 
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instrument deployed by the academic community and, thereby, the government, to 
achieve ends largely unrelated to the purposes of the academy.171  
 The reduction of academic purpose extended beyond the notion of service. This 
same time period saw a movement away from inquiry for its own sake toward the 
application of knowledge. This transition was as evident in the realm of the sciences as 
anywhere. While the post-Civil War period saw a sharp increase in the value of “pure 
science,” historian Laurence Veysey points out that the years immediately leading up to 
World War I saw a reversal of this trend. “The Progressive Era brought with it the 
expectation of prominently displayed altruistic motives in all lines of endeavor. As a 
result, first-rate scientists began to produce numerous statements linking their work to 
practical social benefit.”172 While this phenomenon frames Veysey’s theory about the rise 
in prominence of all sorts of research, it also provided the backdrop for the development 
of what Dorothy Ross calls a “scientific view of the world [which was] an essential 
element in the increasingly rational character of modern society” in the nineteenth 
century.173 Ross discusses the development of the social sciences after the Civil War and 
points to the founding of the Social Sciences Research Council after World War I as the 
symbol of the emergence of the social sciences professions and their respective 
independent academic disciplines. However social scientists, especially those she terms 
the “heterodox,” found expression, legitimacy, and “refuge” in the founding of the New 
School for Social Research in 1918 just after the war had begun.174
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 Just as the social sciences were applying the technical expertise of empirical 
investigation to social problems, liberal Protestant theologians were grappling with a 
Christian faith that had increasingly become intellectually untenable in the face of the 
rapid advances in the sciences and the increasingly prominent role of science in society. 
Darwinism particularly challenged previously held beliefs about the nature of creation 
(and the creation of nature), and participated in the dissociation of seeking truth from 
seeking the divine.175 In their own struggle for relevance, liberal Protestants applied 
theology and the newfound tools of the social sciences to the troubling problems of the 
day in a movement whose theology became known as the Social Gospel.176
  While the scholars Gruber describes nationalized the ideal of service to society, 
social scientists applied empirical inquiry, and Protestant theologians took deliberate 
steps toward establishing the kingdom of God on earth, particularly in the United 
States.177 In each case, the pure had mingled with the practical. By touching 
transcendence, the scholars, social scientists, and theologians unleashed unforeseen 
powers while diminishing the potency of enduring educational and religious purposes by 
fashioning them into provisional and temporal tools. 
 In order to understand the effects of the power which was unleashed by three 
interdependent moves toward utility, I wish to consider not how the reduction of the ideal 
to the practical was, in of itself, operative, but how that reduction functioned to create and 
sustain relationships between and among social actors, including groups of individuals 
and institutions. The relationships I wish to examine are between US intellectuals and 
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German academics, United States scholars, and the United States Government, and, 
finally, social scientists and liberal Protestants. 
 Each of these paired relationships can be characterized as mimetic rivalries. 
Girard’s theory of mimetic relationships explains the apparent contradictions of these 
unlikely partnerships such as the adoption of language and practices native to one 
institutional context by another seemingly unrelated, and often competitive, institutional 
context. Such rivalrous relationships reduce conflict between the actors whether they are 
individuals or institutions but do so at the expense of a victim, the sacrifice of which, 
brings unity between (or among) the rivals. The act of sacrifice, however, actually 
elevates the victim as a god whose immolation brought unity to a relationship (or 
multiple relationships) which otherwise may have been headed toward the mutual 
destruction of the parties involved.178
 
Mimesis: Mars and Minerva 
 I read Gruber’s account not as one demonstrating how the power of the ideal of 
service to society was deployed on behalf of Mars or Minerva at the expense of the other. 
Rather, it illustrates how service became the mechanism for mediating relationships 
between United States scholars and their German intellectual parents, on the one hand, 
and between US academics and the United States government on the other.179 Rather than 
read Gruber’s work as an account of the struggle between the forces of Mars and 
Minerva, I believe it is possible to read her book as a record of the metaphorical birth of 
both deities in the twentieth century United States.  
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  The relationship between US scholars and their German counterparts as well as 
the relationship between these same US educators and the United States government can 
be understood in terms of mimetic rivalry. Doing so brings consistency to the apparent 
contradiction between the US educators’ indebtedness to German scholarship and their 
willingness to indict Germans as militaristic and imperialistic.180 Mimetic rivalry also 
offers a coherent explanation for the willingness with which otherwise independent 
academic institutions freely gave over facilities and faculties to the state for the war 
fighting effort.181   
 Gruber outlines the relationship between German scholars and US scholars in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. That this 
relationship was mimetic is illustrated by the degree to which United States colleges and 
universities adapted the German model of higher education to the US context.182 She also 
lays out the indebtedness German scholars expected their US students and colleagues to 
feel when many of the former took it upon themselves to become apologists for the 
Kaiser’s cause.183  United States scholars responded to the German defense with ridicule, 
criticizing their German colleagues of abandoning their commitment to objectivity to 
which they had been so dedicated and which they had imbued in their US students. 
Nevertheless, the balance of the book, Mars and Minerva, demonstrates how keenly US 
scholars continued to learn from their German tutors even if the lesson was, as Gruber’s 
argument demonstrates, how to lay objectivity aside for the needs of the state.184
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 The transatlantic criticism continued and intensified throughout the war, 
according to Gruber, as the two intellectual communities vied for the position of being 
interpreters of the truth about the war. Though not a tangible object, the authoritative role 
for interpreting the “facts” surrounding the war became the object of mutual desire for the 
two communities whose relationship was reinforced with frequent communication and 
professional association.185  
 In their competing attempts to frame the war intellectually, academics sacrificed 
the prized goal of objective and dispassionate scholarship. The sacrifice redirected their 
increasing hostility for one another toward the ideal that lay at the foundation upon which 
the integrity of the emerging profession depended, namely the objective search for 
truth.186
 At the same time that United States scholars were in relationship with their 
German counterparts, they were also trying to find the right relationship with those in 
power within the United States government, especially the president and the military.187  
US higher education had long associated its purposes with the project of building up 
democratic society. In fact, the project of civilizing the new world had been the province 
of education just as administering that society was the project of government.188  The 
events leading up to World War I beckoned the US out of its isolationist posture and, 
perhaps, for the first time opened up the question of exporting the US project by creating 
and promoting a United States style democratic society beyond US shores. As President 
Wilson increasingly framed resistance to the Kaiser’s expansionism as the promotion of 
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democratic ideals, the two institutions involved in the creation and sustaining of 
democracy vied for jurisdiction over the project of central European democracy.189 US 
higher education and US government were involved in a mimetic relationship that drew 
them closer and closer to one another. In fact, the two institutions began to look more and 
more alike as the mutual imitation intensified.190 In competing for the role of 
democratizing Germany, the two joined forces in denouncing what Gruber identified as 
German militarism.191 While the rivalry faded to the background in this relationship more 
so than the rivalry between German and US scholars, the dynamic was no different. The 
effects of the dynamic were most clearly identified by Gruber in her chapter, “Colleges 
and Commandants.”192
 Gruber marvels at the ease with which United States intellectuals handed over 
their institutions and their talents to the needs of the government. It seems that the 
transfer of power was one-way. She does not note as much of a compromise by the 
government as she does on the part of the academy. However, as she points out, the 
military chose to forgo immediate conscription of much needed young men in order to 
work with the academic institutions and keep them afloat during an otherwise disastrous 
economic circumstance.193 At the very least, the decision to use the colleges as training 
grounds, if you will, could be read as the government giving in to the needs of higher 
education in a way that mimicked higher education’s giving in to increasing government 
control of schools.  
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Mimesis: Faith and Knowledge 
 These mimetic relationships were evolving against another institutional backdrop 
which was shifting as well. Notably, the relationship between the US social institutions of 
education and religion was transforming by a similar mechanism. This shift precedes the 
analysis of The Good Society and may have been a significant condition for the state of 
religion (as privatized) and education (as subordinate to the state) in the US later in the 
twentieth century even though the two institutions, by mimesis grew very close together 
during World War I itself. This qualitatively influenced the nature of the US academy 
which was in turn mimicking and being mimicked by the state and, likewise, by the 
German academy.  
The years leading up to the extremely close wartime relationship between 
colleges and the military were marked by a great deal of curricular change and identity 
shifts for institutions of higher learning, especially insofar as it relates to the place of 
religion in education. James Turner contrasts colleges before and after the Civil War by 
noting the loss of the unified understanding of knowledge provided by the Bible and the 
consequential coherent structuring of the curriculum around the epistemological 
supremacy of sacred revelation.194 There were several attempts to restore a sense of 
integrity to a more secularized curriculum and, Turner suggests that, at least for awhile, 
the notion of liberal culture provided a substantive unifying principle.195 Veysey echoes 
this assessment and chronicles the diminished role of religion in the curriculum as well as 
the easing of compulsory religious practices at colleges and universities of all sizes.196
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 While there were many colleges and universities established by religious orders 
and denominations between the Civil War and World War I, many of these were founded 
in order to resist a growing trend toward secularization in the nation.197 The creation of 
new colleges, however, could not undo the epistemological shift which unseated divine 
revelation as the source of knowledge and the unifying principle for teaching and 
learning. Religion, in many cases, became one part of the curriculum and one dimension 
of a school’s identity. Once the coherent driver of college curriculum, the Bible was 
properly studied only among other great works of literature according to some faculty 
members at Yale and Brown.198  
 I do not wish to paint colleges and universities as faithless secular deserts during 
this time period. Certainly that is not the case and certainly not all institutions followed 
these trends. In the main, however, the point I wish to make is that knowledge was no 
longer defined by faith, and education for liberal culture by and large had replaced, in 
Veysey’s terms, “piety and discipline.”199
 The feeling was mutual. The church just as much as the academy was responsible 
for the widening gulf between faith and knowledge. During what William McLoughlin 
calls the “Third Great Awakening,” a “national prophet” with the most appropriate name, 
Billy Sunday, arose on the heels of the urban revival ministry of D.L. Moody. Carrying 
on the nascent fundamentalism, Sunday attacked new scientific theories which had 
caused a good deal of confusion and fear for many Christian believers.200 “Evolution and 
the naturalistic, pragmatic philosophy of the ‘new social science’…seemed to undermine 
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the whole basis of the Christian faith as the romantic evangelicals understood it.”201 
Sunday and other fundamentalists articulated a notion of salvation that was personal, and 
academics seemed pleased to cede that sphere in exchange for their universal self-defined 
relevance. 
 Against the backdrop of this widening gulf between personal faith and universal 
knowledge developed attention to what became a contested middle ground, the social. 
The academy and the church demonstrated a common concern for a better and more just 
social order and to make sense of the newfound understanding of the place and role of the 
human being in that order. An atheist, and the first professor of sociology at Brown 
University, Lester Ward applied Darwin’s theory of evolution to human activity in the 
world in a way that refuted the association of natural selection with laissez-faire approach 
to social interaction. With an understanding of the human brain as both a product and an 
influencer of evolution, Ward advocated what he called “‘fraternalism [as] the basis of 
political order and progress, not competition. Finally, he declared that education is the 
key to man’s mastery of his environment and therefore that the highly trained social 
scientist must assume an active role…in setting the wisest policies for…progress.”202
 Around the same time theologians were coming to terms with a new theological 
coherence developed in light of emerging scientific understanding and prevailing 
humanism. Progressive theologians’ acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution led 
to an understanding of “the imminence of God, the organic or solidaristic view of society, 
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and the presence of the kingdom of heaven on earth…[thus linking] moral and religious 
improvement to the current optimistic belief in progress.203
 These two philosophical positions did not develop in isolation from one another. 
In fact, the liberal theologians were largely influenced by Ward and others in the 
academy.204 Both academics and clerics desired social progress and each group had its 
own way of achieving it. As liberal Protestants worked toward the social salvation of 
realizing the kingdom of God on earth, social scientists engaged in social engineering to 
foster liberal culture. These two schools of reformers were in frequent communication, 
but a “post-Christian” humanist element developed it the academy just as the Christo-
centric Social Gospel was beginning to take its own shape in the church.205   
 The distinction between the academy and the church was not pure to be sure and, 
as the common pursuit of a social good began to take shape, the way each articulated 
their positions began to sound very much like the other. In fact, McLoughlin points out 
the advantage of the difference between Ward’s voice as progressive academic 
spokesperson and that of, perhaps his successor in that role, John Dewey who was willing 
“to speak in accents of liberal Protestantism.”206 The relationship between progressive 
academics and liberal Protestants was increasingly mimetic to the point of creating a kind 
of unity embodied by Richard T. Ely who facilitated the formation of the United States 
Economic Association which was as much grounded in liberal theology as it was in social 
science.207
                                                 
203 Hopkins, 123. 
204 McLoughlin, 152. 
205 Ibid., 166–169. 
206 Ibid., 167. 
207 Ibid., 169. 
 
   
 107
 Not only was the mimetic relationship in which both (groups of) actors desired to 
articulate a place for human action in the advancement of society personified by Ely’s 
integration of academic and religious approaches, it was institutionalized at the 
University of Wisconsin under John Bascom and others at the turn of the century. David 
Hoeveler describes Bascom, Ely, and John Commons as bringing “perspectives on the 
educational functions of the university that were shaped by their own efforts to define a 
Social Gospel program for America. But the “Wisconsin Idea” was not in any strict sense 
a religious concept.”208  
 What had begun as two distinct approaches to social progress began to look more 
and more alike as theologians adapted social science for their use in framing and 
spreading the Gospel and as social scientists used the force of religion to invade personal 
and corporate sentiment and retain a social cohesion for their ideas. Even atheistic Ward 
valued religion as a “‘social instinct’ for the conservation of existing institutions.”209 Ely 
called for “‘profound revival of religion’ and employed all the force and style of 
evangelical rhetoric…[shifting] attention to the state…[as] the critical vehicle of social 
improvement and moral power.”210 Thus, the social sciences became evangelical and the 
Gospel became social. 
 
From Rivalry to Sacrifice - Faith and Knowledge 
 As lecterns looked more and more like pulpits, the looming war put academics 
and theologians alike to the test. President Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian minister and 
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former academic, articulated a justification for the war that resonated with the object of 
mimetic desire for progressive academics and liberal Protestants, namely social 
transformation.211 By framing the war as one to end all war and by insisting on its ability 
to make the world safe for democracy, Wilson offered the rivalrous partners the ultimate 
progressive transformation. The mimetic rivalry had intensified between the two so much 
that the means for transformation was essentially ignored. Never mind the fact that 
progressive academics had originally placed their faith in the capacity of the human mind 
in a social context to bring about liberal culture, and that liberal Protestants had counted 
on the power of the Gospel of the Prince of Peace to realize the kingdom of heaven on 
earth, academics and theologians alike had become preoccupied with their desired 
outcome through intense imitation of the desire of the other. Their perspectives ultimately 
merged into an almost wholesale support of the war effort.212
 After the war, the Federal Council of Churches, an organizational manifestation 
of the Social Gospel movement, would lament its support of the war, but Social Gospel 
advocates and progressive academics were quite articulate, if not passionate, about their 
support before and during the war.213 “Dewey justified the war as a means of social 
control in both a more immediate and more wide-ranging sense…Dewey saw the 
prospect of permanent socialization, permanent replacement of private and possessive 
interest by public and social interest, both within and among nations.”214
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 Ely, the personification of the unity of faith and knowledge, displayed a great deal 
of regret at not being able to fight in the war himself. In addition he led a campaign 
against his gubernatorial ally in the development of the “Wisconsin Idea,” Senator Robert 
LaFollette who had expressed anti-war sentiment.215
 US entry into World War I provided the opportunity for academics and 
theologians alike to display their highly intensified, mutual, and competitive desire for 
social change, apparently even at the cost of war. Their rational origins and evolutionary 
hope had given way to a lust for immediate transformation. The two institutions had 
grown mimetically so closely together that Ely’s argument did not have to draw explicitly 
on theology or sociology to embody a relatively united position. The war had effectively 
completed a sacrifice of the previous separation of faith and knowledge which had grown 
important to the church and the academy prior to the rise of the Social Gospel movement. 
Insofar as higher education was represented by progressive social scientists and insofar as 
the church was represented by liberal Protestants, their common and competitive desire 
for social transformation led to a radical unity of faith and knowledge, sacrificing their 
previous relatively well-defined isolation from one another. 
 
From Rivalry to Sacrifice – Mars and Minerva 
    In a parallel and simultaneous process, as the war continued, colleges also 
looked more and more like military camps, and commanders more and more assumed the 
role of instructor, tutor, or dorm monitor. Not only was the academy caught up in a 
mimetic relationship with the church, its wartime service had created a similar dynamic 
with the state. Both institutions were reshaped by the relationship. The latter two were 
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united in a common cause, suppressing (German) militarism. In joining together to 
“defeat the Hun,” education and government essentially scapegoated militarism as 
embodied by the German aggression.216 While it is not until the end of her book that 
Gruber began to note any discord between academics and bureaucrats, the fact that these 
two entities were not in conflict, but allied is only stronger evidence that the common 
enemy or object of derision had brought them together and kept them together. The unity 
of school and fort continued beyond World War I, even if expressed in new and less 
drastic ways. The successful completion of the sacrifice of German militarism in wartime 
victory forged a relationship between school and state that was explicitly stronger than 
any relationship between German and U.S scholars, at least as far as Gruber is concerned.  
 Not only did US scholars participate in the sacrifice of German militarism in 
partnership with the US government, they also participated in the sacrifice of objective 
inquiry in conjunction with German intellectuals. Both of these sacrificial mechanisms 
grew out of mimetic rivalries. While the sacrifice of militarism was, on the surface, 
inimical to any prospect of unity in a relationship among United States and German 
scholars, I suggest that a deeper analysis reveals the emergence of a renewed and 
common commitment on the part of both German and US scholars to the objective 
pursuit of truth. Intellectuals on both sides of World War I, by sacrificing intellectual 
objectivity, actually participated in a process which led to its veneration. This 
sanctification, if you will, occurred not in spite of, but because of the sacrifice.217
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 Likewise, the joint defeat of militarism by US professors and generals resulted in 
the “absence of a principled objection to the militarization of the campus”218 and the re-
establishment of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC).219 These phenomena 
signal the dawn of a new era of United States military might that depended on a 
cooperative relationship between school and state, the consequences of which Gruber 
foreshadows in her brief discussion of World War II.220  
 
God-making and Integrity at the Dawn of a New Century 
 The operative sacrifices of the faith - knowledge duality, objective inquiry, and 
militarism during World War I did not destroy any of the three. In fact it made them all 
the more important. James Williams points to the Latin roots of the word sacrifice – to 
make sacred – in order to demonstrate that the ultimate power of scapegoating is the 
power to make gods.221  Communities celebrate the victim whose immolation brought 
them unity in the face of severe rivalry. The mutual destruction of academic objectivity 
by German and US professors and the defeat of the German military machine gave birth 
to twentieth century versions of Minerva, the goddess of wisdom and Mars, the god of 
war respectively. Similarly, the sacrifice of the separation of faith and knowledge 
beatified the duality, again distancing the relationship between school and church. 
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 Gruber laments the professors’ abdication of the position of “critical 
independence” for the sake of pursuing military victory.222 This abdication, and the 
compromise position on academic freedom assumed by the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP), are cast as a lack of personal and organizational 
integrity.223  While it is true that these changes are reversals from previous practice and 
that they lack integrity from the standpoint of conventional academic practice of the day, 
they have integrity when understood in light of the mimetic relationships at work. While 
perhaps a departure from what their German tutors initially taught them, US professors’ 
forfeiture of objectivity on matters of war was wholly consistent with the concurrent 
actions of those whom they regarded as mentors and guides. The mimetic relationship 
across the ocean was intact and unified, even if the action and practices seem inconsistent 
from one year to the next.  
 Similarly, the giving over of college campuses and aims to the War Department 
on one hand compromised the relative independence and isolation college campuses 
enjoyed prior to World War I, but on the other hand demonstrated the coherence of the 
relationship between school and state in the project of building society. 224 In Gruber’s 
terms, it was a natural extension of the ideal of service to society, especially when, as she 
observes, the notion of society is conflated with the notion of state.225
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 Gruber also observes that professors seemed to be oblivious to the compromises 
they were making and seemed to be swept up in a hysterical movement in the same way 
that the Federal Council of Churches confessed what it termed “‘the blind servility with 
which the Christian Church gave itself to the government of the United States in 1917 
and 1918.’”226 Misapprehension and denial of the scapegoating process are essential 
elements of Girard’s theory. If the actors in a given mimetic rivalry are aware of the 
scapegoating they are effecting, then the sacrifice becomes impotent relative to the goal 
of diminishing the rivalry between the protagonists. One key mechanism for preserving 
and intensifying this misapprehension is the dynamic of mob violence or what Gruber 
might call hysteria which explains why “the legion of learned men…prostituted 
themselves by offering ‘their intellectual gifts upon the altar of the nation.’”227
 The gods of the ideal of service to society, pure scientific inquiry, and of personal 
salvation fell from Olympus when US intellectuals reduced service to relevant practice, 
and inquiry to application, and when clergy sent Jesus to war. In reaching out and 
realizing (making real) otherwise transcendent ideals, colleges, universities, and churches 
stripped moral purpose of its power to inspire intellectuals and believers to greater causes 
that survive time and cross national boundaries. The power deployed toward the end of 
obtaining the defined objectives of the war and of a good society ultimately 
consummated those goals and gave birth to two new transcendent gods, Mars and 
Minerva while dismissing Jesus, i.e. the previously dominant Christian faith, from any 
clearly defined substantive public role in the academy. So while relationships with state 
and federal governments and burgeoning research agendas settle into academic life after 
                                                 
226 Federal Council of Churches as quoted in Gruber, 254, 5. 
227 Girard, Berkshire Review, 11-16.; Gruber, 255, 1. 
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World War I, the academy engages in a search for its soul as the church struggles with its 
exile from the academy it had helped create.228
 Clearly at least three of the four major social institutions described by Bellah et 
al., namely religion, education and government, are engaged in the social transformations 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. A Griardian analysis shows how easily mimesis 
can lead to the conflation of institutional frameworks in which there is very little 
difference among church, academy, and state. Recall the role of religion as the institution 
that encodes meaning-making processes for society. If religion - in the US, Christianity - 
is writing and rewriting the violent myth described by Girard that each of these social 
systems continues to deploy, then it infects education and government as the two draw 
closer and closer together. This analysis demonstrated that education during World War I 
at last gave up its role as objective inquirer the more it imitated the state. Education, 
which, in Gruber’s estimation, should have served as the gateway for the ontological, 
sought to impose norms on society. This search intensified in and through the mimetic 
rivalries with German academics and the US Government.  
While the subject of this example is not a particular leader, in Gruber’s account it 
is clear that all the social actors were seeking to impose norms on reality. If Government 
indeed does embody the norms of a society, at least in a democracy, then what happened 
during the “war to end all wars” was a conflation of education - otherwise the gateway to 
the ontological through learning and reasoning  – and church – the would-be synthesizer 
of moral meaning – into the normative dimension embodied institutionally by the state. 
The collective meaning-making strategy of imposing the normative on the ontological led 
                                                 
228 Roger L. Geiger, “Research, Graduate Education, and the Ecology of American Universities,” The 
European and American University Since 1800, ed. Sheldon Rothblatt and Björn Wittrock (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 244-5. Marsden, 369-387. 
 
   
 115
to the abdication of two social institutions, education, and religion and thereby kept the 
system from opening up to objective inquiry and new information, and from synthesizing 
the is and the ought respectively.  
The is and the ought should have been kept in tension with one another rather 
than being completely aligned. The normative dominance led to a developmental 
regression on an institutional scale. This regression was encoded by the myth-making 
religion – Christianity – as a rivalry which ultimately devolved into a system death in 
need of a sacrifice to re-establish order. The Germans, along with the ideals outlined 
above, filled the role of the scapegoat and victim necessary to re-establish order.  
Neglected to this point is the role of the market economy in funding the 
imposition of the normative on the ontological, driving education and religion into the 
hegemonic purview of the state. As I have shown, however, a source of power such as 
economic energy is vital to the continued endothermic imposition of the normative on the 
ontological, particularly on the international scale. When such a conflation of Moral 
Meaning Matrix dimensions, embodied by social institutions, occurs, the hunger for that 
energy can redirect the moral purpose of those institutions toward the prospect of 
maximizing resources. Once that final conflation, a conflation with the dynamic 
dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix, is complete, the consequences can be global 
and deadly. 
 
Colleges at War 
 In the United States, at least, on the level of social complexity identified in the 
Moral Meaning Matrix as society, education institutionalizes the ontological dimension, 
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prescribing the expected patterns of behavior relative to generalizing from the particular 
and reasoning about information gleaned from learning. Education functions for the 
ontological in the same way that religion institutionalizes signification. On the level of 
complexity, described as institution in the Moral Meaning Matrix, education has, in its 
own right, symbol, ritual, and a nomos within the realms over which society gives it 
jurisdiction. In that way, education conveys and creates normative as well as ontological 
elements. However, when education is contributing to the larger society, its rituals 
prescribe and govern the way society makes sense of the ontological. So, my claim that 
education institutionalizes the ontological is not to say that it is free of normative 
elements nor is it to say that its norms and symbols are not translated into a societal 
worldview. It is a claim, however, that education, functionally serves to establish and 
legitimate the means and the terms by which society learns and forms a collective 
worldview which is put into conversation with, and thereby influences, a society’s ethos.  
Similarly, my analysis of Gruber’s account demonstrates how the government or 
Government/Law/Politics in Bellah et al.’s terms institutionalizes the normative, setting 
forth the means and the terms by which society establishes that ethos. This is evident in 
the government’s elaborate policy making, interpretation, and execution functions. With 
police and military power, it can, in very real ways, impose sanctions to enforce expected 
patterns of institutionalized behavior. This leaves the dynamic dimension of reality and 
one of The Good Society’s institutions remaining. In capitalistic US society, it may go 
without saying that the economy is associated with power and therefore the dynamic 
dimension of reality and the matrix. Yet the proposition bears testing. In order to test it 
however, I will draw on examples outside the United States context. This will do two 
 
   
 117
things. First it permits a functional understanding of the broader institutional pattern of 
economy, and with that functional understanding, apart from a strict identity with US 
capitalism, I can demonstrate the power necessary to make meaning. Second, it allows 
me to explore the particular ways the economy institutionalizes violence by setting up the 
power sources in the dynamic dimension of reality as objects of desire and, thereby 
catalyzes rivalry and sacrifice.  
In the following example drawn from two universities in the hotly contested 
Middle East, I will use the term utilitarian to describe the phenomenon which equates 
economic gains with citizenship demonstrating the conflating of the normative and 
dynamic dimensions of the Moral Meaning Matrix. In other words, economic 
achievement, development, and advancement show themselves to be, at least in the 
mission statements and operational behavior of these educational organizations, pre-
conditions for political identity. The economy in this example co-opts notions of 
statehood and those notions of statehood co-opt the purposes of education. 
A bomb exploded in the Frank Sinatra cafeteria on Hebrew University’s Mount 
Scopus campus in Jerusalem. According to the “Embassy of Israel Briefing” of July 31, 
2002, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing 
that day which killed nine students, faculty members, and staff members, as an act of 
revenge for the “recent counter-terrorist operation against Hamas Military Commander 
Salah Shehada in Gaza.”229 Israeli troops had killed Shehada just days before.230
                                                 
229 Moshe Fox, Minister of Public Affairs, Embassy of Israel, Washington DC, July 31, 2002; available 
from http://israelmb.org/articals/2002/July/2002073100.htm; Internet; accessed February 23 2003. 
230 Wolf Blitzer in an interview with Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, July 28, 2002; available from 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0m560; Internet; accessed February 24, 2003. 
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 In January 2003 Israeli authorities closed the doors of two Palestinian Universities 
in Hebron (Hebron University and Palestine Polytechnic University) apparently in 
response to previous suicide bomb attacks in Tel Aviv.231 The move was denounced by 
the American Council on Education and the Canadian Association of University Teachers 
and spawned a debate among United Kingdom educators about an “academic boycott of 
Israel.”232 Israeli officials justified the closures on the grounds that the “chemistry and 
computer labs at the universities were being used to research and train terrorists to build 
bombs.”233
 In recent years, institutions of higher education have moved to the front lines of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict. Again Girard’s lens is useful. Understanding Hebrew 
University, Hebron University, and Palestine Polytechnic University as instruments used 
to gain advantage over rivals in the quest for land and economic empowerment exposes 
the perils of a utilitarian or technical purpose for higher education, which are more 
pronounced in the Middle East because it provides an acutely competitive and a 
particularly violent context.234
 The development of the organizational purposes of these three universities 
contributes to their perceived legitimacy as military and terrorist targets. Participation of 
                                                 
231 Education Guardian, January 17, 2003; available from 
http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/0,9959,876961,00.html; Internet; accessed 
February 23, 2003. 
232 American Council on Education, January 8, 2003; available from 
http://www.acenet.edu/news/press_release/2003/01january/closings.html; Internet; accessed February 24, 
2003. Canadian Association of University Teachers, January 27, 2003; available from 
http://www.caut.ca/english/publications/now/20030127_palestinian.asp; Internet; accessed February 24, 
2003. Education Guardian, January 17, 2003; available from 
http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/0,9959,876961,00.html; Internet; accessed 
February 23, 2003. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Bellah et al., Good Society, 145-178 and William M. Sullivan, “Institutional Identity and Social 
Responsibility in Higher Education, ” Civic Responsibility and Higher Education, ed. Thomas Ehrlich, 
(Phoenix: Oryx Press, 2000), 29. 
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such organizations in mimetic rivalry sets up the universities as unwitting participants in 
an increasingly violent social competition.  
 Rethinking of the purposes of the modern university in favor of one which 
understands and exposes the mimetic mechanism could help universities escape 
participation in such a destructive process and, moreover, act as an alternative to it. This 
new conception of purpose will depend upon a more profound moral understanding of the 
university than the prevailing technical or utilitarian model. Such a purpose will have to 
cross national and political borders in order to sustain a notion of society-building that is 
a broader and more profound endeavor than nation-building. 235
 The language of retaliation and revenge in the rhetoric surrounding the closures 
and the bombing discussed above is emblematic of the mimetic process involved in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict.236 Each act is linked to a previous act. The violence feeds upon 
itself to the point that no one is sure who acted first. The mimetic process makes that 
question irrelevant. Each actor, the Israeli government and various Palestinian militants 
in this case, perpetrate violent acts in response to violent acts. This type of war-like 
context makes explicit what otherwise might be more subtle acts of mimetic violence. 
But is the mimesis related to a common mimetic desire? If so, then is the violence more 
than just mutual imitation? Has it become mimetic rivalry over that same object? 
 I suggest that the answer to all of these questions is yes. It is almost cliché to talk 
about the Israel-Palestine conflict as a battle for land, but truly that is what it is. It is a 
battle for land, but it is also a battle for independent statehood. In order to move beyond 
                                                 
235 Bellah et al., Good Society, 170-8. 
236 That this is part of a long-established pattern is reflected in Gary C. Gambill, “The Balance of Terror: 
War by Other Means in the Contemporary Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, 1 (Autumn 
1998): 51-66. 
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this assertion, I will examine how the desire to establish two states in the same land is 
expressed by the three key subjects of this discussion: Hebrew University, Hebron 
University, and Palestine Polytechnic University. 
 
Universities as Mimetic Rivals 
 Hebrew University was established in 1925, the fulfillment of a dream articulated 
as early as 1918 that “establishing a ‘University of the Jewish People’ in the Land of 
Israel formed an integral part of the early Zionist vision.”237 The Zionist dream was 
encouraged at that time by British influence, and later rule, over the region after World 
War I and by Britain’s explicit support for a Jewish homeland in a land populated largely 
by Arabs.238  The history of Hebrew University traces that school’s development through 
the various wars of the last century, which repeatedly moved borders and boundaries, 
sometimes leaving the original campus isolated from what has evolved into Israel 
proper.239  
 The undulating demarcations also took their toll on the Palestinian side. To battle 
the sense and effect of isolation, the mayor of Hebron in 1967 established a college, later 
to become Hebron University, when he “realized that the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza would eventually lead to isolating the cities and towns attempting to 
create uneducated, easily ruled Palestinians.”240 Established in 1978, Palestine 
Polytechnic University (PPU), also located in Hebron, states its mission in the 
                                                 
237 Hebrew University of Jerusalem website: History; available from 
http://www.huji.ac.il/huji/eng/aboutHU_history_e.htm; Internet; accessed February 23, 2003. 
238 For a discussion of how Zionism relates to modern social institutions, see Eyal Chowers, “Time in 
Zionism: The Life and Afterlife of a Temporal Revolution,” Political Theory 26, 5 (October 1998): 652-
685. CNN Special Report, “Mideast Land of Conflict,” Available from 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/mideast/; Internet; accessed February 23, 2003. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Hebron University website; available from www.hebron.edu; Internet; accessed February 23, 2003. 
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affirmative, perhaps building on Hebron University’s earlier commitment to being a 
countervailing force against Israeli occupation. PPU’s mission is “to produce and support 
the leaders of tomorrow...for Palestine and the world.”241   
Hebrew University grew up with and fostered the very idea of Jewish statehood. 
The two Palestinian universities developed as a response to the state of Israel insofar as 
they were attempting to hold onto or define what Palestinian identity would be in this 
new context. Holding onto that identity was particularly challenging during this time 
period because it was marked by a series of wars and accords which shifted boundaries 
both between Israelis and Palestinians and between Israel and neighboring states.242
 The purposes of all three of these institutions are closely linked with the 
establishment of national identities, if not formal states, and the related issue of having a 
place for those states to call home. While a case can be made for the theoretical 
independence of the ideas of national identity and land, I think it is quite a different story 
to dissociate the idea of an independent nation-state from the acquisition and control of 
the land to serve as a nation’s home. Hebrew University, Hebron University, and 
Palestine Polytechnic University, therefore define themselves by the quest for 
independent nationhood and to elaborate national success through the preparation of 
individuals for participatory and advanced citizenship.  
 Israel and Palestine each desire an independent nation on the same land.243 Israeli 
and Palestinian higher education institutions express and strengthen those simultaneous 
                                                 
241 Palestine Polytechnic University website; available from 
http://www.ppu.edu/about/missionstatment/mission.htm; Internet; accessed February 23, 2003. 
242 CNN.com. and David Hirst, “Rush to Annexation: Israel in Jerusalem,” Journal of Palestine Studies 3, 
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desires to preserve, in the case of Israel, or establish, in the case of Palestine, competing 
nation-states. The Israel-Palestine conflict, insofar as it involves establishing two nations 
with the same borders, exemplifies mimetic desire for the land as well as for independent 
nationhood. The three universities under discussion focus and symbolize this desire and 
provide the means for more effective participation in the rivalrous relationship between 
Israelis and Palestinians. Not only does academe exacerbate the mimetic desire, it 
becomes an instrument of mimetic rivalry. As instruments of the rivalry, these 
universities, therefore, participate in the process of violence. 
  
Nation-building and Utilitarianism 
 Originating with the founding purposes, and within the context of war and quests 
for independence, the Middle East academy’s role as an instrument of mimetic rivalry is 
complicated by two related factors: the conflation of the idea of society-building with 
nation-building and, consequently, the triumph of utilitarian aims over moral identity.244 
In his message on Hebrew University’s website, President Menachem Magidor mourns 
the loss of the nine members of his community, but in doing so he describes Hebrew 
University as “an inseparable part of the society fabric of the State of Israel.” 245  
Similarly, the Hebron University website reflects on the persistence of the University’s 
mission in light of Israeli actions: “Despite such hardships, the University continues to 
expand in new and creative ways in order to better meet the needs of the Palestinian 
                                                 
244 Chowers, “Zionism,” 677. And Beverly Milton-Edwards, “Palestine State-Building: Police and Citizens 
as Test of Democracy,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25 (May 1998): 118. 
245 Menachem Magidor, Hebrew University website; available from 
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society.”246 While PPU does not seem to make the link as generally and as explicitly as 
the other two, the mission statement of the College of Engineering Technology describes 
its programs and curricula as “carefully designed to address the current and future needs 
of the Palestinian community.”247
 On the surface, these statements do not seem dissimilar to what sociologist and 
The Good Society co-author William Sullivan advocates as education’s role in building a 
democratic society when he contrasts twentieth-century US higher education with “its 
founding conception of itself as a participant in the life of civil society.”248  In America, 
he illustrates a shift in purpose from that founding concept to what he calls “instrumental 
individualism.”249   
 Each of the statements above orients education toward a particular telos or end of 
establishing or preserving the society of a particular nation. While Sullivan’s loftiest 
goals for US higher education only relate to cultivating United States democracy, I wish 
to appropriate his utilitarian description of education as a critique of any model which 
seeks to advance the goals of a particular nation rather than the goals of society generally. 
In this respect, this discussion also serves as a critique, not of the rationale offered by 
Sullivan, but of his limiting his discussion to the project of forwarding US democracy 
only. His arguments and evidence are squarely situated in the US context, so it is 
justifiable for him to make claims only about the potential for US civic life. However, the 
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lessons from United States higher education, which Sullivan lifts up, might be instructive 
in other contexts, especially those heavily influenced by US notions of the academy.  
 Sullivan describes post World War II higher education in US as 
“advancing…major tasks then seen as essential to national interest.”250 This, he notes, is 
evidence of a trend toward instrumentalism marked by projects that were “aimed at 
particular strategic outcomes….focusing so relentlessly on contributing to external 
goals… [thereby losing]…the inclination to address these ends from its own intrinsic 
responsibilities.”251 Sullivan continues by discussing the indispensable role of science, 
particularly in military applications and by pointing out the aims of education being 
oriented toward economic empowerment.252
 These same aspirations seem to be reflected in the development of the three 
Middle East universities. They are as ambitious about their own national security and 
enhancement as US institutions. The curricular offerings of the Middle East universities 
exemplify commitments to the specialties that provide for technological advancement and 
economic empowerment. Hebron and Hebrew Universities have faculties of arts and 
humanities respectively, but the bulk of the academic programs reflect a bias toward 
professional education and the application of, rather than the pursuit of knowledge.253 
PPU is the most extreme example of this phenomenon with a “College of Applied 
Science” and a “College of Applied Professions.”254 Not only do the universities 
understand themselves as instruments at the service of nation-states, they perform their 
duties as instruments in an almost thoroughly instrumental or utilitarian manner.  
                                                 
250 Ibid, 22. 
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 As instrumental instruments of nation-states, Hebron University, Hebrew 
University, and Palestine Polytechnic University not only participate in, but are also key 
loci of mimetic rivalry between Palestine and Israel. Palestinians and Israelis are both 
training themselves for economic advantage and for technological superiority in order to 
lay claim to the same land as home for their respective, yet competitive, nation-states. In 
this way, these institutions in this superheated context illustrate the link between Girard’s 
notion of mimetic rivalry and a utilitarian understanding of higher education. 
 Further, as instruments of the rivalry with strategic goals aligned in support of two 
nations, which are essentially at war with each other, the universities also become 
strategic targets for military or terrorist violence.255 When examined in this way, the 
involvement of higher education on the front lines of the Middle East conflict is not as 
surprising as it might seem to be on the surface. These universities are rivals preparing 
rivals for the sake of domination.  
 Nevertheless the targeting of the universities for closure and for terrorist attacks is 
dissonant with our concept of the place that academe ought to occupy in society as 
evidenced by numerous protests from educators.256 The attacks and closures of the 
universities, judged by many in the international education community to be despicable, 
are acts which are consistent with the utilitarian, state-serving role higher education has 
carved out for itself in Israel and Palestine as well as in the US. So the dissonance 
originates, not in the way universities are being treated in battle, but in the fact which the 
battle illustrates, namely the diminished teleological role of the university in modern 
                                                 
255 In many ways the closure of the Palestinian universities exhibits the attributes of the scapegoating 
process suggested by Girard. Similarly the terrorist attack on Hebrew University seems to reflect some of 
the same characteristics for some people within the Palestinian society. 
256 See the previously cited ACE, CAUT, and AUT protests of the school closings and see the Hebrew 
University website for a statement of support for the University which denounces the terrorist attack. 
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society. Sullivan, in “Institutional Identity and Social Responsibility in Higher 
Education,” and in conjunction with his colleagues in The Good Society, calls for a 
reversal of the trend which understands higher education as subordinate to government or 
other institutions, and he calls for an assertion of education as an institution in its own 
right, free from the hegemonic control of the institutions of politics and the economy.257  
While associated with these other social institutions, education ought not be in service to 
them.  
 
The Moral Purpose of Education 
 One way to approach the liberation of education from the more dominant spheres 
of influence of economy and government is to consider how academe can serve to thwart 
the mechanism of mimetic rivalry. Higher education certainly cannot thwart such a 
mechanism while participating in it. Yet, education is, arguably, the home of mimesis 
which serves as a fundamental component of learning. Perhaps higher education can 
leverage its familiarity with mimesis to help it avoid mimetic rivalry. 
 Girard suggests two ways to avoid mimetic rivalry. The first is through a rigid 
observance of prohibitions such as religious codes. Laws which prohibit coveting, 
stealing, and murder, for instance, act as a check on mimetic rivalry. These prohibitions, 
however, flow into rituals which ultimately demand a sacrifice to effectively restore a 
sense of order to a community. Girard shows how emphasis on such codes only leads to 
controlled victimization and not to an eradication of violence altogether.258   
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 Because mimetic rivalry, scapegoating, and sacrifice for Girard all depend on a 
misapprehension of the process, participants in the violence are unaware of the role they 
are playing in the mimetic rivalry, much like the universities I discussed are unaware of 
their contributions to their own troubles. What Girard suggests will end the rivalry, 
violence, and victimization is the exposure of the rivalrous mechanism itself.  
 If these three universities wish to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict, or at the very least remove themselves from the frontlines, they should expose 
the mimetic dynamic for what it is and open an international, trans-cultural debate over 
the question of how two nations can occupy the same land at the same time.259 To 
overlook the rivalry at the heart of the tension is to ignore the violence. To illuminate the 
imitation and modeling going on in the struggle would disarm the mechanism of mutual 
vilification by holding a mirror up to the imitator who is a model to his or her own 
imitator and to the model who is an imitator of his or her own model. No aspersion of 
wrongdoing could be cast without taking into consideration the reflexive and reciprocal 
dynamic at work. This exposure of the mechanism first requires the educational 
organizations themselves to be self-critical and, further, to pass along the self-critiquing 
practices to those who would study there. Perhaps elevating critical thought and the 
practice of mutual engagement is what prompts the authors of The Good Society to call 
for diminishing the emphasis on specializations and applied technologies and “reintegrate 
cognition with a more fully human understanding.”260
                                                 
259 As recently as 1994, but therefore prior to the most recent violence, many Palestinian students at another 
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 “Genuine education” continue the authors of The Good Society, “knows no 
boundaries….A concern for understanding our own society inevitably raises the question 
of where we are in relation to all other human cultures, past as well as present.”261  
Spanning national and cultural borders will not be possible without a fundamental 
reorientation of the purposes of the university away from the utilitarian understanding 
now prevalent.262  Only by reversing this trend toward utilitarian education can academe 
take its first step away from participating in the process of violence in our society and 
toward the integration of society in a way that does not artificially conflate the broader 
more inclusive notion with the needs and interests of a particular nation-state, but is 
authentically interested in the well-being of all of humanity.  
Religion needs education to open society’s meaning-making process to the 
ontological dimension of reality in order to re-write the religion-governed myths of myth-
making. But education’s signification processes are regressing into utilitarianism because 
religion, the institution which prescribes modes of meaning-making, has been relegated 
to the realm of the private and has very little, if any, standing in the academy. Even if it 
did have standing in the academy, religion has been regressing itself, so any meaning-
making processes it would encode would be increasingly violent.  
 So, simultaneously, education needs to rehabilitate its self-understanding in order 
to establish moral meaning in its own institutional terms. In so doing, it will have the 
capacity to rehabilitate religion. Religion simultaneously needs to help education think 
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through how to synthesize meaning in a way that is native to and authentic to education 
and not pointed toward religious, governmental, or economic ends.
 
   
 CHAPTER FIVE 
LEADERSHIP AS MEANING-MAKING 
 
To revive and advance public discourse about the relationship between religion 
and education, I wish to explore the proposition that it is possible to change the 
signification processes of persons, not apart from institutional contexts but as a part of 
those contexts. The change must occur with full knowledge that the institution(s) is (are) 
acting on the person just as the person is influencing institutional change. The persons 
upon whom I wish to focus are those whose roles, skills, or access to resources give them 
the capacity to facilitate meaning making for groups of people – leaders. By examining a 
process of leadership development as an exercise in growing meaning-making capacity 
beyond what the current institutional contexts prescribe and allow with the hope of 
creating more pacific meaning-making processes and institutional patterns, I suggest a 
theory of leadership development that cannot only rehabilitate education and religion in 
their own terms in the United States to make way for more public discourse on what is 
meaningful in United States society, why it is meaningful and what makes it meaningful, 
but also to begin to establish new precedents for signification processes other than those 
which are prevalent in the Untied States today. This would begin to reform institutions 
and thereby reshape US society, its constituent cultures and those of the societies 
influenced by US global hegemony. This exploration must begin with a more critical 
examination of leaders and leadership.
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Leadership and Authority 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to engage in any serious conversation about 
leadership without appreciating the contributions to this field made by Max Weber. 
Though his German to English translators infrequently use the terms leader or leadership 
themselves, many of the prevailing concepts – or perhaps conflations of concepts – of 
leadership emerge from and/or react to his rich school of social thought.263  
More important for Weber than a notion of leadership is the idea of authority and 
what makes authority legitimate. Legitimate authority makes possible what Weber terms 
Imperative Co-ordination.264 For Weber, there are “three pure types of legitimate 
authority” which, correspondingly, create the possibility of three types of imperative co-
ordination: Legal authority, legitimated on rational grounds, Traditional authority, 
legitimated on traditional grounds and Charismatic authority, legitimated on charismatic 
grounds.265 The one who exercises legal authority in a rational bureaucracy is regarded by 
Weber as the person “in authority who occupies an office.” The person and the office are 
separable. The person’s authority is derived from the office and the office is derived from 
the rationality of the bureaucratic structure. Any orders issued by the officeholder are, 
thereby, impersonal edicts from the office more than they are orders from the person.266 
In such a bureaucracy the offices are organized in a hierarchy and the officeholders are 
often selected by virtue of possessing a certain set of technical skills required for the 
efficient execution of the duties of that particular office.267  
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 Traditional authority, however, derives legitimacy from an understanding of how 
power has been transmitted over time. As such it is dependent on a collectively held 
understanding of the past. The authority rests with a person, perhaps in a monarchic line 
of succession, and not with his or her office, even though the person might derive such 
personal loyalty and power as a result of rules established beyond the memory of any one 
particular individual, including, say, the queen, the leader, or “chief.”268
 Charismatic authority also accrues to the person possessing it as opposed to 
accruing to the impersonal entity of the office. However, unlike traditional authority, 
charismatic authority is imparted to someone by the group because of personal qualities 
or attributes. Those characteristics are described by Weber as being “supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”269 Despite the fact 
that charismatic authority is highly personal, it can endure over time through a process of 
“routinization.” Routinization perpetuates the social group which responds to the 
charisma and which, in turn, seeks a successor to the charismatic leader. The successor 
necessarily will be someone who is judged by the group to possess many of the same 
qualities and characteristics as the original leader. While hereditary succession may play 
a role in the selection of a new leader, this type of succession should not be confused with 
the mantle which is passed down through generations in a structure retaining a traditional 
type of authority.270
 Weber describes each of these models as ideal types and suggests that often 
groups of people respond to a mixture of these types of authority. He goes into great 
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detail about sub-classifications of each of these and discusses ways in which types of 
authority may complement one another in various circumstances. 
 While Weber describes the various types of authority, he does so without being 
explicit about the purposes of such authority. He simply describes how it works, rather 
than why such authority is warranted, desired, or useful. To get at his understanding of 
the relevance of authority requires a review of some of the foundational points in his 
work leading up to his own discussion of charismatic, traditional, and legal authority. 
Authority, for Weber, “is the legitimate exercise of imperative control.” Imperative 
control is the likelihood that a command will be obeyed by a group of persons. A 
corporate group, a technical term for Weber that obeys such commands from a legitimate 
authority is, in Weber’s terms, an “imperatively coordinated” group.271 Constitutive of all 
corporate groups is the presence of a head, chief, or leader or, that is, a person in 
authority.272 A corporate group is a specific type of social relationship, which, Weber 
insists, exists only in the presence of the likelihood of a course of social action.273 In turn, 
he clarifies that social action is meaningful human behavior which, “by virtue of the 
subjective meaning attached to it by the individual (or individuals), it takes account of the 
behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.”274 In his explicit treatment of 
meaning, Weber paints a somewhat utilitarian understanding, linking an object or 
organism to a purpose. It must serve as a means or an end to be intelligible or 
meaningful.275 However, a more thorough reading of his basic definitions of sociology 
and social action allows for the possibility that meaning is derived from “ultimate ends or 
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values” or from other altruistic aspirations which may or may not be intelligible to 
anyone other than the persons whose actions they orient.276
 Sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt explores the linkage between Weber’s understanding 
of authority and meaning by examining more closely the concept of charisma for Weber 
and for sociological analysis beyond Weber. Weber’s distinctions between charismatic 
authority and the other two pure types of authority begin to wear down once charisma is 
routinized. In fact, Eisenstadt points out that Weber coins terms to express the 
institutionalized charisma one finds in successive officeholders, “charisma of office,” and 
in holders of familial, inherited, and transferred posts, “kinship, hereditary, and contact” 
charisma respectively.277 Eisenstadt acknowledges that several studies in the research of 
charisma follow Weber’s lead in assuming that charismatic authority, institutionalized or 
originary, is most saliently effective in times of extreme crisis and with people who are 
feeling a deep sense of personal alienation.278 However, drawing primarily on the work of 
Edward Shils, Eisenstadt concludes that charisma, which he links even more closely with 
the search for meaning than Weber, is elementary in any ordered set of social 
relationships. 
The search for meaning, consistency, and order is not always something 
extraordinary, something which exists only in extreme disruptive 
situations or among pathological personalities, but also in all stable social 
situations even if it is necessarily focused within some specific parts of the 
social structure and of an individual’s life space.279  
 
Eisenstadt contends that this presence of charisma in ordinary life is borne out in 
contemporary sociological research. Within that area of research, he identifies charisma’s 
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prominent role at times of transitions or “rites of passage.”280 The necessity or the 
effectiveness of charisma correlates to times when persons or groups actively participate 
in life events which cause them to “experience some shattering of the existing social and 
cultural order to which they are bound.”281 After such shattering, the persons or groups 
look to the charismatic for re-establishing that order. 
Hence in such situations they become more sensitive to those symbols or 
messages which attempt to symbolize such order, and more ready to 
respond to people who present to them new symbols which could give 
meaning to their experiences in terms of some fundamental cosmic, social, 
or political order, to prescribe the proper norms of behavior, to relate the 
individual to collective identification, and to reassure him of his status and 
of his place in a given collectivity.282
 
Again, it is important to emphasize that Eisenstadt does not view the advent or 
appreciation of charisma as an extraordinary occurrence. The studies he reviews indicate 
that it is “part of any orderly social life-of the life of individuals as they pass from one 
stage in their lifespan to another, or from one sphere of activities to another, and of the 
organization of groups and societies.”283 So charisma may be no less rare an occurrence 
than is the regular need for making meaning or sense out of changing life circumstances. 
Perhaps the seemingly regular need for charisma is the reason it surfaces as an attribute in 
many leaders holding various types of positions and exhibiting any of Weber’s ideal 
types of authority.  
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Routine Charisma 
 In describing a particular leader in an academic setting, F. Stuart Gulley notices 
the presence of a mixture of Weberian ideal types, including that marked by charisma. 
While the position of university president is sufficient enough of an office to imbue the 
officeholder with power, especially early in a president’s tenure, the personal traits of the 
president become increasingly important as his or her tenure lengthens. Although 
charisma is not something that all higher education leaders share, in Gulley’s estimation, 
former Emory University President James T. Laney did exhibit this specific set of traits 
in his academic presidency. 
In remembering Laney, many of his senior staff describe him in 
charismatic terms. They refer to his ability to listen, his oratorical skills, 
his facility with language, his sharp penetrating mind, his energy, his 
tenacity, his competitive and entrepreneurial instincts, his pastoral 
sensitivities, a combination that made him a rare academic leader.284
 
While Gulley treats charisma as but one trait of many that made Laney a 
successful and effective president, by his own analysis, Gulley makes the case that it is, 
in fact, charisma, that made the other traits powerful, if not altogether possible. As Laney 
lived out his own model of teamwork, his ability to listen and his pastoral sensitivities 
surely made him more prone to know and understand “the importance of those on the 
margin having their rightful voice in the decision making of the institution.”285 His 
articulation of a vision in a way that would “gain the support of others” would have been 
more anemic without oratorical skills, facility with language and a penetrating mind.286 In 
the midst of “diverse constituent groups and varying agendas” Laney found ways to 
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“make ambiguity work for him” because of, most likely, his energy, tenacity, 
competitiveness, and entrepreneurial instincts.287 And finally, and Gulley makes this link 
explicit, it was Laney’s charisma that allowed him to serve as a mentor and example for 
his staff engaging the “moral dimensions of the office” by demonstrating “a model of 
fairness and integrity that won him the respect of his followers.”288
 Gulley’s account of Laney’s leadership gives a contextual grounding for Weber’s 
connection between authority and meaning. Especially when read through Eisenstadt’s 
interpretation of Weber in light of more recent studies, Laney’s approach to what Gulley 
interchangeably terms “moral leadership” and “effective leadership” demonstrated 
genuine concern for persons, especially in times of great transition.289 Some close staff 
members credit him as “one of the most important and influential figures in their 
lives.”290
He remembered people, expressed interest in their concerns, shared his 
grief with them when they experienced disappointment or loss and 
happiness and pride at a major accomplishment or marker event; such as 
birthdays and anniversaries.291
 
On a broader level, Gulley commends Laney for successfully articulating a vision for 
Emory. A vision, in Gulley’s terms, must answer the following questions: “Whom does 
the institution serve? How might it better and more effectively offer its services? Why 
does it exist?”292
 Laney’s leadership was effective because it was meaningful in the lives of the 
persons who made up the organization as well as meaningful in the organization’s life 
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itself. Whether applying Weber’s utilitarian means-ends test for meaning, his test for a 
referent of ultimate values or use Eisenstadt's test for consistency in times of transition, 
Laney’s leadership, his gift, his charism, was the ability to create, evoke, articulate, and 
sustain a sense of meaning. 
  In Laney’s presidency, Eisenstadt’s evaluation, and Weber’s definitions, a leader 
makes meaning. But what about leaders in other settings, perhaps less accurately 
described by Weber’s mechanistic notions of bureaucracy or who exhibit leadership 
styles which deviate from or intentionally thwart traditional notions of authority and 
leadership as defined by Weber? 
 Estella Bensimon and Anna Neumann contend that the shape of the university 
presidency is changing as the organizations presidents serve also undergo transformation. 
In Redesigning Collegiate Leadership, the pair observes that the role of any single 
individual is diminishing in favor of group efforts, which Bensimon and Neumann refer 
to as a “leadership team.”293 In examining the way fifteen different college and university 
presidents used the teams at their disposal, Bensimon and Neumann observed varying 
degrees of optimization of the collective group. The more presidents truly relied on the 
team to share in the governance of the institution the more they were able to exert 
strength in Bensimon and Neumann’s evaluation of their leadership capacity. 
Interestingly Bensimon and Neumann identify teams with strong cognitive functioning, 
that is a team that “thinks together,” as exhibiting “significant leadership.” The reason? 
“They are actively involved in the interpretation of meaning.”294 For Bensimon and 
Neumann, interpreting meaning consists of the team shaping and altering views of and 
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responses to a particular situation, including the understanding and interpretation that the 
president himself or herself brings to the circumstance.295 They argue that even those who 
depart from the mechanistic organizational models of the past hold onto this fundamental 
tenet. Whether found in a single individual or in a group of individuals, “leadership 
requires skill in the creation of meaning that is authentic to oneself and to one’s 
community.”296
 Going beyond the walls of colleges and universities provides other examples of 
leaders who also exhibit the principles observed and commended by Bensimon and 
Neumann. Such is the case with Carol Bartz, for instance, chairman of the board, 
president and CEO of Autodesk, a leading maker of design software and related 
technology products. Michael J. Marquardt and Nancy O. Berger profile Bartz and other 
leaders in Global Leaders for the 21st Century.297 Their portrait of Bartz describes her as 
believing “in the importance of shared decision-making.”298 Much as Gulley describes 
Laney, she attempts to lead by example acknowledging that “she must set the example by 
not micromanaging her staff, and that they, in turn, must not micromanage their 
employees.”299 This approach and her other attributes as leader suggest to Marquardt and 
Berger the image of a symphony conductor who believes a leader’s role involves 
facilitating goal-setting and promise-keeping while instilling purpose and urgency.300
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 Management researcher and theorist Warren Bennis, along with his co-authors of 
Beyond Leadership, Jagdish Parikh and Ronnie Lessem, credits a leader’s vision as 
crucial to instilling that sense of purpose and goal-setting. 
When the organization has a clear sense of its purpose, direction, and 
desired future state, and when this image is widely shared, individuals are 
able to find their own roles both in the organization and in the larger 
society of which they are a part. This empowers individuals and confers 
status upon them because they can see themselves as part of a worthwhile 
enterprise. They gain a sense of importance, as they are transformed from 
robots blindly following instructions to human beings engaged in a 
creative and purposeful venture.301
 
So Bennis joins Gulley and others in establishing vision as a key element in leadership. 
But notice the peculiar relationship among vision, charisma, and meaning. Charisma, 
according to Eisenstadt, is necessary to enable leaders to provide stability in times of 
transition. It is this stability, which bridges the unsettled middle that provides meaning 
for persons within organizations and/or the entire organizations themselves. However, the 
articulation of a vision seems to be precisely geared toward destabilizing the status quo 
and articulating a future self-concept for the organization. Again charisma is necessary 
for persuading others to share the mental image of the future. It seems to be irrelevant for 
many analysts whether or not the status quo needs changing, although some will contend 
that the absence of change at this time in history, particularly in the business world, 
portends death to the organization.302 In many ways that taken-for-granted maxim is 
moot. Whether the times demanded change or not, the leadership examples I have 
examined, whether alone or as part of a team, evoked a desire for change by charismatic 
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means and, by those same means, provided the support and guidance necessary to 
navigate such change. 
While Weber anticipated routinized charisma in organizations that outlived their 
leaders, this seems to be something different.303 Rather than routinized charisma, it seems 
to be routine charisma. It is almost as if charisma is the object or end of leadership and 
not only the means of securing and conveying authority. It is no longer simply an 
attribute of leaders, it is, as Gulley makes it out to be, synonymous with effective 
leadership. So leaders, no matter their style and no matter which of Weber’s ideal types 
best describe the authority they wield, can create meaning, but to a certain extent they can 
also create the need for meaning-making itself. They do so by articulating a vision that 
bridges the gap between the past and the future through an uncertain middle. As Gulley 
puts it, “Only by understanding the past of the followers in the organization can the 
leader move the followers into the future.”304 Bennis confirms, “With a vision, the 
executive provides the all important bridge from the present to the future.”305 Not only do 
leaders facilitate meaning-making, often during times of personal or organizational crises 
during which time seems to stand still, but, they also do so in the very real context of a 
group’s history. Charisma, then, becomes descriptive of a quality or a tool that any leader 
of any type may or may not possess – a quality or tool that enables him or her to facilitate 
meaning making for persons and groups of persons.  
 Clearly Weber could conceive of organizations that exist without experiencing 
such disruptive crises or major organizational shifts through time, and he could conceive 
of authority that did not derive from charisma. However, his suggestion that his ideal 
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types could blend seems to be true to the observations in the accounts we have considered 
thus far. But whether crises come without evocation or are created by the leaders, they 
come, and the role of the leader is to bridge the gap of uncertainty with a meaningful 
vision.  
 
Meaningful Leadership 
This role for meaning making in leadership informs my theory of leaders as 
meaning makers. Frankl’s situation offers a laboratory of extreme conditions which 
allows us to distill some principles of the meaning-making process more clearly than 
from situations in less extreme conditions in which other circumstances occlude or 
distract from the fundamental processes at work. Frankl’s journey from a relatively 
speaking stable life before being taken prisoner through Naked Existence and then 
through Cannibalism and then through Deceptive Dreaming offers a baseline anatomy of 
the impact change has on social construction and meaning-making.  
 While Frankl’s change was forcibly thrust upon him, even voluntary change 
requires a person or a group to question old norms in light of the facts of a new reality, to 
move through a phase of generating provisional norms to cope with the temporary reality 
of transition and adjusting those provisional norms to suit the facts of the new reality on 
the other side of the change. While organizational change can happen with more rapidity 
than the three years Frankl spent in the concentration camp, the search for meaning at 
each stage is the same. The actors in society struggle with Berger’s anomy, alienation, 
and bad faith until they again become co-builders of society. 
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 Eisenstadt’s demonstration that Weberian charisma, read through subsequent 
social research, links the effectiveness and need for charisma with persons experiencing 
deep senses of alienation. Further he discusses the important role charismatic authority 
plays in helping persons put together pieces of shattered lives or worlds. His association 
of charisma particularly with times of great transitions and rites of passage link this 
fundamental attribute of leadership to the type of change and search for meaning so 
poignantly described in Frankl’s account. 
 Further, each of the leadership case studies discussed above suggests that leaders, 
in their meaning-making capacity, offer groups consistency through times of transition, 
even if the leader or leadership team, himself, herself, or itself had dislodged the group 
from the status quo to begin with. Both the stability through the transition as well as the 
motivation of the group members to enter that transition emanate from the articulation 
and sustaining of a vision of a future state. In other words, a leader deploys charisma to 
articulate and sustain a synthesis between the is and the ought, even if the ought is a 
future state relative to the group’s experience of the is. The charismatic motivators 
contrast the future with the present in normative terms and create a sense that the future is 
better than the present. Vision shields the group’s members from the anomy of Naked 
Existence by supplanting the current ought with a newly articulated version of what 
should be. It sustains the group through the harsh realities of the transition itself, by 
preventing alienation with a sense of working toward a common purpose and vision. 
Perhaps most importantly it has to ring true for the group as plausible, when the reality-
check of the future arrives, lest it be judged to have been a bad faith effort or a deceptive 
dream. 
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 Note, however, particularly in Gulley’s description of Laney, that the charismatic 
leader not only has the skill to motivate people to undertake the transitions which risk 
plunging individuals and groups into successive and severe crises of meaninglessness, 
charisma also entails being able to meet people in crisis, or times of transition, and help 
them create a sense of meaning in those times. On the personal and organizational level, 
persons experience anomy, alienation, and bad faith. They find themselves, for a variety 
of reasons, dislodged from that which once made sense out of life. Leaders can deploy 
charisma to aid persons in their quests to create, discover, or reclaim meaning during 
times of loss or life transition.  
 
The Ritual of Meaning Making 
Whether the leader evokes a change or simply supports others through such times, 
making meaning must attend to the dynamics of life transition. For a thorough discussion 
of what happens during moments of substantive change, I turn to anthropologist’s Victor 
Turner’s book, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure.306 The subtitle offers 
clues to his discussion as well as to the shape of this analysis.  
Turner observes commonalities among some of the rituals of the Ndembu people 
of central Africa and some movements and social processes of twentieth century United 
States. Among the themes he abstracts, Turner describes the phenomenon of “liminality.” 
He attributes his understanding of liminality to Arnold Van Gennep’s “liminal phase” 
during rites of passage. The word liminal, Turner points out, is from the Latin, limen or 
threshold. The liminal is one of three phases found in times of transition from one state to 
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another. On either sequential side of the liminal phase are separation and aggregation 
respectively.307
The first phase (of separation) comprises symbolic behavior signifying the 
detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in 
the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions (a “state”), or from 
both. During the intervening “liminal” period the characteristics of the 
ritual subject (the “passenger”) are ambiguous; he passes through a 
cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming 
state. In the third phase, the passage is consummated. The ritual subject, 
individual or corporate, is in a relatively stable state once more and, by 
virtue of this, has rights and obligations vis-à-vis others of a clearly 
defined and “structural” type; he is expected to behave in accordance with 
certain customary norms and ethical standards binding on incumbents of 
social position in a system of such positions.308  
 
Turner’s work, drawing on his field experience and Van Gennep’s concepts, reduces 
otherwise complex social behavior into three discernable points of analysis. The three 
phases, in fact, describe well the experiences chronicled by Frankl on a grand scale, over 
the three years of internment as well as on a miniature scale in any number of the micro-
transitions Frankl experienced. 
 On a macrocosmic scale, it is possible to see Frankl’s three years as a rite of 
passage from separation from his wife, profession and Austrian society through the 
liminal period of the prison camps and back into Austrian society again - this time 
without his wife. It is also possible to view, in microcosm, his transition into camp as a 
rite of passage, one that required a shift from the state of his position in Austrian society 
to that of a prisoner in the camp through the liminal moment of physical and existential 
nakedness in the shower. Similarly his re-entry into Austrian society likewise required a 
separation from camp life, coming to grips in the margins with his Deceptive Dreaming, 
and assimilating to a new life in his old home. Certainly there were many other such 
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microcosmic transitions during his time there. Nevertheless, the process seems to be 
roughly the same. Whether from Naked Existence, through Cannibalism and beyond 
Deceptive Dreaming, or through each of those stages respectively, it is possible to discern 
Turner’s phases and, therefore, possible to probe more deeply into the dynamics of all of 
them.  
 Turner draws our attention to the middle phase of the rites of passage. In so doing, 
he exposes the profundity of what Berger terms anomy. 
The attributes of liminality…are necessarily ambiguous, since this 
condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of 
classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. 
Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between 
the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and 
ceremonial. As such, their ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are 
expressed by a rich variety of symbols in many societies that ritualize 
social and cultural transitions. Thus liminality is frequently likened to 
death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to 
the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon.309  
 
Macrocosmically, and relative to his life before and after camp, Frankl’s imprisonment 
was marked by many of these attributes. Microcosmically, each stage of Frankl’s journey 
also had such characteristics relative to the before and after states of each transition 
respectively. 
 So Frankl’s journey, Naked Existence-Cannibalism-Deceptive Dreaming, my 
anatomy of social construction and meaning-making, is a rite of passage, which, in turn, 
potentially consists of multiple rites of passage. In the middle of each passage is a 
complete dissociation from social structure. Berger’s analysis shows, and Frankl’s 
observations suggest, the importance of not only regaining a sense of that social structure 
                                                 
309 Ibid., 95. 
 
   
 147
but claiming one’s responsibility for co-shaping it with others to avoid the alienation and 
bad faith which can follow anomy. 
 Leadership, as a meaning-making endeavor, therefore, requires a leader to 
motivate others to join him or her on the threshold between the rooms of past and future 
states, to experience this anomy and the liminality together. Charisma, as described in 
Laney by Gulley, requires a leader to exhibit his or her ability to make meaning within 
that threshold space, by showing concern at times of major life transitions during which 
the passenger, to use Turner’s term, is experiencing liminality outside of the urging of the 
leader, but simply in response to what he or she has encountered in life.  
 
Communitas and Meaning 
 Whether inspiring others to join the trek into and through liminality or meeting 
others in those marginal points of existence, the work of a leader or a leadership team 
implies relationship with others. For this reason, liminality, if it has anything to do with 
group processes, must be considered not only on the personal level but also in the plural. 
Relying on the work of social psychologist Martin Buber, Turner develops the concept of 
communitas to describe the collective experience of that which “breaks through the 
interstices of structure, in liminality; at the edges of structure in marginality; and from 
beneath the structure, in inferiority.”310 It is important for comprehending this concept to 
distinguish it from the structures of society which normally provide the only artifacts for 
social scientific inquiry and are therefore often mistaken for the totality of society itself. 
Turner understands communitas as another “dimension” of society which is 
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“spontaneous, immediate [and] concrete” in contrast “to the norm-governed, 
institutionalized, abstract nature of social structure.”311
 It is the human connectedness experienced in and through communitas which 
provides the substance of society. The bonds which society’s structures order are formed, 
discovered, celebrated, and experienced most fully in communitas. In fact, the experience 
of the liminal is so energizing in this respect, Turner observes and analyzes several 
instances of, ironically, structured attempts to preserve the experience of communitas for 
what would otherwise be non-liminal moments. The process for doing this, of course, is a 
perpetual seeking of liminality. Turner turns to St. Francis of Assisi and his rules for the 
Franciscan order of monks as an example. 
In all of this, Francis appears quite deliberately to be compelling the friars 
to inhabit the fringes and interstices of the social structure of his time, and 
to keep them in a permanently liminal state, where, so the argument in this 
book would suggest, the optimal conditions inhere for the realization of 
communitas.312
 
The pursuit of liminality for the sake of perpetuating communitas requires the monks to 
disregard and disavow structures – at least structures other than, ironically, the rules 
which govern the order. The anti-structural symbol of the Franciscan order relates to the 
relationship Turner sees between property and structure. Disavowing property and 
thereby all structure, except of course the Rule of St. Francis itself, is represented for 
Francis by nakedness which symbolized “emancipation from structural and economic 
bondage.”313
 So was it communitas that Viktor Frankl discovered in the bath house? It was 
certainly liminality. Losing his book was a symbol of losing structure or at least 
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connections with social structure he had internalized. The anomy described by Berger, 
then, is the unstructured environment necessary for the experience of communitas. Naked 
Existence, insofar as it homogenized differences in that bath house, created an experience 
of human connectedness and the fertile circumstance for collective meaning-making.  
Communitas has also an aspect of potentiality; it is often in the 
subjunctive mood. Relations between total beings are generative of 
symbols and metaphors and comparisons; art and religion are their 
products rather than legal and political structures.314
 
Far from being unstructured, camp life was highly organized and required 
conformity with the discipline meted out by the guards. However, the dissociation from 
the structures of Austrian society provided the opportunity to experience communitas 
within the walls of the camp. Perhaps it was the structure of the prison that complicated 
life as inmates moved from Frankl’s Naked Existence phase to Cannibalism. While one 
understandable path is the dehumanizing one of alienation, the path of meaning-making 
requires one to look around the edges of the camp structures. The restrictions of the camp 
and the authoritarian environment crowded out with structure almost every opportunity to 
experience anti-structure. It was not orderliness, curfews, or uniforms that provided the 
opportunities to synthesize the is and the ought, it was on the fringes of the order that 
Frankl found purpose and inspiration - in the cook who ladled soup fairly, and in 
recounting stories with fellow prisoners after lights out and in daydreaming while digging 
ditches.  
 Again, upon release and finding that his wife had died and that life would not be 
ordered as it had been in his imagination, structure fled and left the void for communitas. 
Those acting in bad faith without realizing the delusion of their Deceptive Dreaming 
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were unable to re-engage life outside the camp in meaningful ways. It was the coming to 
grips with the lack of structure again, that allowed the regeneration of meaning to 
commence. Whether with prisoners from various countries, ethnicities, and stations in life 
staring at the fixtures in the bath house ceiling, or with a dying inmate in the bunk above, 
or with the Austrian neighbor who had never experienced a concentration camp but 
whose life had been disrupted by the war, or even with his wife – living or dead – but 
removed from his presence, Frankl experienced the human connectedness of communitas. 
 Frankl and those with whom he discovered he was profoundly and thoroughly, 
connected, made meaning on the edges, the fringes, especially at moments during which 
he was making transitions from one known structure, through a liminal state into another 
structure. These transitions were brought into relief by the strictures of camp life, as 
Turner observes: “Yet communitas is made evident or accessible, so to speak, only 
through its juxtaposition to, or hybridization with, aspects of social structure.”315  
To use the analytical terms from above, Frankl did not allow the abundant oughts of his 
life to crowd out completely an experience of the is. 
For communitas has an existential quality; it involves the whole man in his 
relation to other whole men. Structure, on the other hand, has cognitive 
quality; as Lévi-Strauss has perceived, it is essentially a set of 
classifications, a model for thinking about culture and nature and ordering 
one’s public life.316
 
Communitas, in its purest form, is an existential experience in the extreme. It is important 
here, however, to restate Turner’s description of communitas as a dimension of society, 
not an alternative to it. The existential qualities of society are always present alongside 
the structural qualities. Even if communitas is the generative source of symbol and other 
                                                 
315 Ibid., 127. 
316 Ibid., 127. 
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artifacts of meaning, it becomes so, only in relation to social structure. Even in the case 
of the Franciscans, the pursuit of communitas is an activity governed by norms. Meaning 
is found in the synthesis of the is and the ought, the movement between communitas and 
structure, or more precisely in Turner’s analysis, between anti-structure and structure. “In 
other words, each individual’s life experience contains alternating exposure to structure 
and communitas, and to states and transitions.”317 For Turner, this latter proposition is a 
developmental one.  
There is a dialectic here, for the immediacy of communitas gives way to 
the mediacy of structure, while in rites de passage, men are released from 
structure into communitas only to return to structure revitalized by their 
experience of communitas. What is certain is that no society can function 
adequately without this dialectic. Exaggeration of structure may well lead 
to pathological manifestations of communitas outside or against the “law.” 
Exaggeration of communitas, in certain religious or political movements 
of the leveling type, may be speedily followed by despotism, over 
bureaucratization, or other modes of structural rigidification. 318  
 
Turner’s advocacy for balance has implications beyond individualistic existential 
experience. It clearly suggests that adequate meaning-making processes are essential 
components of ordering life together. In Turner’s terms, then, effective leadership is a 
function of the health of the balance between anti-structure and structure.  
 
Charisma and Communitas 
 With Turner’s descriptions as a backdrop, Weber’s ideal types of authority, now, 
can be read back into the process of meaning making. Regarding traditional authority as 
that which symbolizes continuity and derives imperative control over groups from 
heredity shows leadership in the mode of preserver of social structure. Even the most 
                                                 
317 Ibid., 97. 
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structured societies, and perhaps especially the most structured societies, provide 
opportunities to experience communitas. Such leadership transmits norms or oughts from 
the past, into and through the present for a vision of the future which is by and large a 
continuation, if not expansion, of the status quo. It is from such structures that 
charismatic authority breaks and against which it defines itself. Charismatic leadership is 
liminal leadership. It articulates a vision that is decidedly different from the status quo or 
intercepts an already disrupted status quo. Whether the structures are fading away or the 
vision itself calls for a rejection of those structures, the charismatic leader must be adept 
at making meaning in the wilderness of change. It is here that the group, which has 
entrusted a charismatic leader with the role of facilitating meaning-making, experiences 
communitas and begins to construct shared modes of signification. The experience of 
communitas without structure, is, however, inadequate and requires the preservation of 
that meaning made in new forms of order and differentiation. 
Here, bureaucratic authority is required to capture and perpetuate the meaning in a 
structure that provides order and differentiation. The bureaucratic leader does so, 
however, in increasingly less personal ways and in ways that create structures that 
eventually, again, crowd out the experience of anti-structure, against which the anti-
structure will begin to appear in stark relief. 
Other than the movement to routinize charisma, it is an oversimplification of 
Weber to suggest that he was articulating a historical procession from traditional to 
bureaucratic authority, and I do not mean to imply a cycle of authority that begins again, 
necessarily, with a charismatic response to bureaucracy. What is clear, I think from 
Weber’s ideal types, however, when read against the backdrop of the stories and 
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processes I have examined, is that leaders make meaning. Both traditional authority and 
bureaucratic authority impose norms on realities by creating hierarchies, systems, laws, 
and power structures. While traditional forms of leadership derive normative power from 
an ontological reality, such as heredity, and bureaucratic authority presumes the extant 
normative power of the organization’s structure or, in the case of an individual, of his or 
her specialization, both forms attempt to shape the is by the ought. The cases of 
bureaucratic leaders I examined above showed effectiveness in breaking down 
hierarchies and specializations, in effect breaking apart the bureaucracy. Now we can 
examine those moves as making way for interstitial spaces within the structure for the 
necessary experiences of liminality and, subsequently, communitas. In this way, the 
bureaucratic leader, or, perhaps even an empowering monarch can incorporate 
charismatic qualities in the imposition of power. Without such interventions, however, 
the ability for the group to make meaning for itself is limited. Rather, it is imposed as the 
is and the ought are fused by, literally, the powers that be. This leads to, in the case of 
traditional authority, disaffected alienation as seen in the Cannibalism stage of Frankl’s 
analysis. In the case of bureaucratic authority, it can lead to the bad faith of Deceptive 
Dreaming because the normative is perpetuated without respect to changing existential or 
ontological realities.  
Only charismatic authority (or incorporation of some of its qualities) seems to 
have the capacity for allowing the is to be in conversation with the ought. An anti-
structure virtuoso, the charismatic leader releases those who go with him or her from the 
bonds of extant structures and norms. What the charismatic leader does with that 
meaning-making opportunity is the subject of this inquiry. Charismatic leaders, by having 
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access to the powerful resource of communitas, are engaged in collective meaning-
making, the powerful outcome of which will be shared.  
How will the charismatic leader influence the shape of that meaning and what 
influences the leader? It is possible to conceive of charismatic leaders facilitating 
meaning making in more and less desirable ways. What are those ways and how can we 
influence more desirable and fewer undesirable outcomes? And finally, what is at stake in 
this project of influencing the meaning-making capacity of leaders? 
 Leaders are meaning makers. Frankl’s theory generalizes that every person 
searches for meaning and is capable of synthesizing the is and the ought alone, but not 
outside the context of relationships. Leaders facilitate meaning making for groups of  
people at various levels of social complexity. In a relationship between two people, even, 
one may exhibit more influence over the common praxis than the other. In groups, one or 
more persons may be the repository and interpreter of custom, in organizations, leaders 
are charged with articulating and enforcing tradition and, institutionally, it is the leaders 
who act out the rituals that locate those traditions in the mythic framework of society. On 
the societal level, it is leaders who interpret and author the myths that situate the society 
in light of universal reality. 
 In this chapter, I identified charisma as the quality of a leader that enables him or 
her to make meaning no matter what leadership style he or she employs and no matter 
which of Weber’s ideal types of legitimate authority brought him or her into a position of 
imperative coordination. Charisma is the leadership quality that imbues the leader with 
the confidence of those within his or her sphere of influence to evoke a sense of 
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communitas in times of liminality and, in many cases to also be the one who calls the 
group or causes the group to muster the fortitude to endure liminality in the first place. 
Change agents, perhaps, but whether or not the leader evokes the change, when familiar 
structures fade into anti-structure, the charismatic leader, or more properly the leader who 
possesses a sufficient degree of charisma will make sense of that change.
 
   
 CHAPTER SIX 
LEADERSHIP AND VIOLENCE 
 
Leaders use charisma to make meaning. Earlier I discussed more and less violent 
modes of signification. It follows then that some forms of leadership can make meaning 
in explicitly violent way. In other words it is possible to conceive of more and less 
violent types of charisma. Such is the case with some political dictators, for instance. 
Hitler was known for his charisma, but the ways he made meaning for Nazi German 
society set the context for the tragedy with which Frankl had to come to terms and 
millions more just like him. Other forms of leadership appear orderly and peaceful and 
therefore seem to defy this axiom. These instances of leadership are either in fact non-
violent or trade on a manner of imperceptible sublimated violence. Such may be the case 
with the United States Presidency since World War II at least. While great conservators 
of the status quo in many cases, the status quo preserved served to reinforce a power 
structure which the US dominated or shared with the Soviet Union at times. Many in 
smaller countries around the world would view the way the status quo was preserved as 
violent and, in some cases terrifying. Pax Americana may only be Pax for Americans. In 
this chapter, I will examine the meaning-making mechanisms employed or the way 
charisma is used by various leadership styles – those overtly oppressive and those subtly 
so. I will also look at the potential for leadership styles or ways of making meaning that 
trade on a less violent form of charisma. 
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There are a number of ways to classify leadership styles. I will choose one such 
taxonomy offered by Brian Hall in a number of works, the latest of which is The Genesis 
Effect: Personal and Organizational Transformations. I choose Hall not only because of 
his close personal work with Paolo Freire,319 but also because his discussion of leadership 
is based on a latter day developmental theory which takes into account many of the 
classical developmental theorists and which has learned from many of the critiques of 
those theories.320 Hall also has developed a corresponding evaluative system for 
identifying leadership style on which he based his theory of human development. So 
one’s leadership skills and capacity do not simply reflect, for Hall, a choice from a menu 
of style options, they emerge from the complexity with which one understands and relates 
to the world.321 I will examine his seven leadership styles in terms of René Girard’s 
theory of mimetic rivalry and violence to detect the potential for sublimated violence in 
various leadership styles.322
 
Hall’s Taxonomy 
Brian Hall approaches leadership from the standpoint of his own work in values 
theory. He developed his theory over decades as a result of Christian missionary work in 
Central America with the Anglican Church of Canada. “It was there that I met and was 
                                                 
319 Brian P. Hall, The Genesis Effect,(Makati City: Don Bosco Press, 2000), 14-15. 
320 Hall, Genesis, 14-5; 89-92, for example. Although any developmental theory – and Hall’s is no 
exception – implies that some ways of behaving, knowing, leading or believing are more advanced or more 
desirable than others, Hall seems to pay particular attention to the way this has, in the past, emerged in a 
manner that portrays (what is often described as) masculine normative biases. Much of Hall’s work attends 
to an integration of (what is often described as) feminine and masculine dimensions in every person at 
every point of development. In fact, the higher levels of development seem to correspond with a notion of 
complexity and connectedness associated more with feminine epistemologies in Mary Field Belenky, 
Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, Jill Mattuck Tarule, Women’s Ways of Knowing: The 
Development of Self, Voice, and Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1997), 228-229.  
321 Hall, Genesis 239-241, for example. 
322 Girard, Berkshire Review, 11-13.  
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influenced by Paolo Freire, Ivan Illich, and Erich Fromm. Their main impact was to 
conscientize me to the dynamic relationship among languages, cultural, societal, and 
institutional development.”323 Hall continued his work in the field of Christian pastoral 
counseling and, with a number of collaborators, began to expand his understanding of 
values which he describes as “a quality information system that when understood tells 
about what drives human beings and organizations and causes them to be exceptional.”324 
Unapologetically developmental in concept, Hall’s framework builds on the work of 
Abraham Maslow and Milton Rokeach and specifically defines 125 values which he 
maps onto four phases and eight stages of development. The transitions between stages 
correspond to seven different leadership styles: Authoritarian, Paternalist, Manager, 
Facilitator, Collaborator, Servant, and Visionary.325 Hall’s investigations revealed that the 
seven leadership styles corresponded to what he, and his fellow researchers, came to 
realize were “seven cycles of human and spiritual development, and the leadership stages 
were simply one aspect of a far greater whole.”326 I will discuss each of these leadership 
styles in terms of Hall’s corresponding developmental phases, stages and worldviews as I 
explore the implications of Girard’s mimetic theory for each stage, and the theory in 
general. I include a highly abridged version of Hall’s Development Map below for a brief 
overview and introduction.327 Although my presentation of Hall’s developmental model 
is linear in appearance, a person’s or organization's movement through stages may not be 
as sequential and as linear as the process might appear on paper. 
                                                 
323 Hall, Genesis, 1. 
324 Brian P. Hall, Values Shift: A Guide to Personal and Organizational Transformation (Rockport, MA: 
Twin Lights Publishers, 1994), viii. 
325 Brian P. Hall, “The Omega Factor: A Values-Based Approach for Developing Servant Leadership,” 
October 27, 2003 [document on-line]; available from 
http://www.knowandrelate.com/docs/OmegaFactore[1].pdf; Internet; accessed December 10, 2003, p. 5. 
326 Hall, Genesis, 93. 
327 Ibid.  
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Figure 9: Development Map 
Phase Worldview Stage Cycle: Leadership Style 
1: Safety   
I. Surviving 
The world is a mystery 
over which I have no 
control. 2: Security 
One: 
Authoritarian 
3: Family 
Two: 
Paternalist 
II. Belonging The world is a problem with which I must cope. 4: Institution 
Three: 
Manager 
5: Vocation 
Four: 
Facilitator 
III. Self-Initiating 
The world is a project in 
which I want to 
participate. 6: New Order 
Five: 
Collaborator 
7: Wisdom 
Six: 
Servant 
IV. Interdependent 
The world is a mystery for 
which we care on a global 
scale. 8: World Order 
Seven: 
Visionary   
 
In the following sections, I will depart temporarily from an active discussion of 
education and religion. However, following the examination of leadership styles, I will 
re-engage the notions of education and religion as institutions which sustain patterns of 
behavior related to explicating reality (education) and synthesizing meaning (religion) at 
various stages of development. I will also discuss the need for the institutions themselves 
to be healthy in order to support healthy meaning-making patterns and processes. 
 
Leadership and Mimetic Rivalry 
The violent processes of mimetic rivalry and scapegoating as described by Girard 
involve five main elements: Rival 1, Rival 2, the object of desire, the scapegoat, and the 
hero (or sacrificed scapegoat which brings order). Each of Hall’s first five leadership 
styles involves relational arrangements which reflect the rivalrous violence of mimetic 
relationships. I will refer to the mimetic and scapegoating aspects of each leadership style 
as a relational posture - that is as a position taken by the leader relative to others for 
whom he or she serves as a leader, and, to some extent, relative to the social or relational 
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entity in which the group finds or places itself.328 The postures relate to the way in which 
the leader appropriates energy for himself or herself or facilitates the deployment of 
energy within the social system in which he or she leads. It is the appropriation (or 
deployment) of energy that fuels the meaning-making synthesis which, as we have seen, 
is the project of leadership. Energy is simply the ability to do work. The work of leaders 
is to synthesize meaning. Power is the rate at which energy is consumed to do that work. 
What is powerful, i.e. what has the ability to deploy energy effectively, varies from social 
context to social context and is prescribed by the dominant myths of the relevant society. 
In one society, economic wealth may indicate power, another military might, in yet 
another religious piety, and in yet another some combination of the aforementioned or a 
different set of qualities altogether. Whatever power is in different contexts, how it is 
used determines the level of violence inhering in the leader’s charisma. 
 
Authoritarian as Dominant Rival 
 The first, and therefore developmentally least advanced, of Hall’s leadership 
styles is that of the Authoritarian or Autocrat.329 The authoritarian leadership style 
corresponds to Hall’s “Cycle One: The Primal Cycle.” In this cycle “the adult is 
motivated by the need for security and material ownership, and the struggle for physical 
survival. Ethical choices are based on self-interest which is viewed as the most practical 
way for all to survive.”330 Rooted in the safety and security stages of Phase I: Surviving, 
leadership in this cycle is “necessarily Autocratic on a day to day basis, and control of 
                                                 
328 I am referring to the levels of social complexity in the Moral Meaning Matrix. So a leader could be 
taking this posture relative to an organization, institution or society. 
329 Over time, Hall has shifted terms. Dictator, Authoritarian, Autocrat, and their respective derivatives are 
used in different publications but represent the same set of concepts. 
330 Hall, Genesis, 94. 
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property, profit margin and financial flow, are of utmost importance. 331 Loyalty to the 
organization through its leader [is an] overriding criterion for ethical choices.”332
 While operation at this level is helpful in the midst of life and death crises when 
barked directives to get out of a burning building, for instance, would be preferable to a 
facilitated conversation about perceived danger in the same instance, it loses its efficacy 
and can even be destructive when the context for leadership is not that dire.333 The leader 
postures himself or herself as a dominant rival whether the leader is hurrying people out 
of a burning building or placing “unrealistic expectations on others” at work for the sake 
of controlling property, making a profit, or acting out of a deeply insecure fear about 
one’s place in the world. In any case, the directive nature of this leadership relationship is 
one of a dominant rival, the surviving fittest. In its worst form, it can take the character of 
“domination…a form of manipulation where the individual bullies or threatens persons 
into doing what he or she wants.”334 One rival has appropriated power relative to the 
other or others in the case of the authoritarian leader. The leader, in this case, is able to 
obtain and control the object of desire, whatever it is, as long as he or she maintains that 
power differential. The autocrat concentrates the energy needed for the meaning-making 
synthesis and is able to impose his or her own norms or values on the system. In that way 
the leader gets to decide and define whether or not the way things are is the way things 
ought to be. With this kind of control, the leader can direct resources to adapt the is to his 
or her preferred ought, or simply assert a new ought by fiat. 
 
                                                 
331 I will make reference, without further citation, to the Development Map above and which can be found 
in a number of Hall’s publications.  
332 Hall, Genesis, 97. 
333 Ibid., 99. 
334 Hall,Genesis, 101. 
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Paternalist/Maternalist as Object of Desire 
 Rivalries in relationships spring up out of a common and mimetically intensified 
desire for an object. The centrality of the object of desire gives it a special place outside 
of the relationship itself. The Paternalist leaders, situated in Hall’s Cycle Two: The 
Familial Cycle which bridges the transition between Phase I: Surviving and Phase II: 
Belonging, act according to the values related to stages two and three: security and family 
respectively. Self worth, belonging, and being liked are among the possible values for 
individuals who find themselves at this particular stage and with this particular leadership 
style. A benevolent autocrat, this leader reserves decisions for himself or herself while 
listening and caring for those who are subordinate within the hierarchy. Potentially 
concerned with social prestige, this parental leader is as interested in looking good to his 
or her superior as being loved and supported by his or her peers and underlings.335 The 
followers in this case, says Hall, still feel “oppressed relative to the expression of ideas 
and personal authority, but feel cared for much like a child feels about a parent.”336 While 
Hall discusses the perspective of the follower in the singular, in a group setting this 
metaphor would suggest that fellow followers are like siblings who must curry favor with 
the parent. If the parent’s favor is limited in any sense then seeking it, i.e., the object of 
desire, is a source of rivalry and competition. 
 Being concerned with external desirability, the leader in this cycle avoids the 
conflict of the rivalry himself or herself but remains in control by taking the position as 
the object of desire fostering the rivalry. The Paternalist/Maternalist thereby retains the 
power that others in the social system want. This leader uses that energy to synthesize the 
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is and the ought, again in the way he or she wishes, but the others in the system assent to 
and affirm the synthesis in the spirit of one-upsmanship in the competition with fellow 
rivals for the affection of the synthesizer-leader. 
 
Manager as Scapegoater 
 Hall characterizes the Cycle Three leader as one dedicated to “Efficient 
Management.” This person, who is moving from a family-oriented life perspective to one 
that is more centered in institutional life, is deepening values such as self worth, 
control/duty, and tradition and discovering emergent values such as worship, work/ 
confidence, and law/duty.337 This leader’s worldview has shifted from “The world is a 
mystery over which I have no control” to “The world is a problem with which I must 
cope,” according to Hall.338
 This transition begets a leadership style that understands business as “ordered, 
efficient, and productive. It is therefore managed bureaucratically through the principles 
of scientific management… [such as] management by objectives… [and has a high regard 
for]…respect for superiors and the rules of the…organization.”339 The manager is able to 
muster the organizational team around objectives or a set of principles and practices 
which are less dependent upon the subjectivity of his or her own dicta than in the two 
leadership styles previously examined. Within the mimetic and rivalrous relationship at 
work, then, the effective manager points away from himself or herself and away from the 
group to a set of goals or rules which organize activity.  
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 In the earlier stages, the rivalry among individuals in the system is controlled by 
the autocrat’s appropriation of power which gives him or her the ability to dominate the 
relationship entirely and the more benevolent dictator’s (Cycle Two) success in situating 
himself or herself as the object of desire. Still the locus of power and authority, the 
manager has subordinates who compete with each other for access to that power.  
 As discussed above, rivals ultimately wish to prevent the other in the relationship 
from acquiring that which they so intensely desire. Insidiously this acquisition prevention 
is intensified by the mimetic effects of the relationship. As the violence intensifies in the 
relationship, effective leaders must channel and redirect that energy. In the relationships 
described by Girard, communities will identify a scapegoat upon which to direct that 
violent energy and, in some cases, hatred. In the rawest, most "primitive" societies this 
might involve the actual ritual sacrifice or immolation of a human or animal victim.340 
For Girard, religious sacrifices are related to religious codes, “Religious prohibitions 
[are] efforts to prevent mimetic rivalry from spreading throughout human 
communities.”341 Both ritual sacrifice and religious rules manage escalating interpersonal 
rivalry. I suggest that attention to law and duty is attention to the same sort of control. A 
leader with these values recognizes, perhaps on an unconscious level, the disorder which 
is just beneath the surface. Organizational rules also help sustain differentiation within 
the system. As people increasingly imitate one another, the distinctions between and 
among people begin to break down. Rules, guidelines, roles, and specializations help 
people distinguish themselves from each other when their desires are drawing them 
increasingly closer to non-differentiation. Picture the classic US bureaucratic workplace 
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festooned with identical cubicles. The more the differentiation breaks down, the more the 
group moves toward a chaotic violent free-for-all.342 Girard asserts that rituals shore up 
the group’s ability to deal with its “loss of differentiation whose ultimate expression is 
the creation of a ‘mob.’”343
 The effective manager attempts to control this mob dynamic with rules and 
practices that support and sustain the differentiation and shores up that effort with rituals 
that actually re-enact scapegoating. Policy-making on the one hand, which prescribes 
rules and procedures and defines roles relative to those rules and procedures represents 
the orderly way that managers try to create and preserve distinctions. On the other hand, 
engaging in strategic planning process that evoke “out of the box” thinking when the 
rules ostensibly do not apply provide (albeit a muted bureaucratic version of) a ritual that 
places planning goals and objectives outside the group – often on the altar of a flip chart 
or PowerPoint slide. By directing and focusing the attention and energy of the would-be 
mob outside the system of relationships on objectives, the manager gains unanimity in the 
group, not unlike that experienced after actual religious sacrifices which “assuage the 
desire for violence.”344  
 With less blood and fanfare, a manager might lead a group in a planning process 
which outlines future goals. If the goals are thought of as the inverse of negative elements 
which the group desires to reverse, expel, modify or otherwise cast out or destroy, then it 
is easy to see, in Girard’s terms how “management by objective” can “relieve” a group of 
their “tensions” helping them “coalesce into a more harmonious group.”345  
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 As Hall points out, one of the tendencies of those operating in Cycle Three is to 
be overly competitive and alienating of persons who are not loyal to the system.346 In 
either case the identification and expulsion now gives the group what Girard would 
identify as “a single purpose, which is to prevent the scapegoat from harming them, by 
expelling and destroying him.”347 Managers execute plans. Managers are executives. 
They “carry out” problems from within the community and on behalf of the community. 
Sometimes the problems they carry out of the system are the employees whose salaries 
must be cut from the budget in order to protect, for example, the third quarter earnings 
statement since it is, after all, the celebrated (i.e. holier than personnel) objective of the 
flip chart ritual. 
 The executive or manager acts, in religious analogue as a priest, organizing 
communities around a set of rules and rituals which translate the violence of mimetically 
rivalrous relationship into orderly differentiation and/or rallying around common efforts. 
The effective manager exploits this dynamic to maintain order and create meaning. The 
energy necessary to synthesize the is and the ought comes from the energy of the rivalries 
themselves. That energy is re-channeled by the manager for the maintenance of the 
community. In so doing, he or she creates legitimacy and plausibility for the actions 
necessary to manage the community. The manager does not have to inject his or her own 
power into the system, but must effectively appropriate the energy brought to the system 
by the group members. The least dictatorial of what Hall describes as three levels of 
autocracy, the manager leads by managing the scapegoating tendencies of the group. 
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Facilitator as Victim 
 For Hall the next transition is an important one. The move from Phase II to Phase 
III signals a move from an “Autocratic” to a “Participative” lifestyle. The person making 
this transition is now beginning to see the world as “a project in which [he/she] must 
participate.”348 Emerging values for the person in Cycle Four, which Hall labels the 
“Intrapersonal Cycle,”349 include equality, service, actualization/wholeness, and 
empathy/generosity. “The strong institutional values of Phase IIb and Phase IIIA [cause] 
the feeling of uncertainty in the areas of decision making….Ethical issues no longer seem 
black and white [for instance].350
 In “The Omega Factor,” Hall refers to Cycle Three’s leadership style as 
“Facilitator.”351 In Genesis Effect he uses the term “Enabler...an interim style due to its 
conflictual nature. The leader is caught between adherence to institutional demands, and a 
new view of human dignity and sense of self. The leader/follower distinction is not clear 
for this person.”352 For these reasons, it is important to consider this cycle and this 
leadership style in relation to the one preceding it and the one following it. It is the 
transition between manager and collaborator. The group-defined self must give way to 
the interpersonally and intrapersonally defined self. Unlike the autocrat whose identity 
derives from the rivalry which he or she dominates, unlike the Paternalist/Maternalist 
whose identity is derived from sustaining desirability, and unlike the manager who looks 
for identity outside of himself or herself and the group, the locus of authority and identity 
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begins to shift internally at this point.353 The facilitator or enabler is beginning to put the 
group process above his or her own needs or direction.  
 At the center of the group process, the facilitator or enabler begins to diminish 
himself or herself for the sake of the community. In a metaphorical sense, the self as 
center of power dies as the leader begins an inward search for personal authority and 
direction. In this way, the leader is offering himself or herself as a scapegoat to the group, 
allowing them to unify around his or her own self-sacrifice.354 The scapegoated leader 
facilitates the process of meaning-making by enabling the members of the group to begin 
synthesizing the is and the ought with their counterparts who are brought together by the 
harmonizing effects of the relative diminution of the leader. It is possible that some of the 
leadership teams examined by Bensimon and Neumann involved university presidents 
who were operating out of this – or a later – cycle of leadership development. The 
concept of leadership team would only begin to make sense at this level of personal 
development.  
 
Collaborator as Hero 
In Hall’s terms, this diminution results in a leader who now transcends the group 
dynamics, whose presence is not integral to the function of the group, but whose 
influence has the effect of unifying the group, empowering its members to the point 
where the leader should be able to delegate to a competent colleague anything for which 
the leader has responsibility. “This person sees the whole first and the parts second” and 
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is susceptible to the “corrupting influences of power, particularly manifest in the person’s 
inability to accept personal limitations.”355 Based in Cycle Five which is a transition 
between values which emphasize “Vocation” and those which emphasize “New Order,” 
this self-initiating Phase II leader “move[s] beyond personal human issues to integrating a 
human systems perspective. 356 The Collaborator-Hero has died to himself or herself and 
to the group, and has moved into a (developmentally) unprecedented place from which to 
empower the group to realize its potential for partnerships and for meaning making in a 
context that transcends the interpersonal and intra-group dynamics. 
 While the sacrifice of the leader in the previous cycle is not a bloody one and does 
not involve the type of violence directed at a victim that we might observe in other social 
situations, the leader’s diminution of himself or herself is for the sake of the order and 
harmony of the group. Antithetically, then, the leader’s prominence, if reasserted, could 
threaten the order and may be treated as such. When the sacrificial transition is complete 
and the leader is no longer a central figure, the leader may experience what Girard calls 
“double transference.”357 Prior to the sacrifice, those perpetrating the violence blame the 
victim as a scapegoat responsible for the disorder of the group. Once the sacrifice is 
complete and the desire for violence is satisfied, those who previously converged upon 
the scapegoat now celebrate the victim whose sacrifice restored order and assuaged 
violent impulses that otherwise would have run rampant throughout the group. So, not 
only is the scapegoat seen as a threat to the order of the group prior to sacrifice, but also 
he or she is venerated as a god or hero once the group’s order is also attributed to his or 
her sacrifice. So the leader gets the blame for the disorder and the credit for restoration or 
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preservation of order. The collaborator is the transcendent leader to whom such credit 
accrues. 
 
Servant as Transformer 
“Servant leadership,” according to Hall, “is different than all other forms, in that it 
not only moves beyond any form of autocratic tendency, but it also transforms the value 
of independence into interdependence.”358 This style thwarts rivalry, scapegoating, and 
acquisitive desire by causing “creative synergy in the group that cannot be obtained by 
any one individual alone. In other words, leadership beyond this cycle is always plural in 
form.”359 Meaning is made by the group which shares energy as it synthesizes the is and 
the ought. Leaders in this category are beginning to understand the world as “a mystery 
for which we must care.”360 As the leader moves away from embodying a mythic 
understanding of leadership and relational dynamics, he or she exposes a new way to 
sustain order and meaning at the expense of no one, thus demythologizing the 
organization’s behavior and values. In so doing, he or she aids in the transformation of 
the organization into a non-rivalrous and, therefore, non-violent community. 
 Up to this point, the discussion has centered on leadership styles that are based in 
Girard's assessment of rivalry in human relationships. Moreover, that rivalry is mimetic 
and, by that mechanism, self-intensifying. Each leadership style thus far has described 
different ways for leaders to locate themselves relative to that human dynamic for the 
purpose of channeling, coping with, or exploiting the power of the underlying violence 
for the purpose of meaning-making. For Girard, this is a “basic principle behind the 
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mechanism which, in a single decisive moment, curtails reciprocal violence and imposes 
structure on the community.”361 Further, Girard suggests that “in order to retain its 
structuring influence the generative violence must remain hidden.”362 Understanding 
human relationships in this way is unattractive and confounded by the fact that the 
mechanism’s effectiveness depends on its own misunderstanding. Modernity hides the 
mythic mechanism with claims that modernity and myth are antonyms. “We are not 
dealing with the sort of repressed desires that everyone is really eager to put on public 
display, but with the most tenacious myths of modernization; with everything, in short, 
that claims to be free of all mythical influence.”363 The understanding that modernity is 
free of myths is in itself a myth that helps conceal the influence of the mythic 
mechanisms that Girard suggests are insidiously most effective when hidden or 
concealed. The servant leader exposes this myth and thereby the underlying violence of 
the mimetic rivalry in all the previous stages, fundamentally disrupting the mechanism 
and thereby interrupting the cycle of acquisitive desire and violence that humans 
perpetuate for the sake of maintaining order which we, ironically, confuse with peace. 
Girard argues that the most effective exposition of the mimetic mechanism is one 
which reveals the innocence of the scapegoat or sacrificial victim. The dynamics leading 
up to the identification and expulsion or immolation of the scapegoat ascribe to that 
person or problem the guilt for causing disorder and lack of differentiation. In religious 
terms, the scapegoat embodies the sins of the community. The community must be rid of 
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the sin and therefore rid of the scapegoat. Revealing the social utility of the mechanism, 
which depends on absolute conviction that the scapegoat is, in fact, guilty of the above, 
requires demonstrating that the scapegoat is innocent of that which the community has 
ascribed to him or her. For Girard, the Christian Gospel demonstrates that 
“Jesus…provides the scapegoat par excellence – he is the most arbitrary of victims 
because he is also the least violent. At the same time he is the least arbitrary and the most 
meaningful because he is the least violent.”364  
Girard argues that the insight of the Gospel is itself misunderstood for the sake of 
perpetuating the violent structures which underlie all institutional forms, including 
religious ones.365 The mythic misunderstanding of the Gospel Scapegoat is that Christ 
was modeling a self-sacrifice or that God the Father required the sacrifice of Christ for 
the expiation of sin. Girard points out that “Jesus dies, not as a sacrifice, but in order that 
there may be no more sacrifices.”366 Exposing this insight distinguishes the servant phase 
of leadership from the scapegoat-hero coupling of cycles four and five, which depend 
upon a (self-)sacrificial system of meaning-making. So whether the scapegoat was the 
manager’s set of planning objectives, the facilitator, or the collaborator, the servant-
transformer exposes the scapegoat as a social artifact and not an inherently necessary 
component of group order. By so doing, the servant-transformer offers a new paradigm 
for group meaning-making that is collective and cooperative in nature. 
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Visionary as Strange Attractor 
 Hall’s developmental model is linear in appearance, but recall that a person’s or 
organization's movement through stages may not be as sequential and as linear as the 
process might appear on paper. Hall relies on metaphors and principles from physics and 
mathematics’ chaos theory to describe his system.367 A values-based vision draws one 
into the future as if it were a “strange attractor” giving order to what might otherwise 
seem to be a set of disconnected events, relationships, and behavior.368
 The most developed vision-level values which draw one into the future are 
represented in Cycle Seven, among them are wisdom and transcendence/ecority.369 For 
Girard, the quest for peace and wisdom are intertwined and mutually confounding; “You 
cannot become aware of the truth unless you act in opposition to the laws of violence, 
and you cannot act in opposition to the laws of violence unless you already grasp the 
truth.”370 This is rare and difficult to achieve. In chapter ten, I will flesh out a specific 
example of a Palestinian Melkite priest whose actions and influence seem consistent with 
visionary leadership in that they embody Girard’s admonition that “the Gospels tell us 
that to escape violence it is necessary to love one’s brother completely – to abandon the 
violent mimesis.”371 Notice Girard modifies the word mimeses. Mimesis itself is 
fundamental to human relationships and “is not to be done away with, but is to be 
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fulfilled, transformed, and ‘converted.’”372 Imitating love at the level described above 
uses the mimetic effect, not for rivalry and violence but for peace.373
 Hall describes the leader in this cycle as “Visionary” in “The Omega Factor” and 
as “Prophetic” in The Genesis Effect. In either case, leadership at this level involves 
“interdependent governance by a peer team, [which manages] a system on the basis of 
pre-chosen value clusters.”374 In addition Cycle Seven – and the people and organizations 
operating within that cycle reconnect with values and people in Phase I.” The whole 
person at this cycle therefore integrates the values of survival, security and self-
preservation as they are experienced by others at a global level…. Issues of world peace 
and poverty are going to be major action concerns.”375
 If leaders in Cycle Seven are embodying Girard’s love in community and are, as 
Hall suggests, able to relate to any person at any level of values development, then not 
only do the vision values act as strange attractors, but also the visionaries themselves do, 
if by no other means than through the mimetic mechanism so well-rehearsed at any of the 
stages of previous development. Visionaries as strange attractors draw people into their 
own futures through mimesis but replace acquisitive desire and rivalry with 
interdependence, wisdom, transcendence/ecority, and love. The future into which others, 
then, are being drawn is one not founded on violence and sustained by the myths which 
mask the inherency of violence, but one formed in community that understands 
leadership as a community proposition. Because leadership is a meaning-making activity 
and, in Cycle Seven is a community act, synthesizing the is and the ought in this Cycle 
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generates its own self-sustaining energy as meaning is internalized, expressed, and 
synthesized simultaneously by a synergetic interdependent community whose mimetic 
love intensifies and compounds as rapidly as mimetic rivalry. 
 Hall places Gandhi and Saint Francis of Assisi at Cycle Seven. My appropriation 
of Girard’s work for Cycle Seven comes from a chapter entitled the “Divinity of Christ,”  
underscoring the rarity of Cycle Seven leaders.376 However, Hall suggests that 
technology, global communication, and advances in education are combining to produce 
an increasing number of Cycle Six leaders who may later be capable of advancing into 
Cycle Seven. 
 Hall’s analysis is very much informed by his experience with the Christian faith. 
Girard grounds his anthropological insights in his understanding of Christianity as well. 
Both would claim that the theories they have put forward can be generalized beyond 
Christianity. However, for the sake of this dissertation, it is sufficient to understand 
simply the correlation between an example of a religious myth system and a particular 
taxonomy which I have shown it influences. My analysis to this point is clearly through 
the lenses of Christianity, particularly as it is practiced in the United States. The 
conclusions I have drawn thus far do not need to be extrapolated to other contexts in a 
strict manner. The particular influence of Christian theology on a particular taxonomy of 
leadership styles merely demonstrates the functional relationship between the deployment 
of power by leaders to make meaning on the one hand and a religious symbol system on 
the other. It also provides landmarks by which to judge various ways of making meaning 
in violent and non-violent ways. In other words, it documents the existence of various 
types of charisma. 
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In subsequent analysis, I will examine how this functional relationship that is 
capable of encoding violence in social systems, such as the organizations led by those 
who operate with Hall’s first five leadership types, can translate through to broader and 
narrower levels of social complexity and influence culture formation on various levels. 
Recall also, that even though the examples I use above locate these conclusions in a 
particular context, the context, namely the United States, holds an unusually influential 
place in global affairs and therefore the meaning-making systems prescribed and 
reinforced by dominant myths in this context have the potential of exporting themselves 
into other contexts. This is not unlike the ways Freire observed colonizing norms 
oppressing indigenous cultures by forcing the colonized to communicate using the 
language of the colonial power. So for good or for ill, given the present international 
conditions, the degree to which meaning-making in the United States is violent influences 
the level of violence in meaning-making systems around the world.
 
   
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
CULTURES AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
 
Leadership involves the more or less violent ways of making meaning. Examining 
the meaning-making process on organizational, institutional, societal, and global levels 
demonstrates more and less violent ways of relating on all levels of social complexity. 
Using the language of the Moral Meaning Matrix, leadership on the organizational level 
appropriates authority to synthesize language and category in tradition. On the 
institutional level, a leader balances jurisdictions for the sake of synthesizing symbol and 
nomos in significant rituals. On the societal level, a leader deploys power to synthesize 
ethos and worldview in coherent myths. Global leaders, then, are challenged with 
detecting and helping to create a new common global culture which can see the is and the 
ought simultaneously and with sustainable energy. 
 This chapter will explicate the mechanism by which the various levels of social 
complexity in the Moral Meaning Matrix are linked. Once those links are established, I 
will expose in greater detail how the meaning-making processes, evoked by leaders at 
various stages of leadership development, actually use energy to synthesize the is and the 
ought in what might be thought of as a theory of cultural thermodynamics. Detailing 
minor distinctions among the various cycles of leadership will reveal a major distinction 
between what, in Victor Turner’s terms, I will call uninitiated and initiated leaders. 
Finally, I will show that even though some leaders are initiated into meaning-making
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 mechanisms that release rather than consume energy, most leaders operate as if the 
social systems they lead are closed to external influence. This presupposition of leaders 
contributes to an over-reliance on violent types of charisma.  
 
The Social Fractal 
To gain perspective on the interlocking relationships among the various levels of 
social complexity, I turn again to chaos physics and mathematics to order and integrate 
otherwise disparate levels of analysis within the Moral Meaning Matrix.377 I wish to use 
the idea of fractal to explore the possibility that each of the levels outlined in the schema 
are comprised of infinitely repeating patterns expressed successively by increasingly 
contextual levels. The universe level is comprised of the patterns of societies; societies, 
institutions; institutions, organizations; organizations, groups; groups, persons and 
interpersonal relationships. Fractal geometry suggests that patterns repeat on infinitely 
refined scales. Therefore adjustments in interpersonal patterns of relating require or cause 
adjustments in societal patterns and vice versa. 
 Developmental theories focus primarily on the personal, interpersonal and, 
increasingly, on the organizational level. But, to my knowledge few have answered the 
call of The Good Society to examine institutional development in a way that effects 
changes at the societal level. To that end, I propose to use this framework to develop 
further a theory of leadership development that can effect growth on all levels including 
the institutional. In order to do that, I will relate the institutional level of the matrix to its 
neighboring levels of society and organizations. I will examine the phenomenon of 
cultures, including the prospect of global culture, using, primarily, Samuel Huntington’s 
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The Clash of Civilizations.378 I will look at the simultaneous interconnectedness of 
multiple levels of social complexity using the emerging ideas of network and complexity 
theories. 
 
Network and Complexity Theories 
The structural nature of the Moral Meaning Matrix combined with the 
progressivism of Hall’s developmental theory opens the discussion up to a post-structural 
critique that would expose the inadequacy of any theoretical construct used to describe 
the dynamic reality of social relationships. Furthermore, such a systematic approach 
purporting to be systemic in scope runs the risk of moving from the realm of the 
descriptive to the normative. Even if such models could succeed at adequately describing 
reality at any given moment in time, the very articulation of such models holds the 
potential of shaping reality, or at least future interpretations of it, by the model’s 
influential introduction into the language used to understand social dynamics themselves. 
Conversely, and perhaps more insidiously, is the prospect that the normative has bled 
over into the descriptive in the first instance. Pure description is thereby rendered 
impossible by certain normative assumptions that remain unarticulated but which are 
given expression in a so-called descriptive framework. 
 Rather than try to unpack what those hidden assumptions might be or to try to 
sterilize the models so as to be purely descriptive, it is wholly consistent with the Moral 
Meaning Matrix that such an ambiguous interplay of the normative and descriptive 
(ontological) would occur in any attempt to make sense out of reality. The enterprise of 
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this investigation and analysis is a meaning-making exercise itself. It is a project of trying 
to reconcile reality with theory in a way that can influence reality in the future.  
 The contribution of deconstructionists is to expose the normative nature of models 
which purport to be purely descriptive. The purported descriptions take on normative 
attributes either by embedding normative assumptions or by creating them. Theoreticians, 
then, are left with two possibilities: abandon any attempts to be descriptive or 
acknowledge the interplay between the descriptive and the normative. I have chosen the 
latter path because this choice allows me to proceed with a pursuit of a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between social change and leadership development but 
not one that can represent itself as a closed system devoid of influences external to the 
system being described. Philosopher Mark C. Taylor makes a helpful distinction in this 
regard between the terms “totalizing” and “whole” when responding to deconstructionist 
critiques that might otherwise render theoretical discussion futile. He reacts specifically 
to the deconstructionist perspective articulated by Jacques Derrida.  
What Derrida cannot imagine is a nontotalizing system or structure that 
nonetheless acts as a whole. Important work now being done in 
complexity studies suggests that such systems and structures are not 
merely theoretically conceivable but are actually at work in natural, social 
and cultural networks.379  
 
Derrida and others point out that totalizing structures or systems are closed. For instance, 
theories, as mine seems to be up to this point, that neatly sum up all possible occurrences 
can represent and behave as totalizing structures. Taylor points out that “the violence of 
structuralism results from persistent efforts to reduce difference and repress otherness.”380 
This provides a stark warning as I proceed. It is possible for me in developing a theory 
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about violence – violence caused by imposing norms on reality – that I develop a 
normative system with the capacity to be as violent as the systems which I examine and 
hope to transform. But there must be a way to proceed without creating the illusion of a 
closed and complete system or structure because, as Taylor points out: 
Deconstruction changes nothing. While exposing systems and structures 
as incomplete and perhaps repressive, deconstruction inevitably leaves 
them in place. This is not merely because deconstruction involves 
theoretical analyses instead of practical action but also because of the 
specific conclusions reached by theoretical critique. Instead of showing 
how totalizing structures can actually be changed, deconstruction 
demonstrates that the tendency to totalize can never be overcome and, 
thus, that repressive structures are inescapable.381
 
 As an example of a system that is non-totalizing but acts as a whole, Taylor turns 
to the emergence of technology in the twentieth century. Its implications on 
manufacturing and on communication are profound, even to the point that production has 
been crowded out by information as the currency of the modern economy. The influence 
of media and technology “cannot help but reach the very limits of the system, as soon as 
entire sectors of society topple from productive forces to the pure and simple status of 
reproductive forces.”382 A deconstructionist critique would argue that even an 
information-based society is closed and that any presumptions about social arrangements, 
for example, based on this paradigm are in fact structural in nature and ignore 
fundamental presuppositions. But Taylor observes something more profound here, a 
system and a paradigm that does not construct walls to resist difference. He observes: 
The technologies of production and reproduction in network culture are 
creating strange loops that are transforming rather than destroying 
differences and oppositions that long seemed secure. In a world where 
screens displace walls, neither map nor territory, code nor substance, 
information nor matter, image nor reality, virtuality nor actuality, 
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simulacra nor the real is what it had seemed to be when it was the opposite 
of its presumed other. Something else, something different, something 
new is emerging.383
 
In this chapter and in the chapters that follow, I intend to re-read the Moral Meaning 
Matrix as a system that acts as a whole but does not attempt to totalize. In the analysis of 
signification processes that follow, I hope to offer yet another example of a model that 
avoids structural pitfalls of crowding out difference without simply stopping at a 
deconstructionist self-critique.  
 In order to proceed down that path, it is important to rehearse here some of the 
important elements of complexity studies or complexity theory. It is first of all important 
to have a grasp of the overwhelming influence of many powerful factors at work in 
shaping social life in the twentieth and, now, in the twenty-first century. One of the most 
salient metaphors which social and natural scientists are using to describe these 
influences is the image of the network. Not only does this metaphor connote the influence 
of rapidly developing technology in our lives during what has become known as the 
Information Age, it also provides the possibility for understanding the rapid and 
seemingly unpredictable connections that people make with people by various means. In 
sum, it describes the means and results of human connectedness. Social and natural 
scientists alike describe this nexus of relationships as network culture.  
In order to assess these changes, it is important to understand information 
as inclusively as possible. Information is not limited to data transmitted on 
wireless and fiber optic networks or broadcast on media networks. Many 
physical, chemical, and biological processes are also information 
processes. This expanded notion of information makes it necessary to 
reconfigure the relations between nature and culture in such a way that 
neither is reduced to the other but that both emerge and coevolve in 
intricate interrelations.…What is emerging in this moment is a new 
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network culture whose structure and dynamics we are only beginning to 
fathom.384
 
Understanding nature and culture in this way allows us to take into account the diversity 
observed in most systems by social and natural scientists, to respect chance and to begin 
to describe randomness. Rather than another attempt to create a paradigm that applies 
itself uniformly to all circumstances, network theory allows for structure and chance to 
live together in what is known as a self-organizing system. Rather than leaving us adrift 
in a sea of lack of understanding of deconstructed social and natural phenomena, network 
theory provides an opportunity to describe the complexity of relationships by 
demonstrating the existence and arrangements of relationships in the first place.  
 
Network Theory 
Physicist Albert-László Barabasi distinguishes what he terms “real networks” 
from classical theory about the randomness of networks developed thoroughly over the 
last half-century by mathematicians Paul Erdös and Alfréd Rényi. Random network 
theory “equated complexity with randomness. If a network was too complex to be 
captured in simple terms, it urged us to describe it as random. Sure enough, society, the 
cell, communication networks, and the economy are all complex enough to fit the bill.”385 
With a nod of respect to the role that randomness and chance play in the construction of 
real networks, Barabasi describes such systems as “spiderless webs.” 
In the absence of a spider, there is no meticulous design behind these 
networks either. Real networks are self-organized. They offer a vivid 
example of how the independent actions of millions of nodes and links 
lead to spectacular emergent behavior. Their spiderless scale-free topology 
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is an unavoidable consequence of their evolution. Each time nature is 
ready to spin a new web, unable to escape its own laws, it creates a 
network whose fundamental structural features are those of dozens of 
other webs spun before. The robustness of the laws governing the 
emergence of complex networks is the explanation for the ubiquity of the 
scale-free topology, describing such diverse systems as the network 
behind language, the links between proteins in the cell, sexual 
relationships between people, the wiring diagram of a computer chip, the 
metabolism of the cell, the Internet, Hollywood, the World Wide Web, the 
web of scientists linked by coauthorships and the intricate collaborative 
web behind the economy, to name only a few.386
 
So what are the implications of understanding society as a network, or perhaps 
more accurately, as a network of networks? In order to answer that question, I will 
analyze the model which provides the metaphor I am appropriating. Part of that analysis 
must be, however, determining whether the model is a metaphor that aids in describing 
complex social systems or an actual description of the system itself or both. Barabasi 
seems to take the approach that networks are not only a metaphor but also an actual 
description of social phenomena. In fact, he labels it a new science that provides the 
benefits of a metaphor, namely creating a “new language…allowing us to casually 
converse about ideas and issues that we were struggling to describe before.”387 However, 
he studies social systems as well as physical, biological, and technological systems using 
mathematical tools. To the extent that all mathematics is metaphorical, the new science  
remains in that realm. To the extent that mathematics describes in common terms the 
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properties of diverse phenomena, then he has developed mathematical formulations that 
aid in the understanding of social as well as physical complexities.  
What then are the properties of complex, or in his terms, real networks? While 
Erdös and Rényi easily described the properties of random networks, these networks did 
not exhibit any particular order. The arrangement of each new connection with extant 
nodes was, in fact, random. What Barabasi observed in most complex, real, or naturally 
occurring networks, however, was that connections formed between nodes in a non-
random fashion thus yielding the bell curve useless in describing and predicting the 
activity of growing networks as they became scale-free and developed hubs – or highly 
connected nodes – while many, if not most, nodes remained only minimally connected by 
comparison. It appeared as if these networks were moving from randomness to 
orderliness. Reinforcing this notion was the fact that in natural systems, power laws - the 
formulae describing the emergence of hubs – emerge only rarely. In fact they are closely 
associated with physical phase transitions such as that state between water and ice and the 
point at which a ferromagnetic metal becomes magnetized. Power laws signal a time of 
flux, but one that is moving from the disarray of water molecules to the crystalline form 
of ice or from the randomly arranged magnetic spins of millions of atoms to a 
unanimously aligned array of spins. Both of these phase transitions, and others, occur at 
what scientists call critical points. For water turning to ice, for example, the critical point 
is the freezing temperature of 0° Celsius.388
The mathematics of most naturally occurring networks seem to indicate that such 
networks are in a state of change and that time or some other factor can evoke orderliness 
out of randomness at any moment. Instead, Barabasi concludes that the scale-free 
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networks are not moving from disorder to order in the traditional conception of order. 
They are, in fact, stable and ordered in a highly complex manner, a manner which by and 
large defies our ability to understand all of their properties.389  
The emergence of the power laws, then, is attributable to at least two factors, 
according to Barabasi. The first is growth. Erdös and Rényi had categorized networks as 
random. In order for this assumption to obtain for as long as it did required those 
interested to treat networks as static entities. Barabasi’s work introduces the dynamics of 
growth to network theory. Growth alone does not propel a network from random 
distribution to power law hub-creation. The second element, which Barabasi terms 
“preferential attachment,” when combined with the dynamics of growth, leads to the 
creation of hubs. Random growth of a network makes it likely that the original node will 
end up with the most number of connections. If the network grows large enough, the 
random nature of establishing links eventually distributes out in a bell curve average 
number of links per node. However, in real networks, some nodes are clearly favored 
over others and the key seems to be that nodes prefer to link to the nodes with the most 
number of other links. This dynamic still favors the earliest nodes in the network, but it 
favors them to the extent that a bell curve quickly becomes inadequate to describe or 
predict the number of linkages any one node will have. The prediction and description of 
hub creation in these cases requires a power law. 390  
Still, observation confounds theory. Some nodes in a network seem to be favored, 
but not because of their temporal seniority but because they have qualities that attract a 
number of linkages. Barabasi describes this inherent quality as “fitness.” The more fit a 
                                                 
389 Barabasi, 91. 
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node is, that is the more serviceable the node is to others in the network, the more links it 
will form within the network. Barabasi uses the rapid and late rise of Google on the 
search engine stage as an example of a fit node that generates more hits than competitors 
because it is more attractive to internet users. Google was not at all the first search 
engine.391 When taken together, these three factors: growth, preferential attachment, and 
fitness create hubs of hierarchical significance, in terms of number of linkages, within 
networks.392
Networks, then, provide a tool for understanding complex social dynamics and we 
are growing in our understanding of how those networks behave. Interestingly, these 
descriptions defy the well-known and well-trodden fields of randomness and structure. 
While ordered, scale-free networks do not behave in static or structured ways as we have 
traditionally understood social theory, neither do the observations legitimate a 
deconstructionist critique that there are no generalizable laws other than the law that there 
are no generalizable laws. Network theory has the potential to hold both diversity and 
holism together.  
Network theory alone – a largely mathematical construct – is not comprehensive 
enough, however, to describe the dynamics of relationships within social networks. It 
does, though, open the door to understanding social networks in terms of another 
emerging theory. How do people interact with each other in an orderly but evolving 
network? The key to understanding evolving order is in understanding the concept of 
                                                 
391 Barabasi, 93-5. 
392 In order to account for the popularity or fitness of certain nodes and the coalescence of new linkages 
around those nodes, Barabasi and his students draw on quantum physics to show a correlation between a 
factor measuring node fitness and the extent to which  that node would emerge as a hub. Barabasi, 96-102.  
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self-organization. How do social networks, or any other networks, for that matter, 
organize themselves? To use Barabasi’s image, how does a web develop absent a spider? 
 
Complexity Theory 
To answer this question, it is important to recall that even though scale-free 
networks are not, in Barabasi’s estimation, moving through a phase change from disorder 
to order, they are perpetually evolving through the dynamics generally described by 
phase change physics and mathematics. In that sense scale–free networks exist in this in-
between state which requires theoretical exposition that is different than the exposition 
required by chaotic or random systems and different than that required by systems that 
are in a, relatively speaking, static state of orderliness. Scale-free networks behave 
neither like water nor ice. They are also not in transition from one to the other. They are, 
however, constantly evolving. 
Nobel Prize winning chemist and physicist Ilya Prigogine, along with his 
colleague Isabelle Stengers in Order out of Chaos approach this problem from the 
standpoint of measuring the way the system handles energy. Crystals, like ice, are 
“equilibrium structures” in the language of classical thermodynamics. To describe the 
state that resembles phase transition, but is stable, Prigogine and Stengers introduced the 
term “dissipative structures.” 
[This] notion …emphasize[s] the close association, at first paradoxical in 
such situations between structure and order on the one side, and 
dissipation and waste on the other…heat transfer was considered a source 
of waste in classical thermodynamics. In [dissipative structures] it 
becomes a source of order.393
 
                                                 
393 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos (Boulder: Shambhala, 1984), 143. 
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Dissipative structures are found in conditions that Prigogine and Stengers describe as “far 
from equilibrium” and exhibit organization on the supramolecular or macroscopic scale. 
Whereas crystalline properties are reducible to the properties of the molecules that make 
up the crystal, dissipative structures essentially exhibit global properties that are a 
function of the “global situation of nonequlibrium producing them.”394
 Dissipative structures and their properties offer insight beyond a scientific novelty 
to a very puzzling contradiction in modern sciences. The Second Law of 
Thermodynamics establishes that the universe is increasing in entropy or randomness. 
Yet, Darwinian evolutionary theory lays out a sustained process of increased organization 
in which increasingly complex beings have emerged from less complex beings by a 
process of natural selection. How could Darwin’s processes survive the entropic forces of 
the universe? Prigogine and Stengers dispute neither Darwinian assumptions nor 
thermodynamic laws. Rather, dissipative structures demonstrate how increasing entropy 
or randomness does not preclude organization or order. “According to Prigogine, disorder 
does not merely destroy order, structure, and organization, but is also a condition of their 
formation and transformation. New dynamic states, which emerge in conditions far from 
equilibrium, can temporarily check entropic forces.”395
 These dynamic states are the subject of Taylor’s inquiries and the inspiration for 
his work to develop new theoretical parameters for understanding systems that seem to 
behave in ways that we once would have written off as random. These complex systems 
which resist simple explanations seem to exist somewhere between what we 
conventionally conceive as order and chaos. 
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Complexity theory attempts to identify common characteristics of diverse 
complex systems and to determine the principles and laws by which they 
operate. Moreover students of complexity share the conviction that the 
systems they investigate are not limited to natural phenomena but can also 
be discerned in social, economic, political, and cultural life.396  
 
Complex systems exhibit the following characteristics. 
1. Complex systems are comprised of many different parts, which are 
connected in multiple ways. 
2. Diverse components can interact both serially and in parallel to 
generate sequential as well as simultaneous effects and events. 
3. Complex systems display spontaneous self-organization, which 
complicates interiority and exteriority in such a way that the line that is 
supposed to separate them becomes undecidable. 
4. The structures resulting from spontaneous self-organization emerge 
from but are not necessarily reducible to the interactivity of the 
components or elements in the system. 
5. Though generated by local interactions, emergent properties tend to be 
global. 
6. Inasmuch as self-organizing structures emerge spontaneously, 
complex systems are neither fixed nor static but develop or evolve. 
Such evolution presupposes that complex systems are both open and 
adaptive. 
7. Emergence occurs in a narrow possibility space lying between 
conditions that are too ordered and too disordered. This boundary or 
margin is the “edge of chaos,” which is always far from equilibrium.397 
 
Any examination of complex systems is as concerned with the properties of the 
whole as it is with the functions of the parts. What is fascinating is how the parts 
and the whole seem to form a partnership in the creation of a self-organizing 
system. Taylor draws on Mark Millonas’s study of a swarm of bees to illustrate 
this point. “The swarm as a whole operates according to a logic that cannot be 
discerned in any of the activities of the individual bees.”398  
                                                 
396 Ibid., 141. 
397 Ibid., 142, 3. Taylor’s third characteristic refers to the ambiguity of the system’s boundaries. It is open 
to its environment so it is difficult to determine what factors are inside the system, influencing it and being 
influenced by it, and what factors are outside the system. It is, in other words, symbiotically related to its 
environment in way that makes it difficult to draw distinctions of interiority and exteriority. 
398 Ibid., 153. 
 
   
 191
Belgian chemist Jean Louis Deneubourg formulated the principle 
governing these interactions and named it “allelomimesis.” In an effort to 
understand the behavior of wasps recorded by E.O. Wilson, Deneubourg 
extended Prigogine’s theory of nonlinear self-organization to the activities 
of insects. In allelomimetic behavior, the conduct of each individual is 
influenced by the activities of its neighbors.399
 
The introduction of the study of swarms as a point of departure for discussion brings us 
back to examination of networks. Likening swarms to neural networks, Taylor and 
Millonas suggest that networks learn; they are stable despite fluctuations, but when 
conditions change the stability and the learning provide the robustness for the networks to 
adapt.400 The dynamism of these processes lead Taylor to identify them as complex 
adaptive systems.  
Emerging self-organizing systems are complex adaptive systems. For 
complex systems to maintain themselves, they must remain open to their 
environment and change when conditions require it. Complex adaptive 
systems, therefore, inevitably evolve, or, more accurately, coevolve. As 
the dynamics of evolving complexity are clarified, it not only becomes 
apparent that complex adaptive systems evolve, but it also appears that the 
process of evolution is actually a complex adaptive system.401
 
 In inescapably anthropomorphic terms, Taylor details what we are learning about 
the way complex adaptive systems learn. Even systems not characterized by a high 
degree of human involvement exhibit properties akin to what we would know as memory 
of the past, experience of the present, and anticipation of the future.402 In evolution of 
species, for instance, a genetic mutation which might occur by chance could endow a 
particular organism (or more likely over time several organisms) with a superior means 
of appropriating nourishment, a more efficient way to reproduce, or the ability to outlive 
other organisms of the same species. Any of these advantages increase the likelihood that 
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the mutation will be passed along in the genetic code of offspring. In this case chance has 
appropriated the experience of the present – increased ability to survive and/or reproduce 
– and encoded it in memory of the past. The mutation may come to be prevalent in the 
genetic code of subsequent generations of that species because it offered a successful 
adaptation. In the way that the system favored the successful adaptation at that theoretical 
initial point of the genetic mutation occurring, it anticipated future needs of the organism 
and the species as a whole.  
These processes, in non-human networks at least, are “telenomic” rather than 
“teleological,” that is “end-directed but not purposeful…neither linear nor circular.”403  
Drawing on the work of physicist Murray Gell-Mann, Taylor describes this end-directed 
process which can appropriate past experiences for future behavior. These systems 
recognize patterns in the data they encounter. They do more than just store that data, 
however, they apparently generalize or abstract that information into “schemata” which 
they appropriate when encountering new data. The systems evolve new behavior in 
response to the combined effect of the new data and the schemata.404 Previous data, 
including previous behavior of the system, are summarized and compressed into a 
schema that can formulate competing variants of possible future behavior. Encounters 
with present data lead to new behavior based on the selection of one of these competing 
variants. The consequences of the action are fed back into the system modifying the 
schema, eliminating the schema altogether as inadequate or elevating one schema as 
more viable and effective than other schemata.405
                                                 
403 Ibid., 169.  
404 Taylor, 166-67. 
405 Taylor reproduces Gell-Mann’s diagram of how a complex adaptive system works. It is this diagram I 
am attempting to explain here. Ibid., 167.  
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Halachic Learning 
Theologian Richard Voyles provides a method for understanding this learning 
capacity in terms of the ontological dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix. His 
application of the notion of halacha or Jewish law also illustrates how the ontological can 
operate separately from the normative and, in some way, establish its own rules that 
govern behavior independent of attitudes and values. This distinction is particularly 
important when considering non-human complex adaptive systems, but, as I will show, it 
is also important when considering human systems. 
Figure 10: Moral Meaning Matrix 
Dimension Universe Society Institution Organization Group Interpersonal
Normative Ought Ethos Symbol Language Narrative Word 
Meaning Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
Ontological Is Worldview Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
Dynamic Energy Power Jurisdiction Authority Resource Relationship
 
 Like Freire, Voyles emphasizes the importance of context. Different and 
seemingly contradictory behaviors (or activities) can be legitimated in different contexts 
and the decision to behave in a certain way can operate independent of a norm held 
constant, but changes, almost as a dependent variable, with changing context. One of the 
examples Voyles gives is showing the incongruity between normative claims about 
Christians not killing other people and the circumstances under which Christians do in 
fact kill people. In such situations, killing is ruled as legitimate, e.g., war, capital 
punishment, and importantly for Voyles, the holocaust.406 Different contexts evoke 
different precedents for activity, and those precedents are ordered or prioritized by the 
category selected for comprehending the context.  
                                                 
406 Richard J. Voyles, Christian Practice as Halakhah: Introducing the Halakhic Paradigm into Christian 
Thinking (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 1991), 139-140. 
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 Beyond the illustrations given in the Emory University case study, the simplest 
example I can give for the relationship between precedent and category is one in which 
two people approach a hole in the ground. One sees it as a latrine and the other as a well. 
Latrine and well are categories. While there may be an infinite number of things to do 
when encountering a hole in the ground, selecting the category latrine will give priority to 
a precedent that is much different from the precedent evoked by selecting the category of 
well. Of course a third person might know holes in the ground as both latrines and wells 
and would look for clues like buckets and ropes nearby or walls erected to give privacy. 
The context of his or her encounter with the hole will cause him or her to select one 
category or another. It seems that any universalized norm or attitude he or she was taught 
about holes in the ground may or may not apply as flexibly to various contexts. The 
context and category selection can legitimate two different and even contradictory 
behaviors without even engaging normative absolutes.  
 Simply employing category, precedent, and activity gives the decision-maker all 
the tools he or she needs to respond to the new data of the hole in the ground. However, 
the schema of the person with only the category of well available for identifying 
precedents may be altered, subordinated, or eliminated if indeed he or she encounters a 
latrine.  
 This decision-making scenario lives in the ontological dimension, and, to the 
extent that we have explored it here, leaves the normative alone. No doubt there is an 
aspect of ruling and legitimating involved, but it is different from drawing on a fund of 
values and attitudes to decide how to act. It greets life as it is and draws on life 
experience as it has been in order to determine how to act in the new context. The priority 
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of context, for Voyles, injects the freedom to access a number of different possible 
solutions for problems related to behaving in the world. 
 The activity-precedent-category interplay opens up the opportunity to explore 
social relationships in decision-making contexts as networks. Translating the various 
levels of network complexity might lead to an arrangement that understands each person 
in a network as a node or a “knot in a web of relations [which] function like switches and 
routers that send, receive and transmit information through the network.”407 Following 
this logic leads to the possibility of re-framing the Moral Meaning Matrix as descriptive 
of a network by considering groups as clusters of nodes; organizations as hubs; 
institutions as entire networks and societies as systems of networks. Of course, the choice 
to designate these structures as such is completely arbitrary. Network theory permits 
application of the same nomenclature to almost any level of social complexity. Indeed, 
each person in the network is more than an elemental node that cannot be subdivided any 
further. Each person is, in fact, a very complex system of biological networks. So a 
society is a set of network systems within network systems within network systems. 
Similarly nodes can become hubs, and clusters can appear as nodes in a large network. 
Certainly hubs and clusters are networks all their own as well. However the necessity of 
the arbitrary deployment of this nomenclature for the purposes of making distinctions 
among various levels of social complexity does not undermine its usefulness for 
interpretation. In fact it makes the point that networks have multiple levels of imbedded 
complexity, and the various components of a network can only be discerned and 
described by taking snapshots of the network at various levels of scope. The repeating 
patterns on large and small scales alike “form a fractal set, [which is] a self-similar 
                                                 
407 Taylor, 154.  
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mathematical object discovered in 1970 by Benoit Mandlebrot” and which I described 
earlier.408
 The process which follows the sequence of activity-precedent-category moves 
right to left through the organization level of the Moral Meaning Matrix. But Taylor’s 
schemata exhibit self-organizing properties that subordinate and include the schemata 
themselves. Barabasi describes this organizing property as the network’s topology. Real 
networks exhibit a scale-free topology governed by power laws. Understanding the 
balanced dynamism and stability of scale-free topologies illuminates the character of the 
word nomos as used at this level of social complexity in the Moral Meaning Matrix. 
Worldview in the Moral Meaning Matrix can be thought of, in Taylor’s terms, as the 
telenomy, that is the telenomic orientation of the topology governing the schemata used 
to engage and encounter experience.  
 
Network Consciousness 
 Conceiving of the levels of complexity in the Moral Meaning Matrix as 
components of a network and conceiving of the ontological dimension of the matrix as a 
complex adaptive system enables examination of the properties of social behavior in this 
dimension in the terms of network and complexity theories. Integrating these insights 
with the insights gained by examining the dynamics of halacha also permits the 
understanding of the ontological dimension of the matrix as its own complex adaptive 
system which can operate to generalize patterns without calling upon the normative, 
meaning, or dynamic dimensions of reality in the matrix. The decision about how to act 
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with respect to the hole in the ground, for instance, could be conceived of exclusively as 
an ontological decision and not a normative or meaningful one necessarily. 
 These ontologically-based processes could pertain to any complex adaptive 
system, animate or inanimate. In discussing human social systems, however, it is 
important to understand the semi-autonomy of the ontological level, which has an order 
all its own - as in the well/latrine example. It is also important to understand how the 
ontological dimension relates to the other dimensions of the matrix. Human systems 
make the process of network learning more complex by adding in the effects of the other 
dimensions of reality as exhibited in the Moral Meaning Matrix. Taylor refers to this 
difference between human systems and non-human systems as consciousness. Taylor 
clarifies the otherwise anthropomorphic language he uses to describe the processes of 
inanimate complex adaptive systems:  
Here as elsewhere, the use of the terms like “experience,” “memory,” 
“anticipation,” and “learning,” does not, of course imply either 
consciousness or self-consciousness. Consciousness is no more necessary 
for these operations than it is for the processing of information.”409
 
Consideration of human involvement with such systems requires, however, that we do 
take into account the effects of consciousness, reasoning and, meaning. 
Information, of course, is not knowledge, and knowledge is not 
necessarily meaningful. We know many things about the world and 
ourselves without grasping the meaning. The articulation of meaning 
extends the information processing, which begins in sensation and 
perception, and continues in consciousness and self-consciousness, by 
screening knowledge to form coherent and relatively comprehensive 
patterns. This process takes place through reasoning. Reason seeks to 
determine not only what happens but why it happens.410  
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While non-human systems can learn, that is integrate the general with the particular on 
the ontological dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix, human systems seek vertical 
integration as well, that between the ontological (what) and the normative (why).  
 The discussion this leads into is about as convoluted as a complex adaptive 
system itself. As a way to offer clarification in advance, I distinguish the following terms 
because in other circumstances they might be used as synonyms. There are at least three 
major processes at work in human complex adaptive systems, and I intend for these 
clarifications to relate those processes to the Moral Meaning Matrix. The first process, 
discussed above is learning. Learning is simply the screening of new data in terms of 
information already gathered. Learning, in this strict sense, engages only the ontological 
dimension of reality. The second process is reasoning. Reasoning, which I will discuss in 
greater detail below is the screening or evaluation of the ontological information patterns 
(the products of learning) in light of normative patterns that have been stored in the 
system. These normative patterns, I will show, result from the assimilation of meanings 
that were made in the past by the third process at work. The third process, which has been 
a major focus of this dissertation, is signification. Signification is the synthesizing of the 
normative with the ontological into new patterns, which emerge as a result of making 
sense of the discrepancies detected by the reasoning process’s screening of the 
information patterns, which, in turn, resulted from learning.  
 Insofar as signification (moral meaning making) depends on the effective 
cognitive processes of learning and reasoning, moral development is dependent on 
cognitive development. However, the normative dimension derives its patterns from past-
meanings made, so reasoning is dependent on the signification process. Therefore 
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cognitive development is reciprocally dependent on moral development. These 
conclusions foretell the interdependence of the social institutions of education and 
religion and prescribe the two types of development necessary for complex adaptive 
systems on all scales and especially for the cognitive and moral processes of leaders. 
Before I consider cognitive and moral development further, I will consider more fully the 
three processes such development is meant to improve. For this discussion, I return to 
Taylor.    
 
Learning and Reasoning 
Whereas the process of screening information – on the ontological dimension – is 
learning, the process of screening the patterns of information into knowledge out of the 
ontological dimension by the normative dimension is reasoning.411 The normative 
dimension serves the social system as the memory or storehouse for past meanings-made, 
which are encoded in a moral language and symbol system. This allows the normative 
dimension to act as the screen or the pattern against which the new patterns of 
information are encountered, understood judged, incorporated, or rejected. The new 
patterns that emerge from the screening (of the ontological by the normative) of new 
information patterns against old meaning patterns constitute meaning in the present. The 
latrine/well act would become meaningful, for example, if the person who had known 
holes in the ground only as wells had actually encountered a latrine and acted according 
to a normative prescription of, say, drink from wells whenever possible because they are 
few and far between. He/she would add another precedent – albeit an unpleasant one – to 
his/her set of experiences and one that questioned his/her set of norms which prescribed 
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drinking from wells when encountered. His/her tradition of well-drinking might modify a 
bit to ascertain the contents of the hole. This mediates the difference between the 
potentially unhealthy (or at least unsavory) normative prescription and the inadequate set 
of categories. As the ontological adjusts to add the unpleasant precedent, the category set 
expands to include the category latrine. Holes of different types are named with separate 
words and the story of how to distinguish latrines from wells enters the narrative which 
he/she hopefully will share with others as their overarching moral language adjusts to 
incorporate the now meaningful tradition of sniffing before drinking. The new patterns of 
meaning, then, assume their place in the normative vocabulary as past meanings made in 
order to understand the next data set to emerge from the ontological dimension. 
Both axes of the Moral Meaning Matrix are engaged in learning and reasoning. 
Taylor identifies these two vectors in his work as well: “from the concrete to the abstract” 
and from the “particular to the general” which map onto the Moral Meaning Matrix as the 
movement from ontological to normative and the movement from interpersonal 
(contextual) to universe respectively.412 Both axes are important and should not be, even 
if they often are, conflated. While generalizations can imbed norms, it is possible to 
generalize in a way that is not normative. In observational research, for instance, it is 
possible to identify patterns as generally occurring without saying those patterns ought to 
occur. Likewise it is possible to abstract norms from reality that are highly contextual in 
nature. In American English, a slap on the wrist is different than a pat on the back. 
However if either activity were observed by a person unfamiliar with indigenous acts of 
discipline and appreciation, much less with colloquial expressions for the behaviors 
(which can be invoked even if the actions themselves do not take place), the outsider 
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might not be able to discern much difference between the two forms of physical contact. 
Not only might the American English context be an important factor, but even knowing 
the circumstances surrounding the contact would be important. In a very particular way, 
the activity and the language which speaks about the activity, so thereby the praxis, of 
physical contact between people can be understood as normatively different depending 
on the context. There is no way to generalize from these data that physical strikes of this 
sort to another’s body exhibit any sort of predictable - always good or always bad - 
pattern.  
When the normative and the general are confused, social systems create what 
Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich identifies as “faulty generalizations”  which result from 
abstracting generalizations from too small of a data set. This causes two subsequent 
mistakes. The first is assuming that the generalizations from that data set are applicable to 
those not represented in the data set. The second is the creation of what Minnich terms a 
“hierarchically invidious monism,” or a “system in which one category is taken to be not 
literally all there is, but the highest, most significant, most valuable, and, critically, most 
real category-which sets up all others to be defined and judged solely with reference to 
that hegemonic category.”413
 Just as it is important to distinguish the general from the normative, it is also 
important to keep distinct the meaning and normative dimensions of reality. This 
distinction is particularly helpful for parsing Taylor’s discussion of meaning making. 
Doing so keeps in the forefront the difference between extant meanings and past 
meanings made. The latter, which constitute the screens against which ontological 
                                                 
413 Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich, Transforming Knowledge (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 
53. 
 
   
 202
information is evaluated, provide stability over time to the entire social system. The 
former have the potential to be much more vibrant and responsive to the environment. 
Taylor would agree with this dynamism in the process of meaning making. “Meaning is 
always relational and thus inevitably contextual. As relations change and context shifts, 
meaning transforms.”414 Where Taylor and I differ in this discussion is in his equating, on 
a functional level, theory and myth. Theory, in terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix, 
belongs more to the realm of the normative whereas myth belongs to the realm of 
meaning.  
Theory, or in the case of religion, theology, constitutes the schemata against 
which reality (ontological patterns) are screened. As schemata, they pre-exist experience 
and can predict or anticipate experience. The domain of myth belongs more in the 
meaning-making dimension in that it is the outgrowth of theory trying to make sense out 
of realities for which it is, at least momentarily, inadequate. Myth may not endure in a 
predictive way in the same way that theory might, but it aids in bringing meaning to life 
when theory and information seem to be irreconcilable. Eventually theory might be able 
to evolve into a pattern that can anticipate the variations in reality, which precipitated the 
myth making. The myth, or parts of it, then, might be absorbed into the theory. The 
theory also may be rejected in whole or in part by the realities presented through new 
data. In either case, the need for the content of that particular meaning-making myth is 
then obviated, but the need for a new myth to make life meaningful is only as far away as 
the next discrepancy between theory and reality. Both can be understood as complex 
adaptive systems within complex adaptive systems, but as Taylor himself points out, in 
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contrast to theory, “myths tend to preserve the temporality of experience in ways that 
theories do not.”415  
 Consider the classic tension in the United States between creationism and 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Darwin underwent a process of learning that no doubt 
resulted in information that differed from the normative patterns he brought to his 
research. He reconciled the tension between the discovered is and whatever oughts he 
possessed as he continued his studies. This tension gave rise to meaningful hypotheses 
(meaningful syntheses) similar to a myth about natural selection and so forth. As he 
tested his hypotheses in broader and broader contexts and analyzed more and more data, 
he solidified a theory, enshrining the accumulation of past meanings-made into a symbol 
system that others could use to formulate normative predictions about what one ought to 
find, say, in the paleontological record. The theory is refined by further research by 
others in the ways discussed above and adapts or reinforces itself as new data are 
assimilated.  
 Christians with a certain set of normative assumptions about God creating the 
earth and all life encountered (and still encounter) Darwinian theories in the ontological 
dimension as discordant with their normative symbol system. One response, when 
reading the new data against this normative screen, is to reject it outright and make 
meaning explicitly in contrast to Darwinian theories. Recently, some Christians have 
posited a way of making sense out of the difference between Darwinian theory and their 
norms by creating the synthesis known as Intelligent Design. This synthesis is 
unacceptable to Darwinians who reciprocally encounter it in the ontological dimension, 
screen it against their normative pattern of the theory of evolution and reject it. 
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Nevertheless, Intelligent Design represents an attempt to make sense of new data in light 
of the patterns of past meanings made. For those to whom the Intelligent Design myth is 
meaningful, it will become a normative theory, which is likely to be a slightly different 
normative framework than one that would reject any Darwinian influence. 
 What makes theory and myth so similar is that theory, or other normative 
systems, are symbol systems. But Geertz’s proposition and my argument demonstrate 
that myth, ritual, and the other elements of the meaning dimension are constituted not by 
the normative alone but by the interaction between those symbol systems and reality as 
patterned in the ontological dimension. This difference between the normative and the 
meaning dimensions is important to keep in mind as a backdrop when considering 
Taylor’s discussion of myth and meaning produced in this third process of human 
complex adaptive systems. This third process, joining learning and reasoning, is 
signification, which grows out of reasoning’s screening of learning.  
 
Signification 
 Keeping reasoning and signification separate is more than a heuristic device, 
although it is that as well. Confusing reasoning with signification results in the normative 
being confused with meaning. When this occurs, social systems set up two more 
occasions for error: “circular reasoning” and “mystified concepts” in Minnich’s terms.416 
When the normative assumes the role of the meaningful, then the premise seeks a 
conclusion which reinforces or supports the premise. The normative screens reality in a 
way that filters out discrepancies and rejects difference. This could be the case indeed for 
Christians who refuse to entertain Darwinian theories and, arguably, for evolutionary 
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biologists who reject, without any consideration, notions of divine creation. The 
normative simply replicates itself as the “new” pattern, rather than allowing a truly new 
pattern, which incorporates difference, to emerge. An “assertion is not open to 
contradiction because it is not a descriptive statement, after all. It is prescriptive” or 
normative.417  
 The meaning dimension holds, temporarily, the new patterns that emerge when 
the ontological information patterns are screened by the normative schema in the 
reasoning process. When the normative pattern projects itself into the locus of the 
meaningful, it displaces any new patterns in favor of a recurrence of past meanings made. 
Conversely, if the new patterns of the meaning dimension occupy the normative, the 
neophyte concepts have no supportive language to place them in the context of past 
meanings made. This renders new patterns with normative weight but little explicability. 
Minnich, in her examples, does a thorough job of showing that some concepts, when 
scrutinized, have no grounding in patterns of screened information or learning processes. 
They do no not conform to any rigorous reasoning process that reconciles them with past 
meanings made, but simply live in the realm of custom, tradition, and myth - that is in the 
realm of the meaningful. Yet in the hands of powerful and dominant classes, these 
traditions can be appropriated as norms, but norms without, as she demonstrates, a 
coherent moral language. 
The words, the concepts, we…consider tend to be mind-numbing either 
because they are worn smoothly into platitudes (as in pious invocations of 
“excellence”) or because they are fraught with emotion and/or taboo and 
confusion (sex/war). I want us to think about them for precisely those 
reasons; platitudes and taboos are two sides of the same coin.418
 
                                                 
417 Ibid., 82. 
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Meaning is a temporary emergent pattern which must be stabilized and incorporated 
recursively into the normative patterns of past meanings made. Using the dissociated 
emergent patterns in place of the normative leads to the appropriation of vacuous 
concepts and inexplicable values. Conversely, allowing the normative to project its old 
patterns in place of the emergent meaning re-circulates old patterns. In religious terms, 
the former dysfunctional meaning-making process results in what might be described by 
the phenomenon of people identifying themselves as being spiritual but not religious 
whereas the latter results in self-identification with religious fundamentalism.  
 Minnich’s observations interject into the system, more explicitly at least, the role 
that human agency plays in interfering with the development of complex adaptive 
systems. Of course, the complexity of such systems can account for such agency, once 
we assume that persons are part of the system, even if we have to account for it as 
chance. Taylor sufficiently accounts for – indeed depends on – chance in developing out 
the dynamics of the complex adaptive system. But it is worth recognizing at this point 
that social systems and their cognitive and moral processes, even if they are evolving and 
changing over time, can be arrested or appropriated by human activity in various ways 
that interrupt – or at least further complicate – the patterning and the functioning of those 
patterns over time. 
 
Thermodynamics of Closed and Open Systems 
Taylor examines the role of chance in some detail in his discussion of the role 
communication plays in the thermodynamics of complex adaptive social systems. The 
communicative thermodynamics which propel complex adaptive systems provide a 
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useful category in examining how humans interact within social systems as if we were 
outside of them and how such ambiguity can lead to the confusion and misappropriation 
of dimensions outlined above such as confusing the general with the normative or the 
normative with the meaningful. 
 There are three keys to understanding the thermodynamics of complex adaptive 
systems. These keys distinguish complex adaptive systems, which are dissipative 
structures in Prigogine’s terms, from more familiar systems. The keys are irreversibility, 
difference, and openness.  
 Classical thermodynamics examines systems that are reversible. That is, these 
systems can work forward and backward. They can be done and undone. In a chemical 
reaction, for instance, two substances react and produce a product or products. Under the 
right conditions, the products can decompose or recompose into the original 
substances.419 When reversibility is optimized the reaction occurs in both directions at 
equal speeds, and change is not detectable. This type of system stability is known as 
equilibrium. 
 Even in classical thermodynamic systems though, equilibrium, which is a state of 
forces and energy being distributed rather evenly throughout a system, is also a state that 
keeps the system from doing any perceptible work. In order to effect work, the system 
has to be put in contact with another system whose conditions are different. The 
difference produces a gradient across which energy can transfer to create a force that can 
translate into work. It is easier to conceive of potential difference in physical rather than 
chemical terms. A steam engine puts water, otherwise in equilibrium with its 
                                                 
419 I am indebted to many sources for my elementary grasp of the concepts of thermodynamics, but 
particularly to P.A.H. Wyatt, Energy and Entropy in Chemistry (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967). 
 
   
 208
environment, in contact with a heat source. The heat increases the kinetic energy of the 
water molecules which causes them to expand in the form of steam. When the molecules 
expand far enough to create more pressure inside the system than outside the system, the 
steam will work across yet another gradient in an attempt to equilibrate the pressure 
inside with the pressure outside. Placing a turbine in the middle of that second gradient 
harnesses the steam for work. Recall here the understanding of energy as the ability to do 
work. 
 The potential difference across these gradients is essential for the production of 
forces sufficient to cause work to happen. Unfortunately, real systems such as steam 
engines are not perfectly efficient. They cannot translate that energy potential into pure 
work. Some of the energy that moves across those gradients is lost to the environment. In 
the case of the steam engine, that energy is detectable in the expression of heat from the 
system. While the heat might be useful, if harnessed, for another work process, some of 
the energy of the system is lost in the form of entropy. Entropy is evident in the more 
fluid arrangement of molecules in steam relative to their more ordered arrangement in 
water. The heat released from the system also increases the entropy, or randomness, of 
the environment surrounding the system. The second law of thermodynamics predicts 
this. Entropy, unlike energy, in the universe is increasing. By contrast, energy, according 
to the first law of thermodynamics, is conserved.  
 In order to calculate the energy transfers, scientists draw boundaries around these 
processes. These boundaries, which might be beakers, pistons, measuring instruments, or 
machines, are systems. In order to measure these energy exchanges, scientists regard 
these systems as closed to their respective environments. By allowing only measurable 
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heat to pass across the boundaries, scientists can determine what net change of energy 
occurs in the processes. It is these closed systems that can come to equilibrium after they 
have absorbed or expended sufficient heat from or to the environment.  
 Complex adaptive systems are open systems. They exchange energy and matter 
freely with the environment. As systems, they are discrete entities within their 
environment, but the boundaries of those systems are porous compared to the artificially 
restrictive, but often well insulated, boundaries, of closed systems. By being open to the 
environment, they are constantly susceptible to the creation of potential differences 
within the system that allow the system to do work. That work is the work of self-
organization of the patterns discussed above. Because these systems do not reach 
equilibrium with their environment or internally as long as their environment is changing, 
they consistently have a potential gradient across which to work.  
 The second law of thermodynamics suggests that the environment of complex 
adaptive systems is always changing, if for no other reason than because the entropy of 
the universe is increasing. This environmental change alone could keep such systems 
from achieving internal equilibrium or equilibrium with their environments. Now it is 
useful to recall Prigogine’s observation that dissipative structures, and therefore complex 
adaptive systems, occur only in circumstances far from equilibrium. In these conditions, 
complex adaptive systems thrive because there is always a potential gradient across 
which to work. Entropy, then, which is commonly thought of as useless energy, becomes 
useful in destabilizing complex adaptive systems enough to propel their growth.  
 Interestingly, while the entropy creates the conditions for the work of the complex 
adaptive system, the system’s work, as we have seen, is the development of increasing 
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complexity or self-organization. So increasing randomness is creating the conditions for 
increased order in these systems. These systems, as Prigogine and Barabasi have shown, 
are stable systems, but not because they achieve any sort of equilibrated state intrinsically 
or extrinsically. They are stable but not reversible. The increased organization cannot be 
undone because, in a very real sense, it is the outgrowth of increased entropy, which is 
always, and only, increasing.  
To manage the difficulty of this concept of entropy having an organizing, and not 
randomizing, effect on complex adaptive systems, Taylor uses the term “negentropy,” or 
negative entropy.420 Negentropy appears only in open systems. Closed systems, such as 
the universe is presumed to be, or such as in a bounded chemical reaction, follow the 
second law of thermodynamics and tend to maximize entropy. Negentropy forces the 
conceptualization of open systems within closed systems. While the entire closed system, 
say the universe, still acts according to thermodynamic laws and net entropy increases, 
within the relatively limited scope of the open complex adaptive system, randomness 
decreases and order increases. The second law obtains for the larger scope of the closed 
system but not within the subordinate open system. 
So the processes of emergence and evolution of complex adaptive systems are 
irreversible. They are sustained by a potential gradient generated by increasing entropy in 
their environments. Finally they are sensitive to that shifting potential gradient because 
they remain open to that environment. The complexity compounds. Changing systems 
within changing systems must be “coadaptive,” increasing the likelihood of what we 
might describe as chance to influence the evolution of those systems. “On the one hand, 
system and environment are joined in recursive circuits that create both unexpected and 
                                                 
420 Taylor, 121. 
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disproportionate changes, and, on the other hand, the openness of complex adaptive 
systems leads to aleatory changes in schemata that distinguish the point of departure from 
the point of arrival.”421  Social systems are open systems, yet generally our myths 
prescribe meaning-making processes for leaders and cultures which presume (and 
recursively reinforce the presumption) that social systems are closed.
                                                 
421 Ibid., 169. 
 
   
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE VIOLENCE OF CLOSED SYSTEMS 
 
Taylor uses his understanding of the thermodynamics of complex adaptive 
systems as a backdrop against which to read communication theory when thinking about 
social systems. Having established the relationship between information and knowledge 
as shown above, Taylor’s work pushes the concept of communication one step farther. 
He relates noise or static to entropy, and information to the conversion of that noise into a 
communicative potential gradient across which work can be done. “If information is 
understood as a difference that makes a difference, noise can be understood as either the 
lack of differentiation or the profusion of indifferent differences.”422 The evolution of 
social processes follows the track of noise to information to knowledge. This flow is 
counter-entropic. Much like the evolution of increasingly complex species despite the 
tendency of the universe to maximize entropy, the complexity of open social systems 
increases despite the deterioration of knowledge into information into noise in the 
surrounding closed system of the universe.  
The key to harnessing the creative influence of entropy is maintaining the 
openness of the social system. Closing the social system, perhaps in attempt to stave off 
entropic randomness, walls the system off from its font of difference and thereby creates 
conditions in which the processes become reversible and achieve equilibrium in which all
                                                 
422 Ibid., 119. 
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 forces and energy are distributed equally throughout the system. Equilibrium precludes 
the creation of dissipative structures, which only occur far from equilibrium. Equilibrium 
also eliminates potential gradients across which work can be done. The system is 
analogous to the water tank in a steam engine without the fire.  
When a social system achieves this sort of homogeneity, it cannot grow or change 
without some sort of destabilizing influence. René Girard discusses the social threat such 
an absence of difference creates and the two main ways societies respond to that threat. 
Interestingly it is a threat that arises only from closing a social system off from what 
otherwise is a constant flow of difference.  
Violence in Girard’s thought is an outgrowth of rivalry. Rivalry grows to the point 
of needing a scapegoat or sacrificial victim after intensifying through the feedback loop 
of the mutual imitation of the mimetic desire each of the rivals has for a given object. 
However, mimesis in a closed system creates another problem. It creates homogeneity or 
lack of difference. As mimesis intensifies and broadens there are fewer and fewer 
distinctions between imitator and model. “The similarity of behavior creates confusion 
and a universal lack of difference.”423 This poses a threat, in Girard’s analysis, and such a 
threat has created the conditions for, if not triggered, many of the great persecutions in 
history. 
Men feel powerless when confronted with the eclipse of culture; they are 
disconcerted by the immensity of the disaster but never look into the 
natural causes; the concept that they might affect those causes by learning 
more about them remains embryonic. Since cultural eclipse is above all a 
social crisis, there is a strong tendency to explain it by social, and, 
especially, moral causes. After all, human relations disintegrate in the 
process and the subjects of those relations cannot be utterly innocent of the 
phenomenon. But, rather than blame themselves, people inevitably blame 
                                                 
423 René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 14. 
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either society as a whole, which costs them nothing, or other people who 
seem particularly harmful for easily identifiable reasons.424
 
 This blame escalates to the identification of a scapegoat or a whole group of 
victims against which society can express the violence that stems from the disorder. 
However, the function of the violence is not to exacerbate the disorder but to restore 
order. The selection of victims also entails ascribing to them crimes against society which 
inevitably can be traced to crimes against difference. The victims of the persecution are 
accused of transgressing the orderly hierarchies and other lines of distinction that society 
had created. Whether violent crimes against the strongest or weakest in society, sexual 
crimes, or religious infractions, they “seem to be fundamental. They attack the very 
foundations of cultural order, the family and the hierarchical differences without which 
there would be no social order.”425
 It is important to remember that the function of the violence is to re-establish 
difference when considering Girard’s counter-intuitive point that victims are not selected 
because of their difference alone, but because they are not different enough. 
The various kinds of victims seem predisposed to crimes that eliminate 
differences. Religious, ethnic, or national minorities are never actually 
reproached for their difference, but for not being as different as expected, 
and in the end for not differing at all. Foreigners are incapable of 
respecting “real” differences; they are lacking in culture or in taste, as the 
case may be. They have difficulty in perceiving exactly what is 
different….The barbaros is not the person who speaks a different 
language but the person who mixes the only truly significant distinctions, 
those of the Greek language….Aliens imitate all the differences because 
they have none.426
 
Interestingly, Girard suggests that societies respond to the prospect of this crisis in 
two seemingly contradictory ways. First, societies try to avoid the disintegration of 
                                                 
424 Ibid. 
425 Ibid., 15. 
426 Ibid., 22. 
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difference by establishing religious prohibitions and taboos that reinforce hierarchies and 
other lines of difference. Like Berger’s sacred canopy, the potential of the anomic 
circumstance created by deteriorating differentiation precipitates a religious response. 
Since mimesis ultimately renders the prohibitions and taboos ineffectual in preserving 
distinctions, religion develops a complement to prohibitions and taboos. That 
complement is ritual. Rites, as Turner and others have demonstrated, however, often 
require participants to violate taboos and enact behavior otherwise proscribed by the 
religious prohibitions. Girard reconciles this apparent contradiction by seeing the roots of 
the rites in the mythic stories which recount disorder and lack of differentiation as the 
conditions of creation, or at least the foundation of society or civilization.  
Mimesis is mimetically attractive, and we can assume that at certain 
stages, at least in the evolution of human communities, mimetic rivalry 
can spread to an entire group. This is what is suggested by the acute 
disorder phase with which many rituals begin. The community turns into a 
mob under the effect of mimetic rivalry. The phenomena that take place 
when a human group turns into a mob are identical to those produced by 
mimetic rivalry, and they can be defined as that loss of differentiation 
which is described in mythology and reenacted in ritual.427
 
In other words, the rites that Girard examines formalize and sacralize the same processes 
inherent to persecutions and mob violence. Along with prohibitions and taboos they 
create a cultural process for maintaining and routinely re-establishing the differences 
within the society. The prohibitions and taboos create a feedback loop within a society 
which attempts to regulate the diminution of difference. When that regulatory effect fails, 
persecutions and rituals which mimic the dynamics of mob violence provide a feed 
forward loop. “Instead of trying to roll back mimetic violence it tries to get rid of it by 
encouraging it and by bringing it to a climax that triggers the happy solution of ritual 
                                                 
427 Girard, Berkshire Review, 12. 
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sacrifice with the help of a substitute victim.”428 These loops demonstrate the dynamics 
of an autopoietic system as described by Taylor. “Such recursivity does not, however, 
transform causality in a way that makes the operation of the system irreversible.”429  
Autopoietic systems chart “a course from creation through transformation to 
destruction.”430 Despite this progressive track, which ultimately leads to greater 
complexity within the system, such systems remain closed.431 As closed systems they 
“seek to overcome disequilibrium” and seem to leave “no possibility of chance, accident 
or contingency.” Recall “however, equilibrium appears to be death-dealing rather than 
life giving.”432 So, insofar as prohibitions, taboos, and ritualized or real violence disrupt 
equilibrium, they preserve and advance the life of the closed, albeit, autopoietic social 
system. 
Closed social systems, then, tend toward equilibrium. In order to keep them 
viable, however, the actors within those systems must stave off equilibrium and 
periodically disrupt its onset. Taboos as well as ritualized and actual violence sustain the 
viability of closed social systems.  
 There are two ways to think about a system as being closed in terms of the Moral 
Meaning Matrix. They are related. The first way is to conceive of structural barriers of 
isolation that actually prevent any new stimuli from entering through the ontological 
dimension. The social system, in this case, experiences very few, if any new realities over 
time. This type of sequestered existence cuts off the process of learning described above. 
The second type of closure, for which the first is a sufficient but not necessary condition, 
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is the closing of the reasoning or the signification processes by conflation one way or the 
other of the normative and meaning dimensions. In those cases norms are re-circulated as 
meanings, or meanings masquerade as norms. The former leads to retrenchment of 
fundamental values, while the latter leads to an ungrounded mysticism. If the ontological 
dimension is not closed off, then, in the former system, new information will be judged 
by the fundamental screen as either meaningful or not. Rather than meaning resulting 
from a synthesis of the is and the ought, realities that do not make sense in terms of the 
normative screen are simply rejected as meaningless. While in the fundamentalist system 
there is a stark contrast between the ontological and the normative, in the mystical 
system, there is no substantive normative to act as a point of tension with the ontological. 
Absent a process of reasoning, the new experiences simply feed an increasingly vacuous 
set of meanings holding the place of norms. Every new thing is meaningful and, in a 
relativistic way, normative because nothing old is preserved.  
 Whether the system is closed on the ontological level providing no new 
experiences for any dynamism within the Moral Meaning Matrix, or whether the 
normative and the meaningful are somehow conflated, the processes eventually tend 
toward the identity of all three dimensions involved in signification. The fundamentalist 
system refuses any incompatible patterns, the mystical accepts and incorporates all 
patterns, and the completely sequestered system has no information with which to create 
new patterns. In all cases the potential difference between the ontological and the 
normative tends toward zero. The dynamics of any of these closed systems, in yet another 
way – a way related to the meaning-making process itself – settles toward equilibrium or 
system death.  
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 This necrosis can occur at any level of complexity within the social fractal: 
interpersonal, group, organization, institution, society, or universe/global. Because it is a 
fractal, the decay spreads throughout the web, if by no other means, then, mimetically. 
 
Closed Systems Leadership 
 Mimesis also can be the salvation of these otherwise doomed closed social 
systems. It is now possible to read the Girardian analysis of Hall’s leadership taxonomy 
into the context of closed social systems. Understanding what has typically been called 
leadership style as different methods with which to disrupt equilibrium demonstrates how 
leaders affect the meaning-making process by keeping the closed social system 
destabilized and, thereby, viable. It is necessary at this point to recall the discussion 
above about the endothermic and exothermic syntheses of the is and the ought. Imposing 
the normative on the ontological in a closed system requires that energy be absorbed from 
the environment into the system. Giving primacy to the ontological over the normative, 
as Freire argues, releases energy from the system. Combining this understanding of the 
more traditional thermodynamics of a closed system (as contrasted with the 
thermodynamics of an open complex adaptive system) with the need to maintain 
distinctions or re-establish order in closed systems leads to an analysis of the cycles of  
leadership in terms of the manner with which energy is deployed for the sake of meaning 
making and the way in which differences or hierarchies are maintained and/or restored. 
Leaders facilitate the work of signification for groups. That work requires energy. 
Leaders in closed systems use that energy in one of a finite number of ways relative to 
release or absorption of energy on the one hand and relative to the degree of order and 
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differentiation maintained on the other. Leaders adapt postures relative to entropy and 
energy and do so in various ways depending on the cycle of leadership from which they 
are operating.  
 It might be simplest to think of these two points of analysis as two axes of a grid: 
energy and order. Each of the first six of Hall’s cycles of leadership, within a closed 
system, is exothermic or endothermic with respect to energy consumption and each style 
promotes, diminishes, or maintains differentiated order. This is outlined in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: Leadership Posture Grid 
Leadership Posture DIFFERENTIATED ORDER 
  Promotes Maintains Diminishes 
Endothermic Authoritarian Paternalist/Maternalist Manager 
EN
ER
G
Y
 
Exothermic Facilitator Collaborator Servant 
 
Perhaps the Authoritarian level of leadership occupies the most intuitive position 
on the leadership posture grid. By adopting a dominant rival approach to imposing norms 
on reality, the authoritarian maintains a strict hierarchy which sustains stark 
differentiation. As long as the authoritarian is the dominant rival in the closed system, the 
order is under no threat of disintegration. In order to stave off the natural tendency toward 
equilibrium, however, the authoritarian leader rapidly depletes the energy (or power) of 
others within the system and must appropriate energy from outside of the system and 
bring it across the boundaries. This model can lead to a high level of sustained 
productivity, but it is very costly. The leader must continually replenish the energy or risk 
losing his or her position and therefore the life-sustaining differentiation of the system.  
 The Paternalist/Maternalist leader, by maintaining a position as the object of 
desire in the Girardian scheme, maintains order. Rivalries are managed as rivals are kept 
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at bay and in competition with one another. The leader remains out of the fray, and others 
do not challenge his or her imposition of personal norms on reality as it would jeopardize 
their ability to curry favor with the parental figure. Still, the parent-leader, in the context 
of the closed system, uses the energy of the competing rivals in order to impose those 
norms on reality. To a lesser extent than the authoritarian, the paternalist/maternalist must 
still bring energy or resources from outside the system into the system if for no other 
reason than to maintain his or her desirability. The differentiation among rivals and 
between rivals and object of desire (or leader) keeps the system away from equilibrium. 
 When the paternalist/maternalist system breaks down, when the object of desire is 
no longer the leader, then the rivalries begin to usurp the power of an otherwise strong 
leader. Enter the manager, a type which occupies perhaps a counter-intuitive place on the 
leadership posture grid. However, the dynamic that the manager is managing happens to 
be, essentially, in Girardian terms, that of a mob. Order has broken down to the point that 
the manager, or executive, continually creates policies to preserve it, and when these fail, 
the manager must serve as the priest of continual sacrifices to channel the mob violence. 
The manager, then, rather than maintaining order, constantly disorders and re-orders the 
system around successive rituals of scapegoating and sacrifice. While efficiency, order, 
and bureaucracy are the hallmarks of the manager, such order stands out because it is 
achieved under the most difficult of circumstances. Order, as a goal, is made explicit 
against the backdrop of what otherwise would be chaos. The mob freely gives up its 
energy to the leader for the imposition of norms on reality, but the manager too, must use 
that energy to maintain the successive rituals necessary to affix those norms. To a lesser 
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extent than the antecedent types, the manager must also bring in resources from outside 
the system in order to fuel sacrificial dynamics of this closed system.  
 Once the mob’s energy can no longer be converted for the maintenance of a 
normative-oriented culture, the energy posture of the system and therefore of the leader 
changes. The facilitator diminishes himself or herself relative to the group in order to 
assuage the violent needs of the group. And, like the manager, the facilitator must do this 
over and over again. While the manager is managing the mob chaos on a disordered 
brink, the facilitator allows the mob’s sacrifice to complete itself and so rests more 
comfortably in the re-ordered aftermath of the sacrifice. The facilitator promotes order by 
empowering the others in the organization. As the facilitator elevates the experiences of 
others in the system, those realities begin to give shape to the system’s norms in the first 
of the exothermic meaning-making postures. Rather than requiring energy from outside 
the system, the facilitator releases the power from within the system. It gives energy back 
to the universe. The facilitator does not bring any energy or resources into the system. So, 
if the system remains closed, then its exothermic nature will eventually run it into 
equilibrium even if differentiation and order are not a problem as multiple perspectives 
are honored and incorporated into an overall framework of meaning and organizational 
structure.  
 On the other side of the facilitator’s sacrifice arises the hero. The hero's role in 
myth and as a collaborative leader symbolizes and maintains the order that has been 
created by the sacrifice. A social fabrication, the hero, or collaborator in this case, derives 
all power from the mob turned society that created him or her. As primus inter pares, the 
collaborator delegates authority and preserves the order the system has created for itself. 
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The system has taken a step away from the still more hierarchically ordered facilitator-led 
array by the creation of equals. Homogeneity becomes an increasing threat. The flipside 
of the paternalist/maternalist, the collaborator preserves order while releasing energy 
from the system by empowering others to take the lead. Relative to the facilitator, the 
collaborator as hero is one step closer to terminating the closed system because the model 
both gives up its energy to the universe and diminishes the distinctions upon which order 
is founded.  
The death blow to closed social systems, however, is dealt by the final closed 
system leadership style, servant-leadership. The servant intentionally disrupts the order 
by actually inverting hierarchical relationships. Coupling this disruption of order and 
difference with the exothermic effect best described as revolutionary by Freire makes the 
servant model of leadership the end of the line for closed systems. The pace toward 
equilibrium is hastened by the double threat of loss of differentiation and loss of energy 
in what may be the social equivalent of combustion. 
 In a closed system, the most orderly leadership level but the most costly in terms 
of its insatiable appetite for resources from within and from outside the system is the 
authoritarian style. The least ordered is the servant. As long as the system remains closed, 
the autocrat will hunt for power and the servant will be running his or her social system 
headlong into equilibrium. The endothermic styles only maintain their meaning-making 
ability as long as they continue to use energy from the surrounding environment. The 
exothermic styles only are able to continue making meaning as long as they have energy 
to release to the environment. The exothermic styles, then, remain the luxury of the 
already empowered. It is only possible to lead as a facilitator, collaborator, or servant as 
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long as one has sufficient resources to maintain that level of leadership over time or as 
the systems themselves continue to grow. So with the addition of resources, an 
endothermic leadership posture can turn exothermic, and vice versa. If posture toward 
order is held constant, then a system accustomed to authoritarian rule, once it discovers 
abundance within the system can afford to support more of a facilitative type of 
leadership. Likewise, a Paternalist/Maternalist can move to Collaborator and Manager to 
Servant. Conversely, when resources are scarce, Servant-Leadership can collapse into 
executive mob management, the hero can turn parental and the facilitator can replace the 
flip chart on the easel with his or her portrait. This potential oscillation exhibits the 
reversibility of the closed system based on the relative flow of energy. 
 If resources are not in play, but differentiation is either threatened or strengthened, 
then systems might be able to sustain adjacent leadership styles on the developmental 
continuum within the same energy posture. A servant-leader could retreat into 
collaborator mode in search of greater differentiation; likewise a collaborator to 
facilitator. Styles with endothermic postures could proceed accordingly: manager to 
parental and parental to authoritarian. However, if the system experiences a great deal of 
increased differentiation, either through expansion or personnel turnover, for example, 
then the system might be able to sustain the next (or higher) level of leadership. In this 
way the closed system of leadership also exhibits reversibility along a continuum of more 
and less developed leadership styles.  
 Just because the system can sustain a leadership level or style that is more highly 
developed does not mean that it will move the leaders in that direction. The leader must 
have the cognitive (learning and reasoning) and moral (signification) capacity to adapt to 
 
   
 224
the changing dynamics of the system or risk losing leadership status. A leader can easily 
assume a less developed leadership style for a social system operating using, say, 
authoritarian modes of signification, just as an adult who can ride a ten-speed bicycle 
probably can somewhat awkwardly manage to ride a child’s tricycle. But if the social 
system evolves to the point of calling for the leadership equivalent of a unicycle rider, 
then a Tour de France champion may not even be able to succeed without further 
cognitive and moral development. Like the excommunication of a judgmental evangelist 
caught with sin-stained hands, the most likely means of removing a leader from a system 
which he or she helped create and which is outgrowing him or her will be by the violent 
meaning-making mechanism the leader himself or herself helped encode or reinforce for 
the sake of the system’s stability. Dominant rivals get dominated; scapegoating managers 
are sent packing; collaborators get elevated to honorary yet non-functional posts.  
However, when the system is threatened with extinction due to a diminishing 
number of resources and/or lessened differentiation, then the leader’s reversion to a less 
developed approach may be necessary to maintain the viability of the closed system. The 
mere perception of such scarcity of resources and loss of differentiation within the system 
might be sufficient to cause such a retreat. Such a perception may, in fact, be cultivated 
by the leader in order to maintain power at the less developed style of leadership. 
Remember that the systems under consideration are closed or are being treated as closed 
by the leaders and the constituents; so the ability for the systems to adapt and change in a 
way that makes sense to persons with a closed-systems mindset is not as fluid as that of 
complex adaptive systems.  
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 Regardless of the capacity of closed systems to support various leadership styles, 
all such systems tend toward equilibrium and the leader’s role is to stave off that 
equilibrium. Each of the styles or cycles of leadership moves the system away from 
equilibrium either by imposing hierarchical orders of differentiation or by creating 
differentiation by disrupting homogeneity. Each style brings its own gift or charism for 
creating differentiation within the system. The charism of the Authoritarian is rivalry, of 
the Paternalist/Maternalist, desire, of the manager, scapegoating, of the facilitator, 
sacrifice, of the collaborator, heroism, of the servant, transformation. It is possible for 
leaders at different stages to exhibit charisma and for that charisma to have the effect of 
creating differentiation within the system. Now it is possible to understand why 
contemporary leadership analysts seem to suggest that charisma must be routine and why 
saying a leader is charismatic does not necessarily say much about the style of leadership 
or the developmental cycle of the leader. At any level, without routine charisma of one 
type or another, the system would settle into equilibrium and would die.  
 
Charismatic Energy 
 Charisma is the gift of being capable of destabilizing the system. Charismatic 
leadership is the ability to destabilize the system in a way that also facilitates the 
construction of meaning for the group. Understanding charisma in functional, rather than 
evaluative, terms reveals that it is available at all cycles of development. Charismatic 
leadership, then is a means of posturing relative to equilibrium and entropy in a system 
insofar as those systems are closed or regarded as closed by the leaders. A closed social 
system requires that a charismatic leader articulate a vision for re-ordering or establishing 
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new distinctions when the old distinctions fail or begin to slide inevitably toward 
equilibrium. The charismatic leader gains credibility in this task by having demonstrated 
a comfort level with entropy and equilibrium, perhaps by being effectively present and 
supportive at times of major life disruptions - that is at times of entropy on a personal 
level. Note, however, that the way a leader expresses such effective presence may be 
directly related to his or her level of moral and cognitive development as a leader.  
 As differentiation and order break down in a system, the need for charisma 
increases. In Girard’s analysis, the breakdown looks like and/or precipitates mob 
violence. In the face of that eventuality, the charismatic leader uses his or her gift to re-
establish order. The gift or charism differs based on the leadership style being employed. 
An authoritarian uses dominance; a paternalist/maternalist, desire; a manager, 
scapegoating; a facilitator, self-sacrifice; a collaborator, heroism; a servant, 
transformation. Note in this analysis the particularly important role charisma plays for a 
servant-leader. The combination of expending energy and disrupting order requires a 
continuous need for re-establishing what is, ironically, a disordering order. The servant 
almost constantly has to call his or her community into a re-ordering transformation for 
the sake of creating the level of energy necessary to sustain the system. 
 With respect to the leadership posture grid, leaders encounter the threat of 
thermodynamic equilibrium relative to energy flows in the oscillation between 
exothermic leadership styles and endothermic leadership styles. If the system balances 
energy, it ceases to be exothermic or endothermic. The social system and the 
corresponding leadership style are reversible across this point. Likewise leaders 
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encounter maximum entropy when moving between the manager and facilitator styles at 
the point prior to re-establishing order. 
 Leadership postures relative to equilibrium, then, resist a balancing of the energy 
flow. Recall now the earlier analysis of Freire’s insights relative to the Moral Meaning 
Matrix. Endothermic meaning-making corresponds to the imposition of the normative on 
the ontological. Conversely, exothermic meaning-making corresponds to the privileging 
of the ontological over the normative. A balance between the normative and the 
ontological would equate with equilibrium. Thus in a closed system, the leader 
necessarily privileges either the normative or the ontological in order to stave off 
equilibrium. Understanding normative patterns as past meanings-made and ontological 
patterns as potential future meanings unfolds the dimension of time into these 
conceptions of leadership. Endothermic leadership styles are regressive in nature in that 
they rely on past-meanings made for the processes of signification they engender. 
Exothermic styles, however, are progressive in that they give primacy to potential and 
future. Remember that the systems are closed and are therefore reversible. A progressive 
leader, when energy runs out, reverts to the corresponding regressive style to bring 
energy back into the system. 
 The danger this reversibility causes is that once a leader adopts a regressive mode, 
the past is recursively privileged pulling the leader toward, developmentally speaking, 
earlier and earlier, modes of meaning-making. A servant turned manager in the face of 
depleting resources can regress through paternalist/maternalist to authoritarian. Whereas 
reclaiming a servant style requires that the system replenish its resources, devolving into 
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authoritarian requires only the repetition of the cycle of privileging the past over the 
future. 
 Conversely, in a system with plentiful resources, the leader’s meaning-making 
style has the opportunity to shift into exothermic or progressive mode. In this mode, 
future meanings, in the form of the ontological, are privileged thereby facilitating 
personal growth and development. 
 While the abundance of resources may be a necessary condition for enabling a 
progressive leadership style, it is not a sufficient condition. The leaders must have the 
cognitive and moral capacity to operate at higher cycles of development. Such growth 
again has to do with the leader’s posture relative to the onset of equilibrium and entropy 
in a social system.  
 In the middle of the developmental continuum for leaders and the systems for 
which they facilitate meaning-making is the point at which the enterprise of signification 
shifts from an endothermic process to an exothermic process. This is the point where the 
meaning-making process of the system is immanently reversible. In the theoretical center 
between manager and facilitator systems there is no energy exchanged and the 
ontological and the normative contribute equally to the meaning-making synthesis. The 
only problem is there is no tension between the two points. The system is incapable of 
producing meaning because it is in equilibrium – heat death.  
 Closed systems leaders at all levels of development must deal with this threat of 
equilibrium or system death. Endothermic leadership styles regress away from the 
equilibrium and experience the increased entropy that comes naturally from the 
ontological dimension as pulling the system closer to heat death. No closed system 
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leaders can escape increasing entropy, because entropy is always increasing. At one 
extreme, authoritarian leaders react to entropy by increasing hierarchical ordering and, 
given the charism of the authoritarian, interpret entropy as a foe - yet another rival to be 
dominated. Charismatic authoritarian leadership, therefore, involves the dominant rival 
leader articulating a vision for followers that demonstrates his or her ability to fend off 
the entropic forces of experience with power appropriated from outside the system to 
establish the articulated future vision. Given the regressive nature of endothermic 
leadership, this norm-dominated future vision will involve a retrenchment of past 
meanings. Thus the struggle between entropy and order for the authoritarian regresses the 
leader and the system as a whole. It is meaningful, but meaningful in increasingly 
historic, or fundamentalist, terms. Again here we encounter the conflation of the 
normative with the meaning dimensions in its extreme which reveals the closure of the 
system through increasing fundamentalism. Differences in the system are recursively 
screened out as ontological data are judged against the more and more rigid normative 
screen. Taken to the extreme, this closure of the system, in response to entropy, results in 
a homogenization as distinctions regressively disappear thus requiring the leaders to 
appropriate more and more power from within and from outside the system to maintain 
any kind of hierarchical ordering at all. This very power hungry system, in reaction to the 
entropy of the future, powers itself into the homogeneity of the past which intensifies and 
eventually overcomes the system. As Taylor observes, the “processes of globalization 
have unleashed resurgent nationalisms and fundamentalisms throughout the world. 
Though these reactions often issue in devastating violence, they are ultimately fated to 
fail.”433
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 Whereas the authoritarian is hungry for power for the sake of constantly re-
establishing order, the servant, on the other end of the spectrum, is hungry for difference, 
needing to add it to the system to sustain the exothermic meaning-making process. Since 
the servant system depletes energy rather than absorbing it like the authoritarian, it must 
move away from equilibrium by increasing difference. It does so by privileging the 
ontological over the normative to the extreme, enveloping the variety of new experiences 
in order to resist the equilibration of energy exchange. Unlike the authoritarian, entropy 
in the servant system increases difference and propels the progressive system away from 
equilibrium. Whenever the system nears equilibrium, the charism of the servant 
transforms the power structures and demythologizes the status quo. This leaves the 
system radically subject to the ontological without regard to any governing norms. It is 
intensively progressive to the point of making past meanings made irrelevant. The 
ontological realities feed the process of signification without any substantive screening 
by the normative. The meaning dimension serves as a substitute for the normative and 
simply must accept the ontological as meaningful and therefore normative. The way it is 
becomes understood as the way it ought to be. The relativistic ungrounded mysticism 
tightens the seal on the closed system by shutting it off from the past. The Moral 
Meaning Matrix dimensions collapse into homogeneity. 
 So authoritarians react against increasing entropy and in so doing regress into 
homogenization. Servants allow entropy to increase to avoid equilibrium and in so doing 
progress toward homogenization. Both equilibrium and homogenization in closed social 
systems establish the mythic conditions for creation or re-creation. A Girardian analysis 
suggests that societies will differentiate and re-order by re-enacting the myth with a firm 
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grip on the meaning-making process. Times of homogeneity and equilibrium require 
sacrifice, or the mimetic violence will destroy the social unit altogether. 
 Thinking about the leadership styles as a continuum of openness to the 
ontological dimension, with authoritarian being the most closed to it of the six, and 
thinking of the ontological dimension as the dimension that introduces entropy in the 
form of new experiences which increase difference in the system, makes it easy to 
understand how authoritarians fighting entropy move farther and farther away from 
difference and into increasing homogeneity. It is equally easy to imagine how servant 
leaders stand on the precipice of total entropic consumption, yet servants retain a closed 
system by ultimately disallowing any dialectical conversation with the past. The degrees 
of openness between authoritarian and servant are also degrees of balance between the 
ontological and the normative positions in the matrix. Authoritarians privilege the 
normative to the exclusion of the ontological and servants privilege the ontological to the 
exclusion of the normative. This scale of shifting balance corresponds to a continuum of 
energy deployment moving from highly endothermic to highly exothermic. In the 
theoretical middle of this continuum is the immanently reversible system in which the 
ontological and normative are balanced. Between the manager and facilitator leadership 
styles is that middle ground. This equilibrium state in the evolution of leaders and their 
closed systems serves as an attractor as the systems will move naturally toward 
equilibrium. As a result, the charisms of the manager and facilitator are probably among 
the most often engaged to stave off the entropic pull toward equilibrium by ordering and 
re-ordering the system, in the case of the manager, or allowing in just enough entropy to 
thwart the slide into equilibrium in the case of the facilitator. The charisms involve 
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making meaning by using power using the mythical processes of execution and self-
sacrifice. The equilibrium-attractor of closed social systems invokes the apex of the 
violent myth. So the ritualized activities described above of scapegoating and sacrifice 
are actively and intentionally replayed over and over again in order to revive closed 
social systems that would otherwise plunge irresistibly into the equilibrium of mob 
violence.  
 
Scapegoating a Manager 
Consider, for example, a case study of a budget-cutting process at the University 
of Missouri. The normatively-driven decision-making processes attempted to close the 
system. The openness of the system persisted however and at least one leader who had 
participated in prescribing managerial meaning-making modes experienced his own 
scapegoating once others in the system re-ordered it as his expense. The other two 
scapegoating manager-leaders temporarily re-established order in the system, which was 
headed toward undifferentiated equilibrium, by scapegoating the third manager. They 
simultaneously regressed the system and kept it from opening up even more. 
In the early 1980s, Provost Ron Bunn at the University of Missouri faced several 
questions as he attempted to chart a long-range path for responding to the financial 
pressures the university had been experiencing. His thought processes and actions are the 
subject of a case study developed for the Harvard Institute for Education Management by 
Jacqueline Stefkovich, Chris Harris, and Lee Bolman.434  
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Harvard University Institute for Education Management, 1985, 1986, 1993). 
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 The case study leads me to characterize Bunn’s decision-making process as one 
which attempts to discern which budget cuts make sense in light of the fiscal crises he 
faced. In his case, I generally detect a desire to inscribe the normative onto the 
ontological. In other words, Bunn’s rational approach (along with that of Chancellor 
Barbara Uehling and President James Olson) to the difficult situation he was facing was 
to impose his normative sense of orderliness on the complex realties of the situation. He 
was attempting to keep an open system closed by emphasizing and acting from the 
normative and general at the expense of the ontological and contextual. While he was not 
at all naïve to the complexities involved, his rational approach did not find a happy 
reception within the organizational framework.  
 Organizational theorists Michael Cohen and James March, from the framework 
they articulated in Leadership and Ambiguity, would argue the rational approach is not at 
home in an academic setting because the environment does not conform to common 
assumptions about what is reasonable. In their words, such an environment is an anarchy, 
and Bunn was not sensitive enough to the chaotic environment to employ tactics that 
would enable him to make decisions or execute successful strategies.435
 Beyond the order-disorder dyad outlined by Cohen and March is a third option. 
That is the possibility that what Cohen and March might construe as anarchy has an order 
in and of itself that is discernible but not necessarily resonant with a western rational 
sense of order. Cohen and March point to this possibility somewhat, but I read their 
suggestions and tactics more as helping the normatively-driven provost succeed in 
applying norms to a chaotic environment. Rather than calling for a complete surrender to 
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the ontological order in which a leader finds himself or herself, the authors give a 
normative handbook for navigating the wild jungle of the university.436 They still 
presume that normativity precedes ontology but admit that acting normatively in such an 
environment requires special skills derived from attention to the fact that the environment 
is norm-resistant. 437
 I would like to push Cohen and March to go a step farther and abandon the order-
disorder duality and look into the chaos of the university to find the sense that is, in fact, 
made there. What is it that rules the chaos? That is, how does the chaos itself make 
sense? Rather than trying to force norms upon a system that is resistant to them or slip 
them by while the system blinks, it may be the mark of a more powerful leader to attend 
to, understand and act in accordance with the laws of an order that may be judged as 
chaos on the surface.  
 In the case of the latter, I argue that the ontological gives rise to the normative and 
that the ontology itself has an order all its own. I will attempt to show evidence of this 
ruled chaos with what data are available from the University of Missouri (UMO) study as 
we examine how that community makes sense of the cuts. 
 My analysis proceeds as follows: Cuts That Make Sense, Cutting Sensitively, and 
Making Sense of the Cuts. In each of these sections, I discuss the thought processes, 
actions, and justifications around two dimensions of the study: The tension between 
uniform cuts across the board and making strategic cuts, and the development of criteria 
to guide Bunn’s and others’ decisions. 
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Cuts that Make Sense 
 The president, chancellor, provost, Board of Curators, and faculty council all 
agreed “in principle” that executing uniform budget reductions across the board was an 
undesirable solution to the financial problems facing the university system. A poll 
conducted by the campus newspaper confirmed, to the extent it could, that the campus 
generally favored strategic cuts over reductions that were spread evenly across campus. 
The “principle” to which so many assented seems to have been summed up nicely by the 
following: 
Both Bunn and Barbara Uehling believed that it was essential for the 
Columbia campus to concentrate its resources on its strongest and most 
significant programs. Uehling had frequently and publicly expressed 
concern over the University’s tendency to skim all programs across the 
board at the expense of the institution’s mission.438  
 
The mission of the university provides a normative standard against which programs can 
be judged. In fact, the way the case study is written implies that some programs already 
had been assessed against that standard at least in the minds of Bunn and Uehling. What 
is unclear from the case study is whether even Uehling and Bunn shared a common 
understanding of what made a program “strong” and “significant.”  The mission held 
symbolic value for both Uehling and Bunn as it likely did for the entire campus. Further, 
the principle of measuring programs against that mission seems to have obtained near 
universal agreement.  
 Rationally, it would seem that the decision-making process was off to a great 
start. The community could commonly affirm the mission and agree in principle that it 
ought to guide the university’s actions as the community navigated this difficult budget 
crisis. This consensus, however, begs the question that, theoretically, nothing ought to 
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exist in the university if it is inconsistent with or detrimental to the mission of the 
university.  
 The consensus is not illusory. It is real, but it is consensus around a symbol which 
by nature throws together disparate meanings and holds them as unified. The power of a 
symbol is that it can express a multitude of values, some of which may be in conflict with 
one another. In this case, the engineering dean and the education dean, for example, could 
affirm the mission with equal conviction while holding contradictory interpretations of 
what that affirmation means. 
 So the consensus is off to a rocky start at the beginning, and the difficulty is 
amplified by the principle of judging programs against that symbol. Knowing that there 
may be as many interpretations of the mission as there are people interpreting it makes it 
even more difficult to conceive of how many myriad ways programs can be judged 
relative to that standard – a standard which turns out to be a multitude of standards after 
all.  
 The mission as symbol is useful in that it helps to unify an otherwise disparate 
operation, but its strength is its weakness if it is deployed in a deductive manner and 
applied to a situation such as the one confronting UMO. The principle of judging 
programs by the mission is problematic from inception because of the symbolic nature of 
the mission.  
 When confronted with a difficult reality, Bunn and Uehling attempted to organize 
the complex by reaching for available norms, gaining or confirming consensus around 
those norms, and applying them to the situation. Bunn and Uehling attempted to apply the 
normative mission to resolve the ontological budget crisis. 
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 Bunn, Uehling, and Olson were aware of the difficulty in applying this principle 
to the situation and its susceptibility to many different interpretations. Therefore they all 
proposed and followed criteria in their decision-making processes. President Olson 
articulated criteria for the consideration of the Board of Curators. His criteria included: 
quality, need, redundancy, and financial considerations. The Curators agreed to these 
criteria. In a more extensive process of consensus-building, Uehling had led her staff to 
the formulation of campus-specific criteria which Bunn later used in his evaluation of 
programs. These criteria were quality, centrality to the mission, cost-effectiveness, and 
demand. Both Olson’s and Bunn’s criteria are discussed in more detail in the case study. 
At issue here is not the validity of the criteria but the fact that criteria were developed in 
the first place. 
 Again, Uehling’s norm-development process was year-long and involved many 
constituencies. Olson’s criteria were well-developed and published in a speech before the 
Board of Curators. Contrast, however, the process of developing criteria publicly with the 
chaplains’ process at Emory of trying to determine what to do. UMO focused on 
consensus around the why before getting to the what, whereas Emory ultimately focused 
on the what and built the why around it. Nevertheless UMO was able to gain consensus 
around the normative as well as around the principle that one can use the normative to 
evaluate and shape the ontological. By using the normative to guide his actions, Bunn 
proposed cuts that made sense. 
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Cutting Sensitively 
 The analysis of Cohen and March begins to expose the problems of the way the 
leaders were approaching this problem. While nodding to the importance of the 
ontological and qualifying the role of the normative, even Cohen and March’s approach 
does not quite go as far as embracing the full openness of this system. Nevertheless, their 
conclusions move this analysis in that direction.  
Cohen and March suggest that statements of purpose are “meaningless or 
dubious.”439 In order to be broadly accepted, the goals statements must remain ambiguous 
and, therefore, in Cohen and March’s estimation, meaningless. This ambiguity makes 
“ordinary theories of decision making and intelligence…problematic.”440 Cohen and 
March offer strategies for “how a leader with purpose can operate within an organization 
that is without one.”441  
 It is perfectly understandable how Bunn, Uehling, and Olson could come to 
understand the normative dimension of the crisis as key to resolving it. Yet by 
concentrating on the normative, Bunn et al. construct an artificial clarity of purpose that 
is, in actuality, unrelated to the organizational circumstances surrounding the crisis.  
 Cohen and March illuminate the dissonance between the presumptions of 
leadership and the realities of the context in which they lead. It is possible that Cohen and 
March would argue that Bunn did not pay attention to this dissonance and headed off in a 
process that mistakenly presumed an environment hospitable to a normative approach. 
 The same might be said of the establishment of criteria to guide the budget cuts. 
Cohen and March critique what they call an “ethic of rationality” which presumes 
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purpose and which requires consistency between action and belief and relates 
consequences to objectives.442 Certainly the way in which Bunn deployed the criteria in 
the midst of this crisis was to achieve some, if not all, of these elements of a rational 
approach to the crisis. What Cohen and March might suggest to Bunn, among other 
things, is to reconsider the whole notion of evaluation.  
As nearly as we can determine, there is nothing in a formal theory of 
evaluation that requires that criteria be specified in advance. In particular, 
the evaluation of social experiments need not be in terms of the degree to 
which they have fulfilled our prior expectations. Rather they can examine 
what they did in terms of what we now believe to be important.443
 
In sum, by referencing the mission at the beginning, employing the principle of 
evaluating programs in terms of the mission, and by elaborating that principle in the 
establishment of measurement criteria, Bunn and the other UMO leaders imposed an 
artificial order on an environment which might have yielded new terms of self-evaluation 
if attended to in what Cohen and March call a “playful” manner.444 By relaxing, rather 
than clarifying rules and standards, Bunn may have been able to discover new norms 
more native to the organization than the ones prescribed by the mission and measured 
with the evaluation criteria. Cohen and March might suggest that cutting the budget 
sensitively relative to the organizational context would have been a key to effective 
leadership in this time of crisis. 
 
Making Sense of the Cuts 
 Despite the fact that a number within the UMO community seemed to assent to 
the idea of strategic or mission-guided cutting as opposed to across-the-board cuts, the 
                                                 
442 Ibid., 216-8. 
443 Ibid., 228. 
444 Ibid., 229. 
 
   
 240
reactions to the budget cuts show that the common affirmation did not lead to an outcome 
that was as universally accepted. Across-the-board cuts were a more common precedent 
than strategic cuts, so the call for a more mission-based approach was a call for departure 
from historical practice.  
 While Bunn and the leadership seem to have achieved consensus on the departure 
from precedent, some of the reactions to Bunn’s proposals indicate that the departure was 
still being judged against the precedent which was, essentially, equal budget cuts for all. 
George Nicklaus, dean of the College of Public Health and Community Service, viewed 
his school as having been “attacked” for the gain of faculty salaries in other areas, and he 
criticized what he perceived to be a lack of clarity as to where the redirected resources 
would go.445 His arguments do not subscribe to norms based on mission or strategy but 
rather appeal to the order of fairness inherent in the across-the-board cuts of previous 
years. Mission-based cuts could justify the elimination or reduction of programs without 
accounting for the savings. In fact, the mission does not seem to enter into Nicklaus’s 
protests at all. His arguments were based more in what appears to have been the tradition 
of how budget cuts were done in the past.  
 As far as the use of the criteria is concerned, there is little or no evidence in the 
protests recorded in the case study that anyone indicted the decision-making criteria per 
se. What happened, rather, is that protestors imputed criteria upon the decision-making 
process. “Engineers said that [Bunn] was ‘anti-engineering.’” Other faculty “rejected the 
assumption that there was a fiscal crisis, and argued that the university was in excellent 
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condition….‘This was an administration-induced crisis that was mismanaged.’” Many 
ridiculed the process claiming that it was not universally representative.446  
 Still no one seemed to reject the articulated criteria on their face. In fact the 
reactions seem to ignore the a priori normative criteria altogether. They did not see the 
cuts as stemming from an application of criteria. Instead they saw a need to postulate 
criteria based on the ontological reality of the cuts. 
 Both instances described above indicate that the ontological has more sway over 
the normative in this case than does the normative over the ontological. In making 
meaning of a given set of actions and decisions, the community members most affected 
by Bunn’s proposals drew on precedent (the way things have been done in the past) to 
judge the actions of the present. In other words present actions were judged against past 
action, both elements of the ontological realm. The standard applied to the present actions 
was whether or not it was consistent with the precedent that budget cuts are conducted 
out of necessity in a zero-sum world having an equal impact on all programs or, 
alternatively, unfairly benefiting one at the expense of the other. The precedents 
themselves actually provided a sense of order that guided or could have guided decision-
making. When the order of the precedents was violated, it was more noticeable and more 
hotly protested than a normative violation would have been.  
 In Cohen and March’s framework, this shows up as chaos or anarchy, but closer 
examination reveals that there is an order; it is just not an order which derives from 
normative assumptions. The ontological conditions here give rise to new meaning around 
the notions of fairness. However, an ethic of fairness was not one that was ever 
articulated in the debate about across-the-board cuts versus mission-based cuts. It is a 
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tacit order which proceeds from the history of actions of those within the organization an 
organizational category of precedents in terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix. This 
category lives within a broader nomos or order at the institutional level of education. 
 In the same way, the force of the post-facto imputation of criteria upon the 
decision-making process not only overshadows the a priori work conducted by the 
leaders of the organization, it essentially negates it and disregards it altogether. Even after 
lodging protests, the same dissenters might be able to agree to the criteria Bunn, Uehling, 
and Olson had articulated, yet their protests give evidence that such consensus and 
conversation is, in fact, irrelevant to the actions of reducing budgets and eliminating 
programs at UMO.  
Again those who would be affected by Bunn’s proposals make meaning out of the 
action. Note, however, that again the what preceded the why. There is no evidence in the 
case study that those who disagreed with Bunn showed any contempt for his application 
of principles. Rather they looked at the actions themselves and began to think about 
reasons and motives. They made sense of the actions, the ontological, by assigning norms 
to them. It was the ex post facto assigned norms which were criticized for being part of a 
personal agenda, not the norms that Bunn originally applied. The a priori norms became 
irrelevant. Again, the ontological preceded the normative. 
In Cohen and March’s evaluation, this might seem chaotic and offer evidence of a 
context that resists or denies norms. Looking at it from the perspective of whether or not 
the organization accepted the prescribed norms would lead to that evaluation. But the 
university was not norm resistant. In fact it was searching for norms, but the norm 
development came after the action, not before it.  
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 Cohen and March hint at both the value of precedent and the ontological 
preceding the normative. In their discussion of experience as theory, they suggest a need 
to develop a “normative theory about acting before thinking.”447 However, their 
framework still regards the ontological as un-ordered chaos. Their discussion, for 
instance, of “foolishness” entertains the idea of norm-breaking as rule-breaking to see if 
new criteria for what is important might surface.448 They acknowledge that preconceived 
notions may not be able to impose order on a situation. They call for leaders to depart 
occasionally from preconceived notions and “play” in the disorderly world to see what 
new directions emerge.449 Still they hold order and chaos or ruled behavior and play in 
opposition with one another in their recommendation that leaders sustain a “creative 
interaction between foolishness and rationality.”450 This indicates that their framework 
still is mythically inscribed – seeing openness to the ontological as a disordering threat 
that needs to be engaged but ultimately only for the sake of managing it. 
What I have tried to show, however, given the limitations of the case study, is that 
there is evidence of an order in what Cohen and March call chaos. It is not an order in the 
rational sense of the word, but in the sense that organizations can be ruled by it. Rather 
than advocating a dance between poles, I suggest that leaders work to understand the 
order inherent in the system and act in accord with that order. Just as the order could 
permit and understand uniform budget cuts as well as cuts that benefit one program at the 
expense of the other, the order is not necessarily rigid and limiting. It might have its own 
limitless possibilities. So rather than fighting the ontological order with a normative one, 
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a leader might be better advised to attend to the ontological halachically and learn how 
people make normative sense out of what is actually occurring. 
 Cohen and March plant their feet squarely in the camp of the normative shaping 
the ontological when they characterize the world as “absurd [so that] the president’s 
primary responsibility is to virtue.”451 The point of their recommendations seems to be to 
find ways to introduce virtue into the absurd when the world embraces and lives by the 
absurdity. Perhaps a better course of action might be to learn to find the virtue in the 
world, absurd as it may seem. 
Others in the UMO community sought to make meaning on the edges in their own 
experience of communitas while administrators tried to impose normative explanations 
on a highly disruptive reality. The managerial style of leadership involved in executing 
these budget cuts left many feeling rightfully victimized and excluded from (read 
scapegoated by) the community. Given the breadth of the impact of these cuts, the 
meaning-making style was adopted mimetically by the larger community, which sought 
out its own scapegoat, Ron Bunn. 
At a hearing before a standing committee of the state Senate, Uehling and 
Olson testified first, seated side-by-side. When Bunn’s turn came, the 
committee chairman asked, “Are you alone?” Bunn replied, “Yes, but I am 
getting accustomed to the idea.”452
 
 Scapegoating processes whether they hurt persons or isolate or elevate ideas and 
ideals mimetically translate throughout the fractal web to all levels of social complexity. 
By looking at a specific organizational example we are able to see how the system was 
indeed open and made meaning as an open system. However, the leaders’ treatment of 
the system as closed called for a scapegoat-based budget-cutting process. The meaning-
                                                 
451 Cohen and March, 205. 
452 Stefkovich et al., 15. 
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making myth inscribed by that approach obtained even at the expense of one of the 
leaders, as others in the system tried to stave off equilibrium. 
 Reviving such systems however, requires a leader with developed enough 
charisma to lead the meaning-making project through these rituals. Hall’s taxonomy is a 
developmental one. Leaders whose meaning-making skills have only developed as far as 
authoritarian or parental will be unable to execute the ritual sacrifices necessary to keep 
the system out of equilibrium. Their only hope is to continue to privilege the normative 
over the ontological which eventually leads to homogenization and subsequent system 
death – a death from which authoritarians and parents will be unable to recover. 
Managers know how to keep the system from succumbing to the entropic pull toward 
equilibrium, but as norm-privilegers themselves, they also regress the system.  
 Authoritarian, Parental and Managerial leaders regress systems by privileging 
norms. Norm-focused efforts to evoke change can be met mimetically with norm-focused 
resistance, especially when the leader is invoking a non-native moral language. 
Conversely, facilitators, collaborators, and servants employ a charism that focuses on the 
ontological and has the effect of progressing the system, at least to a point, allowing the 
ontological to bring new data into the system. Contrast the endothermic and the 
exothermic charisms in the following case study involving Harvard Law School. 
 
Dominating a Rival and Elevating a Hero 
In Confronting Authority: Reflections of an Ardent Protester, Derrick Bell cites 
his mother, Ada Childress Bell, as one of a number of his models for challenging 
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authority.453 In one vignette, Bell describes the occasion upon which his mother refused 
to pay her rent until the landlord repaired the doorsteps of her family’s house. Through 
her own protest, she was successful in obtaining the response she sought from her 
landlord. In one of the stories he tells about his own personal protests, Bell was not 
successful in convincing the Harvard Law School faculty to retain among its ranks 
Professor Regina Austin, an African American woman with a visiting appointment.454 In 
fact, Bell seemed to evoke a normative retrenchment on the part of his colleagues. 
Contrasting these two instances illustrates Ada Bell’s ability to change the reality of her 
family’s living conditions and Derrick Bell’s inability to reshape norms related to 
Harvard Law School’s hiring practices. The difference in the two approaches is one of 
awareness of the openness of the respective systems. 
 “Eventually,” says Bell, “the Harvard Law School will hire and tenure its first 
woman of color…even that event will not herald the adoption of polices to ensure either 
diversity or merit in the hiring process.”455 While Harvard may eventually behave in the 
way Bell hopes, the behavior will not be, according to Bell, a result of a normative shift 
for the faculty. Bell’s failed Harvard protest, as I will show, was a normative one, which 
did not understand or exploit the power of the contextual and the ontological. By trying to 
appropriate norms from one institution to another without passing through the gateway of 
ontological context, Bell exhibits the same moral con-fusion demonstrated by the 
president and the bishop in the Emory case. His mother, by contrast, effectively changed 
                                                 
453 Derrick Bell, Confronting Authority: Reflections of an Ardent Protestor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 
10-11. 
454 Ibid., 49-65. 
455 Ibid., 163. 
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her circumstances by leveraging the contextual and ontological within the appropriate 
institutional framework. 
 
Ontological Change 
 By withholding the family’s rent money from her landlord, Bell’s mother was 
able to pressure him to bring the residence out of its state of dangerous disrepair. She 
waved the rent money in front of the landlord’s teller and refused to hand it over until the 
landlord repaired the back steps of the Bell residence.456  
 Analyzing his mother’s actions, to the extent we have the data to do so, in terms 
of the Moral Meaning Matrix shows that her protest was really focused more on the 
ontological dimension (or on changing reality) and less on the normative. Her actions 
actually did not necessarily call into question any norms that the landlord may have held. 
Her refusal to pay rent was legitimate and salient within the same normative framework 
that also would have caused the landlord to expect payment. As an aid, I reproduce the 
Moral Meaning Matrix in Figure 12 below. In this version, however, I identify the levels 
of social complexity as components of a network as discussed in chapter seven. 
Figure 12: Moral Meaning Matrix as Network 
Dimension Universe Society 
(System) 
Institution 
(Network) 
Organization 
(Hub) 
Group 
(Cluster) 
Interpersonal 
(Node) 
Normative Ought Ethos Symbol Language Narrative Word 
Meaning Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
Ontological Is Worldview Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
Dynamic Energy Power Jurisdiction Authority Resource Relationship 
 
As shown in Figure13, the institutional framework for the transaction between 
landlord and tenant is (and was at the time) the market economy. Paying rent and 
                                                 
456 Ibid. 
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withholding rent both make sense in the framework of the market. Bell describes the 
teller cage in symbolic terms. Paying rent was the ritual interaction between the 
normative and the ontological that established the authoritative relationship between 
landlord and tenant which was formalized in a lease which served as an instrument of 
power with the force of jurisdiction in the relationship. 457  
 The operative tradition, in this situation, within the market economy is one of 
exchange. The Bells paid rent; they had a place to live. Other exchanges are legitimate as 
well. Bell’s mother probably most often categorized the rent-for-housing exchange as 
money due to the landlord. The only power in the relationship within that categorization 
is that of the landlord who would have had authority over the use of the property. The 
precedent this category evoked for Ada Bell up until the point of her protest was, 
presumably, one of dutiful response to that obligation.  
 At the moment of protest Mrs. Bell effectively re-categorized the transaction as a 
trade. Not only was the landlord getting money for the use of his property, the tenant, 
turned customer, was expecting some consideration for the payment. Under this 
categorization, the landlord had to operate more as a merchant in the relationship than a 
collector - a merchant who had an interest (limited as it may have been) in his or her 
customer’s satisfaction. Figure 13 displays the analysis above in tabular form. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
457 Geertz, 127. 
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Figure 13: Ada Bell’s Protest vs. Business as Usual 
Dimension Universal Society Market Economy Exchange 
Relationship
Rent Office Teller & 
Family 
Normative Ought Ethos Landlord Commerce Money buys 
goods and 
services. 
Purchase 
Meaning Synopsis Myth Paying Rent Landlord as 
Merchant vs. 
Collector 
Shopping vs. 
Servicing debt 
Acting as 
consumer vs. 
debtor 
Ontological Is Worldview Tenancy Trade vs. 
Due/Owed 
Bargaining 
vs. Dutifully 
Responding 
Withholding 
vs. Paying 
Dynamic Energy Power Lease Parties in a 
Contract 
Property/ 
Payment 
Landlord/ 
Tenant 
 
 Mrs. Bell did not confront authority as much as claim the authority she already 
had in the relationship. She did not alter the institutional framework but worked within it 
taking full advantage of the multiple options available to her at the group and 
interpersonal levels of social complexity. She had authority over the money used to pay 
the rent and used that authority to re-categorize the transaction. This put her in a position 
of bargaining as she, perhaps, had done in other contexts in which she withheld her 
money until she saw a product she was willing to purchase at a price she was willing to 
pay. Not only might the precedent have been familiar to her, it could have been familiar 
to the landlord as well. It fell squarely within a narrative the two likely shared even when 
they may have shared little else. Her praxis in this case, then, was to act as a consumer 
instead of acting as a debtor. She behaved meaningfully and in a way that was intelligible 
to both tenant and landlord, but she behaved differently than expected nonetheless. 
 Mrs. Bell’s behavioral change did not require a normative shift for her or for the 
landlord. Derrick Bell never reports his mother trying to convince the landlord to 
reconceive of the repairs as something he or she ought to feel obliged to do. She never 
tries to persuade him in terms of fairness or safety, for example. Ada Bell withheld 
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something she knew the landlord wanted and would likely prefer over the prospect of 
locating a new tenant. In a way that was meaningful for him, the landlord responded by 
repairing the steps. The response, initially at least, was as limited as the circumscribed 
protest. 
 
Normative Failure 
 While his mother effected change on the ontological level, Bell’s own protests 
seemed to have been oriented toward trying to alter the ethics and norms held by the law 
school faculty. In fact, a similar analysis of his protest regarding the retention of Regina 
Austin illustrates that Bell was fighting for his cause on a normative front while 
simultaneously acting in a way that was inconsistent with the faculty’s operative 
normative framework. 
 As Bell relates the facts of the Austin case, he notes that she was a visiting 
professor for the 1989-90 school year.458 His request to the faculty, by way of the 
appointments committee, was that Harvard find some way to “retain” her.459 Bell does 
not indicate that there was a search underway or hint at any open position on the faculty.  
 Bell uses the faculty’s refusal to consider the possibility of creating a position for 
Austin as the focus for his protest regarding the addition of a black woman to the faculty. 
He then articulates the case for such an addition, be it Austin or not, in the context of an 
appeal to diversity within the faculty ranks. He points out many of the educational and 
symbolic advantages to having a diverse faculty. He persuasively argues that, despite the 
appearance of diversity, the faculty needed to be even more diverse and was indeed 
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lacking the important component of a black woman.460 His argument departs from the 
specific question of whether or not to retain Austin and focuses more on his assertion that 
the faculty ought to include a black woman for the sake of diversity.461
 Within the meritocratic order of the faculty, the potential for a visiting professor 
to seek a permanent position was governed, generally speaking, by prohibiting such 
consideration until after he or she had completed his or her visiting term.462 The practice 
of a one-year delay coheres with past practices and the extant meritocracy without 
explicit appeal to the normative. When pushed, however, other faculty members began 
making meaning of that policy by discussing the merits of a visiting professor being able 
to teach freely without being inhibited by oversight and evaluation. This rationalization is 
consistent with a general devotion to academic freedom.463 That devotion, in turn, resided 
comfortably within a broader and more symbolic educational commitment to tenure for 
members of the permanent faculty.464
 Bell’s protest, however, does not draw on precedents described by the faculty’s 
normative framework of tenure and academic freedom. His action is based on the 
precedent of boycotts within the civil rights movement. By ceasing to teach, he is hoping 
to interrupt operations and leverage his power to effect change. Unfortunately, for Bell’s 
cause, he is withholding very little from the law school unlike his civil rights role models 
who had both buying-power and the cumulative effect of collective action to leverage 
changes in corporate hiring practices. 465  
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 Contrast Figure 13 with Figure 14. While Bell’s mother’s protest began with an 
activity at the intersection of the ontological dimension on the interpersonal level of the 
Moral Meaning Matrix, Bell’s own protest begins with the organization’s norms, 
challenging straight away the moral language which was deeply imbedded in the 
institution of education.  
Figure 14: Harvard Hiring Practices vs. Bell’s Protest 
Dimension Universe Society (Higher) 
Education  
vs. Market 
Economy 
Faculty Self- 
Governance vs. 
Civil Rights 
Movement 
Harvard Law 
School vs. 
Corporations 
Regina 
Austin 
Appointment 
Normative Ought Ethos Tenure vs. 
Best Economic 
Interest466
Academic 
Freedom vs. Just 
Business 
Practices 
 
 Scholarly 
Independence 
vs. Seeking 
Change 
Temporary to 
Permanent 
Status 
vs. Protest  
Meaning Synopsis Myth Search vs. 
Integration467
Transient and 
Provisional 
Participation vs.
Collective  
Action  
Evaluation 
Free468 vs. 
Withholding 
Participation 
Deferred 
Consideration 
vs. Leave of 
Absence 
Ontological Is Worldview Meritocracy 
vs. 
Leveraging 
“Buying 
Power”469
Visiting 
Professor vs. 
Boycott 
Hiatus Policy 
vs. Stopping 
“Business As 
Usual”470
Wait One Year 
vs. Stop 
Teaching 
Dynamic Energy Power Faculty vs. 
Hiring/Sales 
Policy vs. 
Owner/ 
Consumer 
Votes vs. Jobs/ 
Purchases 
Membership 
vs. Professor/
Faculty  
 
The moral language Bell invoked was from a foreign institutional context. His mother’s 
protest was an inductive one which started with activity and only precipitated change as 
general (left on the matrix) as challenging whether within the tradition the landlord was 
going to behave as a merchant or collector. Her protest never appealed for change on the 
                                                 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid., 55. 
469 Ibid., 59. 
470 Ibid. 
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normative level. Rather it used the extant and shared norms to synthesize new meaning 
on the organization, group and interpersonal levels.  
 Bell’s protest, conversely, was a deductive one which worked from moral 
language through to his activity decision to stop teaching versus waiting a year. Because 
he appealed to the moral language of a different institution altogether, even the dynamic 
dimension of the matrix gets altered to reflect the tensions between two different power 
structures legitimated by two different institutions. Jurisdiction, authority, resources, and 
relationship are defined and assigned differently in education than they are in the 
economy. Figure 14 details this analysis in tabular form. 
Significantly, the precedents upon which he draws pertain to situations and 
contexts related to white-owned businesses which, like Mrs. Bell’s rent protest, primarily 
relate to the institution of the market economy and not to higher education. Importantly 
the operative relationship in the civil rights protests he cited as models were between a 
customer and a proprietor which is a much different set of relationships than those 
between one professor and the balance of his colleagues on the faculty. While the praxis 
of a leave of absence registers as a protest in the latter context and while it seeks 
normative change and just business practices in the same way as the civil rights protests 
did, ontologically there is a difference between refraining from teaching and refraining 
from buying. 471 By adopting the category of boycott to interrupt business, Bell presumes 
he has leveraging power that would be akin to buying-power in the marketplace. But he is 
not in the marketplace; he is in higher education. The law school seemed to cope with 
Bell’s absence in ways that boycotted companies could not and, therefore the faculty 
changed neither reality nor norms as a result of Bell’s activities. 
                                                 
471 Ibid. 
 
   
 254
 Bell’s protest differed from his mother’s in two important ways. First, she desired 
an ontological change and not a normative one. The landlord could do what Mrs. Bell 
wanted him to do without changing the principles which framed the landlord’s actions 
and relationships with tenants. Derrick Bell, conversely, seems to have been less 
concerned with the ontological question of retaining Austin and more focused on 
replacing or supplementing Harvard’s normative and symbolic commitments with a 
dedication to diversity. In order for Bell to have succeeded, the faculty as a whole would 
have had to undergo a significant shift in the way they conceived of what they ought to 
be about. Second, Bell subscribed to a practice that was not native to higher education. A 
boycott was an effective practice within an entirely different institutional framework. In 
many ways, it did not make sense in the university setting, especially when undertaken by 
a lone faculty member. 
 Had Bell exploited the exceptions previously made to the one-year deferral 
policy, including the one which he described as being granted to another colleague, 
Robert Clark, he might have found a precedent that he could have deployed in the service 
of retaining Austin.472 Like his mother, he would have had the opportunity to re-
categorize the situation by describing it in the same way Clark’s circumstances had been 
described – in whatever terms they were described at the time of the exception having 
been made for him. If he had been successful in convincing the faculty that the Austin 
situation in 1990 was just like the Clark situation in 1978, he may have been able to effect 
change without having to challenge the operative normative framework.  
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Ontological Change and Normative Shifts 
If diversity, writ large, and not Austin’s retention was truly Bell’s goal, then my 
suggestion above would still be only a partial victory. Considering his mother’s results 
more fully, however, offers hope for the possibility of a normative shift as well. Mrs. 
Bell’s landlord apparently went on to repair all of the steps in the complex without being 
asked or provoked to do so. He embarked upon a new practice, one which may have 
stimulated a new process of meaning-making. The unexpected universal repairs could 
have indicated a category shift in which the landlord began to view all tenants as 
customers who might otherwise withhold rent, or it could offer a glimpse of a nascent 
ethic for the landlord - one that had to do with equal treatment and fairness of his or her 
tenants. Without knowing the landlord, it is impossible for me to say.  
 Mrs. Bell may have affected a normative shift for the landlord, but her actions and 
aims resided decidedly in the realm of the ontological. What is clear is that on the level of 
organization in the Moral Meaning Matrix, or hub in network theory terminology, the 
landlord was able to make meaning of his relationships with tenants in a new way even if 
it remained within the original normative framework. Mrs. Bell affected a new patterning 
by opening up the system to a particular ontological context and offering a different, but 
legitimated precedent with which to order the relationship and share power. If Derrick 
Bell had aimed at ontological change, perhaps he eventually would have succeeded in 
shifting meaning-making patterns and subsequently norms as well. Contrasting the 
protests of mother and son reveals a tenant who by reframing a conflict, claimed and 
legitimated her authority to act meaningfully within a particular institutional framework 
and a son who acted outside the institutional framework altogether forcing him to 
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confront the authority of a policy in a way that did not make institutional sense to his 
faculty colleagues. While Derrick Bell confronted authority, Ada Bell authorized her own 
confrontation. 
 Bell’s story and this analysis illustrate the interconnectedness of the social fractal 
in four ways. First, Bell relied on precedents to inform his action at Harvard Law School. 
The two operative action precedents came from very different levels of complexity within 
the fractal. He imitated his mother from his home life and he imitated civil rights leaders, 
very much in the public eye on a national and international stage. Second, his adoption of 
these precedents illustrates the difference between the institutions of market economy and 
education. Legitimate market economy action may or may not be salient in an 
educational setting. Third, his adoption of civil rights protests as a precedent also 
illustrates the ways actors move fluidly in and out of various institutional contexts, 
importing precedents and metaphors that may or may not be salient in the new context. 
The civil rights protests he was imitating were aimed at leveraging economic power for 
political change. It is similarly interesting to consider the likely overlap between 
Government/Law/Politics and Education in the context of a school of law. However, Bell 
appealed to neither of these two institutional frameworks or their rich sets of precedents 
in his protest. 
 Fourth, and importantly for the present discussion, Bell’s attempts to make 
meaning in this situation were increasingly endothermic. Bell paid attention only to the 
normative dimension of reality. His protests began by trying to manage policy, 
identifying the lack of full diversity as a condition he wished to exile from the faculty 
community. Scapegoating lack of full diversity caused him to scapegoat others who 
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identified with that position. They responded with normative positions of their own 
which regressed the system recursively. He then adopted a Paternalist posture by 
elevating himself (or his continued teaching) as (a withheld) object of desire, his 
leadership style eventually regressed into an authoritarian cycle of a rivalrous stand off 
with a rival he could not ultimately dominate. He evoked mimetically a reciprocally 
regressive response from his increasingly norm-entrenched colleagues until he was 
dominated right out of the faculty. His mother’s protest did not devolve to that level. 
Using a style that is probably most closely described as collaborator/hero, she asserted a 
partnership of equals with the landlord to resolve her problem. She remains a hero to her 
son and likely co-elevated her landlord who perhaps was also regarded as a hero in the 
eyes of others whose steps he fixed without provocation.  
 Facilitators, collaborators, and servants privilege the ontological in their meaning-
making processes. More than that, however, they know how to navigate the middle 
ground of balanced energy states, between norm-privileging and reality-privileging. That 
is, they know how to make meaning through the transition of equilibrium. Even if they 
choose to lead, or the system causes them to lead, at a less developed level of leadership, 
they have developed far enough along to be able to weather the transition of equilibrium. 
Likewise if, as servants, they drive a closed system to a homogenized end, they will have 
the skills and experience necessary to guide the group members through the liminal 
transitions that re-creation requires. This also holds true if a highly developed leader for 
some reason exercises endothermic meaning-making skills and regresses the system into 
a homogenized end on the other end of the spectrum. 
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Initiated Leaders 
This developmental difference in meaning-making ability among the various 
charisms causes me to propose a new distinction which hearkens back to Victor Turner’s 
observations. That is the distinction between initiated and uninitiated leaders. Initiated 
leaders have endured liminal phases and are subsequently able to make sense in those 
times of (albeit often ritualized) death of a social system. 
Drawing on the work of the great student of great myths Joseph Campbell, 
Warren Bennis and colleagues describe well the role that myth plays in guiding leaders, 
“It has always been a central function of mythology to supply the symbols that carry the 
human spirit forward, in counteraction to these other images that constantly hold us 
back.” Quoting Campbell, they interject a developmental element, “‘We remain fixated to 
the unexercised images of our infancy, and hence disinclined to the necessary passages of 
adulthood.’ This disinclination can apply just as much to organizations as to 
individuals.”473 Remaining grounded in Campbell’s model of the hero’s journey, Bennis 
et al. continue, offering an itinerary for the journey that initiates leaders, describing in 
some detail the liminal transition which is the current object of focus.  
“Risking the loss of your old self” is the inward equivalent of the outward 
risk-taking that accompanies business and personal enterprise. Whatever 
ideas you pick up intellectually you have to develop the emotional 
commitment to put both them and yourself to the test. In the process you 
may become a different person, disassembled and reassembled, as a result 
of the emotional wrangles you have undergone.474
 
On the other side of this liminal trial emerges the initiated leader. As a result the charisma 
of exothermic progressive leaders can be described as initiated charisma. The difference 
between initiated and uninitiated charisma is that the uninitiated leader, while able to 
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articulate a vision and make meaning in the face of liminal threats, is not one that has 
developed the personal capacity to endure the liminal himself or herself. Reflect back on 
Frankl’s plight. He experienced what Turner might describe as communitas around the 
edges of camp life. The hyper-structure of the camp regime crowded out any anti-
structure within its closed system of permissible life. Communitas or anti-structure was 
only available around the edges of the hyper-structure. The camp regime synthesized the 
normative and the ontological by imposing the normative on the ontological to the extent 
that the ontological was eventually excluded in the closed system of the camp. The 
system died in terms of its meaning-making ability with the homogenization of the two 
dimensions. Therefore the ontological, anti-structure, and communitas were only found 
outside of the camp regime in darkened bunkhouses, the quietness of the soup line, and in 
what was left of one’s memories and imagination. The authoritarian leaders of camp life 
were synthesizing the is and the ought, literally and figuratively to death, but they were 
unable to endure the liminal with those whose lives they plunged headlong into anti-
structure. 
 Contrast this with St. Francis of Assisi and his orientation toward communitas. He 
prescribed a life to which he himself was committed that maximized the experience of 
anti-structure and communitas. The charism of the authoritarian camp leaders rested 
solely in their ability to deploy power to coerce and force others into their closed system. 
By contrast the initiated charisma of the Franciscan Rule was embodied more 
authentically by a leader who, himself, was willing to endure the liminality his charisma 
evoked.  
 
   
 260
 Whether discussing initiated or uninitiated leaders or charisma, one fact remains 
in all of the cases examined thus far. The leadership styles examined to this point 
presume that the systems they lead are closed systems and work hard to keep them 
closed. This leads to very specific understanding of the life and death of the systems 
relative to the energy available to synthesize meaning. Further, given the dominant 
human myth, which according to Girard is reinforced by a misreading of the Gospel, the 
leadership styles which presumed closed social systems deploy power with unconscious 
attention to the mimetic violence and sacrifice encoded by this myth. 
 As discussed above, the necrosis of the social system translates through the levels 
of social complexity by means of mimesis through the fractal-like relationships which 
link persons to entire societies and vice versa. In the same way, these leadership postures 
which presume closed social systems translate the violent meaning-making methods 
throughout the system. Managerial techniques trading on scapegoating and execution are 
imitated, changed, and perhaps intensified in a way that the dynamics of a corporate 
board room, for instance, can influence global politics. The reverse is also true. However, 
in order to acknowledge the connection between the board room and the White House’s 
situation room where military conflicts around the globe are managed, I must make one 
more epistemological shift. Despite assumptions to the contrary, the board room and the 
situation room, as social systems are in fact, open systems. Deconstructionists contributed 
this insight earlier. Taylor draws on Derrida’s reading of Kurt Gödel to make the point. 
“Every system or structure includes as a condition of its own possibility something it 
cannot assimilate. This ‘outside’ which is ‘inside,’ exposes the openness of every system 
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that seems to be closed.”475 Imagine the scientist who discounts the degree to which his 
or her body temperature alters the ambient temperature of the room in which an 
experiment is being conducted. The watchword “negligible” reveals external influences 
on an artificially closed system in the physical sciences. Scientists who regularly conduct 
experiments in “closed systems” are careful to take such influences into account, 
bounding the system as necessary to achieve the desired results or measurements, but 
eventually the closing of the system relies simply upon a definition of a boundary, a 
definition that describes the artificial assumptions created for the sake of the experiment 
and one that by its very existence acknowledges that the boundaries are artificial and, to 
some degree, porous. Most often we are oblivious to how interconnected all of these 
influences are. But cultural systems are open systems despite attempts to close societies, 
organizations, or groups to outside influence. It is particularly crucial for education to 
understand social systems as open, because education is the portal to ontological context, 
the access any society has to difference. But education needs to rehabilitate its own moral 
language to avoid co-option by other social institutions. It must draw on religion as a 
resource for understanding anew how to synthesize meaning and re-create its own moral 
language. In this way, education and religion can have a mutually transformative effect 
for one another and, together provide the institutional patterning necessary to keep the 
institutions of the government and economy from colluding to close societies and their 
processes of culture-creation which results in increasing and translating violence 
throughout the social fractal. 
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 CHAPTER NINE 
OPEN SYSTEMS CULTURES 
 
 The chapter four call upon education to rethink its moral purpose is a call to 
understand education as the keeper of the gate of ontological context and to de-fuse its 
moral language from that of other social institutions. A moral language which adopts a 
transformative approach to opening systems is the key to re-writing society’s myths 
which describe cultural systems as closed and inscribe violent methods to sustain the 
viability of those mythically closed systems. The dissociation of religion and education 
left religion without education functioning to open society’s meaning-making processes 
to ontological context so that it could re-write the religion-governed myths of meaning-
making. Education’s prospects for functioning in this way for religion and thereby 
society is limited because its own signification processes are regressing into utilitarianism 
as a result of religion, the institution which prescribes modes of meaning-making, being 
relegated to the realm of the private. Religion has very little, if any, standing in the 
academy. Even in places where it does have standing, religion has been regressing itself, 
so the meaning-making processes it encodes trend away from, not toward, openness.  
 Simultaneously, education needs to rehabilitate its self-understanding in order to 
establish moral meaning on its own and thereby rehabilitate religion. Reciprocally and 
simultaneously, religion needs to help education think through how to synthesize 
meaning in a way that is native to and authentic to education and not pointed toward
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religious, governmental, or economic ends. Examining the relationship between 
education and religion in the context of the following two examples provides insights into 
the way education and religion can relate to one another without being subsumed by the 
other. Further, it shows that a vibrant relationship between the two provides persons a 
way of understanding public participation in society in terms that do not rely on the moral 
language of government. This re-categorization of the understanding of public begins to 
give religion and education stronger footing in a social milieu dominated by government 
and economy.  
 
Education and Religion 
Robert Jackson examines the Warwick Religious and Education Research Unit’s 
attempts to respond to the failure of programs designed to provide multicultural religious 
education in their efforts to address adequately the problems of racism in England and 
Wales. He frames the problem in this way. In “Religious Education’s Representation of 
‘Religions’ and ‘Cultures,’” multicultural religious education came under attack by anti-
racists for, among other things, its notions of culture and religion as being closed systems 
and for its lack of attention to the structures of power.476 While Jackson notes that 
religious education has a history of helping to alleviate racial misunderstanding, he 
agrees that the current conceptions of religion and culture are potentially inimical to the 
goal of eliminating racism.477  Jackson traces notions of culture and religion through a 
history of anthropological thought and lands at the ones employed by the Warwick 
project which regard “concepts of religion and religions” as modern post-Enlightenment 
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477 Ibid., 273. 
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constructions and acknowledges the role of colonial power in defining the ‘other’ in 
terms of discrete religions and cultures.478 He continues by commenting on how 
important it is that a concept of religion be broad enough to accommodate several levels 
of internal diversity even within identifiable membership groups.479  
He essentially shows that the project does the same with the notion of ethnicity, 
pointing out that “A sense of shared descent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
of common ethnicity.”480 He draws on Geertz and others to explicate the implications of 
this understanding on views of what culture is and is not, relying on a notion of culture as 
patterns of meaning or symbol systems subject to being contested and renegotiated.481 
Jackson argues against avoiding issues of religion and culture in the classroom, but 
advocates careful reconsideration of notions of culture and religion that were being used 
to frame conversations.482 Jackson’s insistence on teaching about cultures and religions, 
in the classroom in the specific way he advocates doing so deploys education’s greatest 
strength. It can expose the myths that religions and cultures are closed systems and show 
how complex and diverse religions and cultures are or can be. In so doing, education acts 
as an entry way to difference – different ideas and, ultimately, participation in the system 
by persons once conceived of as different. 
 Reciprocally, religion can deepen the way education thinks about itself as shown 
in Nancy Lesko’s study, Symbolizing Society, which examines life for girls at a 
Midwestern US Catholic high school. Like Bellah et al., Lesko wishes to revive the 
notion of “Public” and sees schooling, particularly private schooling, as having public 
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significance. It acquires this relevance as a symbol characterized most poignantly by the 
internal cultural structure. 
Attention should be placed on the school as a site of meaning-making and 
identity creation, rather than merely as a training or contest site….In the 
interpretive structure of thought that underlay some of St. Anne’s school 
practices was an orientation toward “something higher” or deeper, an 
imperative to go beyond the surface actions to distill meaning and 
understanding….Across differing interpreting principles, students and 
teachers understood their lives, religion and literature in light of deeper or 
higher principles.483  
 
Lesko adopts notions of education and religion akin to Bellah et al.’s institutions and 
identifies a common language for the school, which speaks to the tensions between 
community and individual.  
St. Anne’s High School can be understood as a myth, told in words and 
actions. The subject of the myth is the conflict between two codes of 
conduct, caring and contest, each of which embodies a distinct way of 
thinking about, seeing and acting in the school.484   
 
Ultimately, Lesko sees the myth of the school resolving in favor of “caring” as illustrated 
in the school rituals she characterized as “love and fun.”485 Perhaps more to the heart of 
this inquiry, one of the most significant defining moments in this myth-ritual complex 
was a Catholic Mass during which the preference for “caring” relative to “contest” was 
made explicit. The theme of the mass was “Give good gifts” and, ultimately, the “good 
gift” to give was “Christian love.”486  
Just as St. Anne’s opted for a culture of caring, The Good Society calls for a spirit 
of “cultivation” versus one of “exploitation,” that is a “willingness to cultivate the 
purposes of individual and common lives rather than be swept along in the fervor of 
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exploitation.”487 William Tierney, in an examination of several educational settings, 
identifies as a recurring theme for his research the Greek notion of Agape or “selfless 
love” made explicit in the New Testament. “An organization that operates from the ideal 
of agape operates in a fundamentally different manner from other organizations. The 
underlying tenet here is that all life is interrelated” 488 Girard advocates the imitation of 
Christ which is mimesis but not mimetic rivalry. It is, as Williams puts it, a “mimesis that 
is good, a mimesis of love.”489
This seems contradictory with this analysis. I have gone to great lengths to 
demonstrate that Christian mimesis, generally is not loving. It is violent. But here, Girard 
and Williams offer a glimpse into something transformative about Christianity, a myth-
ritual-tradition-custom-praxis set that could yield something other than violence. Are 
there alternative ways to mine Christianity specifically and religion generally to 
overcome the violent effects of people adopting what Huntington terms a meaningful 
identity? Further, is religion’s symbol system robust enough in its myth-making potential 
to inscribe a pattern of meaning-making for open systems? Can it provide a signification 
mechanism for society’s other institutions that keeps them open and freely pattering their 
own moral frameworks? Reading two explicitly religious paradigms alongside 
educational research outlines proposed elements for patterns with the potential to make 
meaning for open systems. While the elements can be explained and enacted in explicitly 
religious terms in religious contexts, the elements of such a pattern need not be, in the 
end, explicitly religious. Yet the relationship is more than one among analogues. Religion 
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functions to inscribe modes of signification. Enacting and writing myth in explicitly 
religious terms encodes for societies ways of making meaning in other settings as well.  
In the following examples, I turn again to a crossroads of religion and education 
and the way that religious affiliation of a college can thwart openness to difference or as 
it is experienced in these situations, human diversity. Contrasting a model in which 
religion closes the system with a hypothetical paradigm which proposes mythical 
elements available to any school regardless of religious affiliation can aid in opening a 
system requires religiously-affiliated colleges, at least, do as Martin Marty suggests and 
“excavate their own traditions for resources to address [a] diversity of publics – and thus 
exemplify and contribute to public attitudes in other plural contexts far from campus.”490 
What this exploration unearths is not a prescriptive myth or set of myths for open systems 
but the elements with which such myths could make meaning for open systems.  
 
Elements of Open Systems Myths 
 
Religion can be understood as a factor which negatively influences students’ 
willingness to accept and embrace other students with different backgrounds or with 
racial, ethnic, or sexual identities other than their own. Parochialism both connotes and 
denotes the degree to which religious affiliation might be a negative indicator for 
openness to difference or diversity. In some cases it might be understood as the main 
factor resisting diversification of a student body, creating a climate inhospitable to those 
who fall outside of whatever categories may be considered normal at an institution and by 
failing to provide an environment that promotes campus-wide understanding of diversity 
issues by reinforcing system closure and violent modes of meaning making.  
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The apparent incompatibility, or at least incongruity, of diversity and religious 
affiliation is acute around the issue of sexual orientation. In a 1998 article in the Journal 
of Higher Education, Patrick Love discusses what he identifies as institutional barriers 
facing Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual (GLB) students at religiously affiliated colleges. 
While his study did not show the actual barriers created by the college's church 
affiliation, it did show that GLB students and their allies perceived that the religious 
identity of the college was a barrier.  
Homophobia, heterosexism, the discomfort with issues related to 
sexuality, the invisibility of sexual minorities, and the stigma associated 
with homosexuality were all elements of the culture of the greater societal 
context in which St. James existed. These elements interacted to reinforce 
one another; they were intensified by the religiously affiliated elements of 
the culture (i.e., perceptions of Catholicism, fear of typically peripheral 
and external constituencies, lack of appropriate ways to discuss sexual 
issues); and marginalized what was being done to address sexual 
orientation.491  
 
Ernest Pacarella and his colleagues documented the importance of diverse 
learning environments. “Indeed our analysis suggests that exposure to a range of diversity 
experiences in the first year of college may be particularly important for the development 
of students’ critical thinking.”492 Any purposeful or even unintentional negative impact 
on the diversity of a college’s student body, such as what Love describes, may have an 
adverse affect on the learning experiences of the students. 
The educational opportunities at religiously affiliated colleges and universities - 
and indeed the development of cognitive skills among students - may be severely limited 
if the college’s religious identity creates an environment inhospitable to diversity. In 
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“Influences on Student’s Openness to Diversity and Challenge in the Second and Third 
Years of College,” a study published in 2001, Whitt et al. show the importance of the 
institutional environment in promoting student openness to diversity.  
The combined impact of institutional commitments and expectations also 
could encourage students to feel comfortable taking risks needed to 
interact with persons different from themselves and to seek opportunities 
to challenge previously held beliefs. And such experiences contribute to 
increases in students' openness to diversity and challenge.493   
 
How can religiously affiliated colleges create environments that foster openness 
to and understanding of difference or diversity without compromising the integrity of 
their religious identities? Must schools achieve a hospitable environment despite religious 
affiliation? Or is there a way to understand religious commitments as particularly 
supportive of openness to difference?  
In what follows, I attempt to forward two explicitly religious paradigms to 
legitimate systems as being open to difference. The purpose of this exercise is to show a 
counter-example to what Girard describes as a misreading of the Gospel which leads to 
violence. By showing a Christian and a Jewish paradigm, I move back to a functional 
notion of religion. I will draw in great detail on the content of the particular traditions, but 
by illustrating the point in two traditions at once, I intend to show that religion can 
function to legitimate openness for multiple cultures. Even though one particular 
theological interpretation or practice leads to violent modes of signification, others, from 
within the same tradition, have the potential for opening systems up, helping others 
within the systems value in a meaningful way encounters with difference which derive 
from the inherent openness of their social structures.  
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From a Catholic standpoint, one explicitly religious paradigm for diverse 
individuals coming together for a common purpose is that of Holy Communion. Girard 
would point out that there is a compelling and pervasive sacrificial theology of Holy 
Communion which perpetuates the very violent patterns I am trying to avoid. In this 
proposal, I offer a re-reading of Holy Communion in the non-sacrificial terms Girard 
advocates. Holy Communion in the Catholic Church is the highpoint of the mass for 
which there is much personal and corporate preparation. The preparation immediately 
preceding the actual sharing of bread and wine, taken with Holy Communion itself, is 
known as the Eucharist, literally “good gifts” in Greek. Although the ordering of the 
activity of the Eucharist has varied from time to time and place to place, there are a few 
discernable common movements, which have persisted since the earliest records of 
Christian worship. Along with other actions and prayers, the Eucharist contains at least 
the following: Offering of Gifts, Anamnesis, Epiclesis, Doxology, Fraction, Exchanging 
Signs of Peace, Agnus Dei, and Communion. While a case can be made that each of these 
movements is fundamental to the establishment of a community of diversity, I will focus 
on Offering of Gifts, Anamnesis, Epiclesis, Signs of Peace, and Communion. 
Similarly, an explicitly Jewish paradigm for exploring issues related to 
encountering difference can be uncovered, as I have alluded to before, in a closer 
examination of Jewish law or halalcha. Halacha may better be understood as practice 
rather than law because it is more inductive in nature than what we, in the West, typically 
think of as law. Halacha is also less rigid than it might appear to be on the surface. In 
fact, fluidity inheres allowing it to adapt to new contexts, changing technology and 
shifting historical realities.  
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As previously discussed, halachic decisions about practice take into account three 
main factors, category, precedent, and context. In order to know which precedent to use 
to guide practice in a given situation, the decision-maker must determine which category 
to invoke for the context. Different categories call on different precedents and different 
contexts call for different categories of precedents. Another example of this decision-
making method being applied to a situation which has very little to do with Jewish law 
might be something like the following: An automobile driver approaches a red light on a 
narrow, one-lane, one-way street at 2 a.m. As the driver pulls up to the light the category 
“traffic signal” is evoked. The precedents upon which the driver draws instinctively are 
driving through a green light, stopping at a red light and exercising caution when the light 
turns yellow. The driver is followed to the intersection by an ambulance with its lights 
and siren on. The light at the intersection is still red. Does the driver stop or pass into the 
intersection slowly and with caution in order to make room for the ambulance to pass?  If 
the driver remains rigidly wed to the category, “traffic signal,” then he or she will only 
call upon the precedent which would lead to the driver stopping. If however, the driver 
chooses to understand the situation by using the category “emergency” then a different 
set of precedents is invoked which might allow the driver to maneuver in a way that 
breaks the law of “traffic signals” but makes way for the ambulance.  
Now consider what would happen if another driver traveling on the cross street 
saw the green light and heard the siren of the ambulance. If he or she employed the 
categories of “traffic signal” and “emergency” together and drew upon relevant 
precedents, he or she might chose to speed through the green light to clear the way or 
might shift from “traffic signal” to the “emergency” category half-way through the 
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intersection and stop dead center. In either case, the two cars might collide. The same 
circumstance (context) might legitimately be read two or more different ways by two 
different drivers. If both chose the category “emergency” in a timely manner, then they 
would avoid collision and the ambulance would pass safely through the intersection. 
    Simplistic as it is, this example shows the fluidity and adaptability for the halachic 
decision-making process and the collision course individuals may be on when they read 
and respond to the same or similar contexts using a different set of rules. Note, however, 
that even in the case of the first driver, two apparently conflicting activities, driving 
through the light and stopping at the light could both be ruled legitimate responses to the 
same situation. They would each be “legal” or “ruled” activity. Hardly rigid and hardly 
linear or deterministic, such a decision-making process can dissect complex situations 
and legitimate many actions. There are many different “ruled” ways to respond to the 
intersection problem. Making sure each person understands how others with different 
experiences interpret contexts, employ categories, and appropriate precedent can help 
avoid collisions. It also can help us avoid missing the complexity of interactive decision 
making and simply ruling that one practice is absolutely right and others are absolutely 
wrong. 
 
Coming Together 
When individuals with diverse backgrounds and experiences come together on a 
college campus, they must work to understand one another in order to form a community. 
If successful, there ultimately will be one body formed out of many without losing the 
richness of the diversity. The Eucharist offers an excellent model for understanding how 
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diverse persons can come together and transform their relationships with one another 
from previous relationships marked by hatred, suspicion, and ignorance to ones of deep 
appreciation and love for one another. While what I am outlining will seem like a 
sequential progression along a line to a destination, it is important to keep in mind that 
even the movements of the Eucharist are juxtaposed in different ways in different 
churches and have changed over time. This is not a prescription for progress but a 
description of the various components that comprise community creation.  
The first movement I will discuss is the Offering of Gifts by the individuals who 
are coming together from diverse backgrounds. When any group of persons comes 
together, their similarities and differences become apparent, either starkly so and 
immediately or gradually over time. While initially this can cause feelings of superiority 
or of being judged, students must be urged simply to note the similarities and differences 
and use this as an occasion to understand and know who they are and what they bring to 
the table. In other words what are the gifts with which they each have been endowed?  
What stories and characteristics make up their personalities up to and including the 
current moment? What are their strengths and vulnerabilities?   
Once this sort of personal inventory has been done, a student must determine that 
he or she is eager and willing to offer the gift of himself or herself to others. This requires 
an acknowledgement of his or her inherent value as a person and courage to become 
vulnerable with others, sharing what he or she has to offer. In the mass, 
the substance of the offertory prayers for the bread and wine (offered 
along with money) are found in the Didache, but are originally rooted in 
Jewish Blessings. The new formula, [which begins with] “Blessed are you, 
Lord” has a threefold idea: the bread and the wine are products of creation 
and provide nourishment, and thereby symbolize our worlds and our life. 
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They also signify the work of our hands and our daily labor, and thereby, 
are an offering of ourselves.494  
 
What the student brings to the table (or to college) is important. Most significant 
is a student’s pre-college values regarding diversity. Whitt et al. were not surprised to 
learn that “the most significant positive influence on a student’s openness to diversity and 
challenge during the first three years of college was the student’s openness…before 
college.”495  
There are ways to effect this sort of self-assessment of pre-college values and 
facilitate mutual sharing once students are on campus, including service learning. 
Students engaged in service learning in a study conducted by Susan Jones and Kathleen 
Hill “began to make a connection between understanding others and understanding 
oneself. This process involved an awareness of their advantages and privileges.”496
This is the moment in which a halachic crisis can occur. Individuals who have 
grown up in different communities have learned to navigate the world in different ways. 
As the students come together, it is important to know if they see a hole in the ground as 
a well or as a latrine. Students must begin to assess the category sets they have, most 
likely unknowingly, created over a lifetime. Their practices and interactions with others 
and the world will depend on what categories they employ to understand different 
circumstances. Those categories will call upon different precedents and lead to different 
decisions for action.  
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Recalling and Sharing 
Following the offering of gifts in the Catholic paradigm is the Eucharistic Prayer 
which includes one or more elements known by the Greek term “Anamnesis” literally 
meaning “unforgetting.”  During this part of the prayer the priest recalls the history of 
God’s saving and liberating relationship with humankind. While the English “re-
member” packs its own poetic punch if analyzed carefully, its common usage disarms it 
somewhat. In addition, I think for the issue at hand, the process of unforgetting may be 
more important. As people of difference come together, the group will surely be 
comprised of those who are advantaged and those who are disadvantaged both in 
resources and power. The power gradients present in our world today keep and have kept 
some stories from being told or heard as Freire demonstrates. Once students have taken 
stock of what they have to offer and have decided to share it with others and once 
students have made a commitment to receive the gifts others bring, the stories must be 
told and heard. Stories of oppression and discrimination have a particular urgency and 
priority for the group determined to be a community. Those stories, as painful as they are, 
must be unforgotten by those who have experienced them directly or indirectly and 
incorporated into the anthology of community consciousness.  
Developing a common anthology of stories extends experience from one member 
of the community to others and begins to help each person reframe their notions of 
reality. As one student working in an AIDS service organization and participating in the 
Jones and Hill study commented, “It all occurred in such a non-threatening way that it 
was, that’s great, that’s really cool…I guess just listening to some of the people talk 
about their partners it struck me as sounding weird, abnormal, unusual to me just because 
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I hadn’t heard it before, but now its like an everyday thing for me.”497 Jones and Hill 
conclude that this type of interaction “led to an appreciation of diverse perspectives and 
an understanding of life circumstances with which each was unfamiliar.”498   
From within the halachic paradigm, once a student begins to become self-aware 
of the category sets he or she uses to understand and navigate life, it is important that he 
or she begin to share the implications of working from that category set has had in his or 
her life or even to share what has occurred or recurred to reinforce his or her categorical 
understandings and appropriation of precedent. Likewise, it is key to understand literally 
where others are coming from. Learning how they use the stories of their lives as 
precedents will foster common understanding and appreciation of why two persons have 
such a hard time conversing with one another in the first place. In the story above about 
partners, for instance, some students might have parents who are lawyers or business 
owners and assume that the word “partner,” when used by a client of the service 
organization, referred to a legal or businesses partner. The student may never have had 
the (need to develop the) same vocabulary of the client he or she is now serving.  
 
Transformation 
 
The next Eucharistic movement I wish to describe is the Epiclesis. Calling upon 
the Holy Spirit the celebrant asks that the gifts be transformed for the sacrament. 
Likewise, the telling of the stories described above as a praxis in and of itself will either 
cause a transformation to occur or make the need for transformation more evident. The 
type of transformation that must occur in a diverse community - as it comes together - is 
                                                 
497 Ibid., 207. 
498 Ibid. 
 
   
 277
one that takes the gifts brought to the table by members of a group and reorients them for 
the work of community building. It is simultaneously a call for transformation of the 
world around the community members and of the community members themselves. 
Jones and Hill reported that study participants involved in community service 
“learned to pay attention, to notice different things around them, and to appreciate diverse 
life circumstances and perspectives. One student commented: ‘Now I know what it is 
like…I view everything differently now.’”499 Not only are the individuals changed, but so 
are the stories each brings to and receives from others. Ellen Broido discusses what she 
calls “Meaning-making strategies” undertaken by those developing skills as social justice 
allies. Using these strategies, students mingle what they bring to the table with the stories 
they learn in their encounters with others. “The participants transformed information into 
knowledge. They used their pre-college values and the information they had acquired as 
the content for these meaning-making processes.”500  
Halachically, once the stories of others have shown that there are other ways to 
understand similar experiences and different ways to act sensibly in what otherwise might 
seem to be the same situation, the students engaging one another can begin to “try on” 
new categories and try to approach situations in ways they had never approached them 
before. The world is new to a person who is seeing it through the eyes of another for the 
first time. Halachically, this is evidence of shifting categories. Students encountering 
difference realize that there are multiple categories available for use when understanding 
appropriate practice and when they begin to understand why someone who sees a hole as 
a latrine approaches it and uses it in a different way. More than that, the student may even 
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begin to be able to move fluidly between his or her own category set and that of someone 
else with whom he or she has shared stories.  
 
Inter-subjectivity 
 
Once the Eucharistic gifts have been transformed, worshipers must prepare 
themselves for the encounter with, appropriation of, and use of the sacrament. In order to 
do this, they offer each other Signs of Peace as an act of reconciliation. In the midst of 
having become self-aware and being transformed by the telling and hearing of stories, the 
differences, the growing relationships, the past (passive or active) enmities between 
persons and the emerging shared worldview are all becoming more evident. These 
realizations beg for intentional inter-subjectivity. Previously, understanding of other 
came in the third person, learning about those who are different (that is if any such 
learning had occurred at all). In a Eucharistic community, learning occurs face to face 
with, from and for each other. The next step in overcoming divisiveness and charting a 
new course is making peace.  
In the same way, Jones and Hill noted: “Through their work at the community 
service sites, students began to view community members and clients whom they served 
as unique individuals, rather than categories of difference or only as members of 
particular groups.”501 They continue, pointing out the importance of reciprocity in 
relationships, “[In] reciprocal  relationships…defined as those in which all partners are 
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involved in the design of the activity, all learn from the relationship, and all benefit as a 
result.”502   
Halachic peace is speaking the same moral language, using the same categories 
and employing the same precedents. Or, when not doing so, knowing the language of 
others with whom you are in relationship. Halachic interaction must be inter-subjective. 
There will be conflicts in the interactions, and when these occur the actors must actively 
translate categories and precedents to one another or else they will be acting upon or in 
spite of the other. This would make the other an object of the action, an object that fits 
into a category and calls upon certain precedents to guide practice. Such objectification 
may be harmful because it does not acknowledge mutual agency and does not lead to 
interpersonal relationships or common community building. 
 
Community 
 
The culminating movement of the Eucharist is Communion itself. At this point in 
the mass, worshipers share a meal together as one family. Divided and brought together 
around one table, one loaf, and one cup, the church too is one. So too, divided student 
communities, in a profound way can work through the differences and divisions and build 
community. 
Not only do such encounters form community, they deepen and transform ideas of 
community for engagement of difference even beyond the community just formed. Jones 
and Hill see the power of activities that engage students with persons they would not 
otherwise have encountered. “The possibility of truly realizing the principle of reciprocity 
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and appreciation of diversity depends upon the ability to sustain relationships and 
develop ongoing partnerships.”503  
Halachically, community cannot be conceived of as a state. It is not a place to 
stay. Rather it is a time for work. If students do indeed come together with other students 
or with community members, for that matter, they are not only versed at moving among 
each other’s category sets and understanding how others are going to react differently to 
similar situations, they have begun the work of common category maintenance and the 
creation of new categories. Categories are formed through lived experience. As the 
students experience life in community, they are developing their own library of 
precedents together which ultimately will be categorized in similar ways. Holes in the 
ground may become more often understood in the new community as places for planting 
trees. Students may even lose touch with the fact that others in their home communities 
still see a hole as a latrine or a well. Once students reach this stage, they must continually 
touch base with other elements described above remaining self aware and aware of the 
standpoint of others with whom they relate. They are indeed building a new community 
which will require maintenance, but one which will also differ from the next community 
they enter. After some work, they will have a precedent for encountering difference in a 
new context – a precedent which will guide and which will be the gift he or she has to 
offer to the new others he or she encounters. 
An explicitly religious paradigm for establishing and maintaining an environment 
are not without its difficulties. Many priests and rabbis hold beliefs and teach doctrine 
that is clearly understood as hostile to some. It is here that the halachic approach is 
particularly instructive. If explicitly religious models for creating environments that 
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intentionally incorporate difference are implemented and work, they will become 
precedents within ecclesial or rabbinical categories that might serve as legitimating 
factors in transforming teachings or environments that might otherwise be hostile. This 
provides for the possibility of a self critique of a re-opened institution of religion. Such a 
model may bring to light substantive theological and moral critiques on stances taken by 
religious authorities. The critiques, importantly, will be from within the institutional 
framework of religion, because its potential for openness has allowed such difference into 
the legitimated and legitimating system.  
In religious or educational terms, the preceding exercise lifts up potential 
elements of cultural myths on a societal level that could, indeed, help shape open 
systems’ meaning-making processes. Whether approaching meaning-making process 
from the standpoint of the Eucharist, halacha, or educational research, those elements are: 
Coming Together, Recalling and Sharing, Transformation, Inter-subjectivity, and 
Community.   
 
Opening Systems 
Both in institutional form and mythical content, religion and higher education 
have something to contribute to one another. Rethinking and rehabilitating education and 
religion require not only exposing the myth which conceals mimetic rivalry, but also the 
myth which conceals the openness of the system. Servant leadership stands on the 
threshold, the limen, of closed and open systems. As agents of transformation, then, 
servant leaders must demythologize the closed system and ultimately demythologize 
system closure altogether. However, the charism of servant leadership is also mythically 
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inscribed. So servant leaders are capable only of demythologizing a system by privileging 
the ontological at the expense of the normative. Opening systems requires that leaders 
weave and advance new myth not by ignoring past meanings made, but by, using Marty’s 
image, excavating them for normative patterns capable of making sense of new realities 
in non-violent ways. These excavated patterns provide the starting point for opening 
cultural systems which will then continue to re-weave myths like the one which prescribe 
Coming Together, Recalling and Sharing, Transformation, Inter-subjectivity, and 
Community. As an example, myths which embody these elements have the potential of 
continually opening the cultural systems to difference and to model for other institutions 
non-violent ways to make meaning. This avails the system to the energy of negentropy 
freely available and always increasing for the sake of culture creation.  
Leaders and cultures are mutually constitutive. Leaders depend on cultural 
patterns to legitimate their meaning-making charisms, and culture depends on leaders to 
shape and re-shape meaning-making patterns. A co-condition of the development of 
leaders who can establish and sustain open systems cultures is the rehabilitation of the 
institutions of education and religion. These institutions create patterns for cognitive and 
moral development upon which the growth of open systems leaders depend.  
Education inscribes the patterns necessary for cognitive development. A model 
for growing leaders capable of opening systems and sustaining them meaningfully, then, 
requires a more explicit understanding of the ways education creates more and less open 
and therefore more and less violent patterns for learning and reasoning.  
Education is about learning, and learning is about reconciling the general with the 
particular. However, more than a tension between the general and the particular inheres 
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in the process of knowing, according to Taylor. He suggests that the process of knowing 
starts with the contextual, the particular, the perceptual.504 As Minnnich points out, 
however, many notions of cognition begin with generalizations and proceed to the 
particular. It is exactly this process that Freire seeks to reverse, again giving priority to 
context. Halacha gives us a model of how that can actually work.  
Voyles illustrates the necessity of not mistaking analytical isolation (of normative, 
ontological, general, and particular, for instance) for the way life really works. Life is a 
set of messier processes that relate is, ought, and meaning as well as general, particular, 
and knowledge. These processes are going on at various levels at the same time in 
different and differently understood contexts.505 I respect and agree with his 
understanding of the complexity of these processes and how he balances that with his 
faithfulness to Geertz’s enterprise of isolating cultural processes into analytical categories 
in order to see how processes do relate dialectically rather than as “mere reflexes of one 
another.”506  
 The priority of context, for Voyles, injects the freedom to access a number of 
different possible solutions for problems related to behaving in the world. For Freire, the 
priority of context puts the power to create reality in the hands of the people. When 
priority is given to the universal, oppressed and oppressor alike behave by applying the 
worldview to a given situation. Action, which starts in context and behaves in a way 
different from the propounded worldview, is revolutionary in that it breaks from the 
worldview and begins the process of shaping a new one.507  
                                                 
504 Taylor, 207. 
505 Voyles, 126. 
506 Geertz 1973, 169 
507 Freire, 65-66. 
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 It is this priority on context that gives the ontological dimension its openness to 
new experiences, which, in turn, fuels the complex adaptive behavior of the worldview-
creation process for networks of persons. Persons and networks of persons know 
something when they are able to reconcile the general with the particular. Growth in the 
system depends on access to new data. In that sense, future knowledge is present in 
contextualized experience. Past knowledge is stored in the patterns (nomoi) that govern 
the schemata (precedents and categories) with which the system encounters new data. 
This relationship between past and future as mediated through the present propels the 
self-reflexive growth processes of the complex adaptive system.508 The problems of 
application (applying the general to the contextual), then can be understood in cognitive 
terms of privileging the past over the future. Patterns, then, will repeat but not just 
stabilize around the last pattern created. Because the system is reflexive and has stored all 
previous patterns, it will reflexively regress, recursively revisiting past patterns in place 
of adapting and incorporating new data that impels system progress, i.e. cognitive 
development. Openness to new data by means of privileging context, therefore, is 
essential to cognitive development of persons and networks of persons.  
Cognitive development is only part of leading open systems cultures, and the 
ontological is only one dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix. But what happens when 
one system of cognitive and moral development is trying to make sense of another such 
system, such as in the case when people of profound difference come in contact with one 
another? What emerges as information, knowledge, and meaning in one system may be 
read as noise by the other. Again network and chaos theories are helpful here:  
                                                 
508 Taylor, 93-94. 
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Constituting a structure bordering on the fractal, myths are networks of 
networks made up of nodes within nodes. Never fixed, these networks of 
symbols and myths must constantly adapt to each other. Though neither 
programmed nor planned, such changes tend in the direction of ever 
greater complexity. Like other complex adaptive systems, myths change in 
response to what appears to be noise.509
 
How does one feed the complex adaptive process of signification of one 
system into the complex adaptive process of cognition of another system in a way 
that respects and preserves the openness of both systems? This requires not only 
highly developed cognitive skills but also highly developed signification skills. 
These skills aid the enterprise of re-mything an existing myth with respect to a 
newly encountered - and equally plausible (as far as the new acquaintances are 
concerned) - myth. How do Huntington’s civilizations with meaningful identities 
informed by religion encounter one another in a way that results in mutual 
transformation and not conflict? This requires even more than the 
demythologizing charism of the servant as transformer. It requires the leadership 
charism of visionary as strange attractor.
                                                 
509 Taylor, 213. 
 
   
 CHAPTER TEN 
CULTIVATING CULTURAL LEADERSHIP 
 
Uninitiated leaders have charisms that enable them to move cultures to the brink 
of liminality and re-order them with regressive and violent meaning-making codes and 
rituals. Initiated leaders have charisms that enable them to move a closed system through 
the liminality of equilibrium and reconstitute it with violent, yet progressive codes and 
rituals. Servant-leaders, the most highly developed of initiated leaders, make meaning in 
ways that diminish and eventually eliminate the meaningful distinctions and hierarchies 
of the closed system. They respond to the threat of this undifferentiated edge of liminality 
by privileging the ontological at the expense of the normative, keeping the system closed 
to the stabilizing effects of past meanings made. Re-engaging the past as a key 
component of creating future patterns in the present requires a different charism, one that 
understands the inherent openness of the system and provides for an alternative attractor 
to the ever-beckoning equilibrium state of a closed system. The new charism is not one 
which empowers the leader to endure and move through liminality or guide the group 
similarly, but one that is able to remain in a liminal state exposing the group to the 
constant interplay of structure and anti-structure in communitas and the organizing fuel of 
negentropy. Rather than understanding social arrangements as constituting a closed 
system that is managed by staving off entropy and equilibrium, this type of leader 
understands social arrangements, and indeed cultivates them, in ways more analogous to
 
   
286
 287
 Prigogine’s dissipative structures, which exist far from equilibrium, are yet 
stable, and thrive on a constant flow of negentropy. Such a leader, a visionary leader in 
Hall’s terms, functions as a strange attractor, supplanting the equilibrium of the closed 
system with initial conditions that set a complex adaptive system’s cognitive and moral 
patterns in motion. In this way, a visionary leader adopts a posture relative to energy and 
entropy that understands social systems as changing in irreversible ways, seeks out 
difference rather than trying to wall it out, and cultivates the openness of the system in 
order to incorporate difference and to stabilize the system with the ever-increasing flow 
of negentropy available to it.  
 
Writing Her Ass Off for Peace 
 Consider the visionary leader encountered by Brenda Sage, a graduate student at 
Longstreet University, a large private research university in an urban setting.510 She is in 
the graduate division of religion and is working in the area of history. She is working 
with church historians as well as with faculty from the history department at the 
university. At the time of my interview with her she had completed her coursework and 
was ready to challenge her comprehensive examinations. She attended an evangelical 
Christian college which she describes as offering a strong education. Although she never 
had plans to be ordained, she attended seminary at Longstreet. Upon graduation, she 
worked in the university’s ethics center for two years and then entered the Ph.D. 
program.  
 
                                                 
510 Brenda Sage (psued.), interview by author, undisclosed location, written notes and tape recording, 
Summer 2002.  
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Middle East College 
 She first learned of Middle East College – an interfaith college in Israel/Palestine 
– from a young man who leads tours to the Holy Land and is very interested in and 
involved in the college himself. This piqued her curiosity. A contributing writer for a 
Christian magazine, she wondered about the possibility of turning this curiosity into a 
story. While exploring this possibility, she learned that one of her faculty advisors is on a 
US advisory board for Middle East College. This gave her an additional contact with 
Middle East College and the school’s founder, a Palestinian Christian Priest, in the 
Melkite tradition, whom I will call Abuna (which is a transliteration of the Arabic word 
for Father). Her contacts facilitated a meeting with Abuna during a visit in May 2002. In 
fact she accepted an invitation to join Abuna, her faculty advisor, and other members of 
the US board for breakfast. Her editors never commissioned her to write a story about 
Abuna or Middle East College. She attended the breakfast anyway out of personal 
interest and in hopes that there might be other publications whom she could interest in a 
story about her encounter. 
 Clearly Brenda has a personal interest in Abuna and Middle East College, but she 
framed her discussion of her interest in terms of writing about Middle East College. In 
some ways her writing served to mediate her (at least initial) encounters with Middle East 
College. She apparently relied to some extent on her role as a writer and the enterprise (or 
activity) of writing a column or article to provide a public motive for wishing to meet 
with Abuna and learn more about the college. Her pursuing the relationship despite the 
fact that she did not receive any prior affirmation from her magazine editors betrays an 
interest beyond simply getting the story or researching a column. Her desire to find other 
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places to write about her relationship, however, may indicate that writing itself does more 
than give her permission to build such relationships and is not the sole source of her 
identity in these relationships. Her framing the encounter in these terms may indicate that 
the activity of writing is important for her and potentially holds significance beyond the 
economic benefit it provides. 
 
Profile of a Prophet 
Brenda described the most striking feature about her encounter with Abuna as 
“his presence.” She felt like she was in the presence of a truly “great man” and a truly 
“loving man.”  She sensed that he had “lived and suffered” and, unlike many people, 
seemed to “walk the talk” of loving the other. Being with Abuna did not make her feel 
uncomfortable in any way. He seemed to take a genuine interest in her and she indicated 
that she could have easily felt like a graduate student who had no reason to be there or a 
writer who had no prospect of publishing an article. Despite the potential for feeling (or 
being made to feel) out of place, she felt very much at home and very comfortable in the 
group.  
 Feeling at home in the group was apparently important to Brenda. She related not 
having a purpose or reason for being there to the idea of feeling welcome. Abuna and the 
others apparently did not relate the two and welcomed her without her having an apparent 
purpose or reason for being there. Was this an expression of Abuna’s ability to “walk the 
talk” of loving the other?  Did she contrast this character trait with herself or did she find 
it resonant with her own character?   
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 Her walk is talk, so to speak. One of the things she does is write words (in a sense 
talk), perhaps about loving the other. Does she view writing as “walk” or “talk?”  
 The coherence of walk and talk are, for Brenda, an important dimension of 
creating a presence of greatness. Brenda went on to describe other dimensions of Abuna’s 
presence. The first thing she told me was that he seemed to her to be very intelligent but 
had the gentleness of humor. He took the issue of the Palestinian problem seriously but 
he did not take himself too seriously. She contrasted this with other activists that she had 
known who seemed to take themselves as seriously as they took their causes, and she 
thought that Abuna acted in a different way that to her made him more welcoming and 
more approachable.  
 He also seemed to regard each person as distinct and worth knowing in his or her 
own right, and he invited her to become more involved in the cause of the college in a 
number of different ways, including by encouraging her to attend a conference in Galilee. 
His personal care and interest in her made her feel connected, and motivated her to 
consider the possibility of becoming more involved.  
 Brenda moved from words about Abuna’s gentleness to describing him as 
exhibiting a “righteous anger” when he talked about the Palestinian situation. During the 
breakfast with the board, the conversation turned to finding funding for the school. One 
member inquired about the number of Jewish students currently attending Middle East 
College which prides itself on its interfaith commitments and student body. Abuna 
indicated that the parents had taken all of the Jewish students out of the schools because 
of the current crisis and conflict. The board then pressed Abuna to reclaim some of those 
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Jewish students in order for the college to be understood and interpreted as a truly inter-
religious effort.  
 Abuna agreed in principle but he also asked who is working to try to get 
Palestinians into the Jewish schools. Brenda characterized this response as reflecting an 
attitude about “what is fair.”  He did not express his anger in an anti-Semitic way but he 
seemed always to want to side with fairness. This was important to Brenda.  
 She described Abuna as being able to see the tragedy and losses on both sides 
clearly and that he was not polarized to one side of the conflict or another. He, in her 
words, integrates the difficulties on both sides in his understanding of the situation. She 
said that it is clear to her that his heart was more for the Palestinians because they still 
have a land issue that has still not been resolved. 
 
Inter-faith Violence and Education 
 Beyond getting to know Abuna, Brenda expressed a desire to see the college. Not 
having experienced the college firsthand, the thing that strikes her as most compelling 
about its mission is that it is truly inter-faith. This is unusual in its own right but even 
more ambitious in a violent area such as Israel/Palestine where the religious differences 
have so much to do with the conflict and breakdown of society. 
 The current violence in Israel/Palestine prevents her from taking what she judges 
would be an irrational risk to visit the college. She still is working to maintain a 
relationship with the college from a distance by having written an article about Middle 
East College and its related elementary and high schools for a major regional newspaper. 
Writing that article occasioned her doing additional research about the schools. Many of 
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Brenda’s Jewish neighbors have mentioned her article to her and have engaged her in 
conversations about it. She specifically described an encounter with one woman who had 
heard Abuna speak at a synagogue in town. This woman fully supported the stance that 
Brenda took in the paper, namely that education can help bridge differences and abate 
violence.   
 Brenda is continuing to try to educate herself about Middle East College by 
reading some of Abuna’s books. She remains open to being involved directly although 
she does not know exactly what form that might take. She says right now there is a 
financial barrier because she is just working part-time jobs while in graduate school, and 
she can barely support herself much less support any kind of in-depth involvement with 
the college. She is giving some thought to organizing students in support of Middle East 
College or trying to find ways to write more about the college. 
 
Brenda’s Path 
 Brenda desires to be connected with justice work in her life and wishes to be 
active in doing something rather than simply researching and writing about matters of 
justice. She indicated that she had done other things along this vein, such as work in 
homeless shelters. She cares about people who have been “stepped on” and wants to do 
something “hands on” to really help those people. One of the specific things that she 
thinks that she can do is to write for a public audience in order to raise awareness. 
 By “stepped on,” Brenda is describing those who have experienced loss or death 
in their lives or have some severe economic disadvantage. She speculates that everyone at 
one point or another in their lives has been stepped on. In the instance of Israel/Palestine, 
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it seems to her the Palestinians are the ones who have been stepped on and who are 
suffering injustices. For Brenda, involving herself in matters of justice is all about 
fairness. It is important to her that people be treated in a fair way and that such treatment 
is reciprocated. 
 By writing, Brenda is able to watch how she changes. When she researches and 
writes, it changes her. She can get outside of herself and understand that there is a bigger 
world beyond. She hopes to turn minds toward issues that she thinks are important. 
Interestingly, she related the idea of turning minds to her own evangelical background 
and likened it to converting people or saving people from their own lack of knowledge. 
This metaphor was a negative one for her and she prefers to make sense of what she does 
by understanding her writing as a way to “provide space to learn about things [her 
readers] wouldn’t have known.”   
 Brenda paraphrased Abuna when characterizing the most important thing for 
others to know about what she has learned about Middle East College: Peace is built on 
the desktops of school children. In her understanding, attitudes about difference start at a 
very young age. Moreover, we could employ Abuna’s methods to affect the same kinds 
of changes in attitudes about differences in the United States. She said even her 
evangelical family could have learned about Catholics, for instance, here in the United 
States and perhaps not have felt so negatively about a different religious group. She 
quickly added that it is more than just adopting a philosophy of education for peace. 
Abuna really models the way to live that out. In her words, he “works his ass off for 
peace.” 
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 What would it mean for Brenda to work her ass off for peace? What if Abuna 
were to become a strange attractor or visionary leader in her life whose actions and 
motivations she mimetically imitated? I will try to approach this question in light of the 
questions I raise above and in terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix as Network repeated 
below in Figure 15. 
 
Abuna as a Visionary Strange Attractor 
Figure 15: Moral Meaning Matrix as Network 
Dimension Universe Society 
(System) 
Institution 
(Network) 
Organization
(Hub) 
Group 
(Cluster) 
Interpersonal
(Node) 
Normative Ought Ethos Symbol Language Narrative Word 
Meaning Synopsis Myth Ritual Tradition Custom Praxis 
Ontological Is Worldview Nomos Category Precedent Activity 
Dynamic Energy Power Jurisdiction Authority Resource Relationship 
  
Brenda initially approached the context of meeting with Abuna around the idea of 
writing about him and his mission. She may have referred to the activity of meeting 
Abuna using the word interview and synthesized the word with the activity around the 
praxis of conducting research for a column. This would have been a meaningful way to 
engage Abuna as a columnist or journalist. As it was, her editors did not ask for the 
article. The activity of meeting Abuna therefore was thrown momentarily into a state of 
meaninglessness. Brenda indicated some discomfort with meeting him without a 
prescribed reason or purpose. It was in discussing the context of the encounter that she 
began to show a new way of making sense of the encounter. Abuna helped her know that 
she was worth meeting without such a prescribed purpose or reason. She was reason 
alone, and he indicated a deep interest in her. She described the activity in new terms of 
comfort and acceptance yielding the meaningful praxis of becoming a part of the group. 
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As a journalist, becoming part of the group may never have been available to her. Her 
praxis or meaningful activity would have been understood in different terms and for a 
different end. Because of the disruption of the circumstances surrounding the context of 
the meeting, the relationship was built on much different terms than it might have been.  
 The encounter with Abuna itself either gave insight to Brenda about Abuna and 
his mission or provided a metaphor for her to use to describe what he does and how he 
does it. More importantly, as she understood herself through Abuna, her encounter 
provided her insights about herself and how she uses her time and talents.  
 She linked his interest in her as a person to her desire to become more involved in 
the college. She describes a desire to do something hands-on for those who have been 
stepped on. In her estimation, everyone has been stepped on. While she cannot personally 
relate to the plight of the Palestinians per se, as one of the stepped on ones she knows her 
motivation for helping and the sense that it makes to her. The activity of Brenda meeting 
Abuna sent her searching for a proper response. She searched for a precedent of “hands-
on” involvement which she deems as much needed against the backdrop of the narrative 
of everyone having been stepped on. She reconciles her narrative and her hands-on 
approach by remembering, I suspect, her own story of being stepped on which provides 
her a meaningful resource for helping others feel included, just as Abuna made her feel 
included.  
 Brenda’s search for a hands-on activity leads her to mine precedents, that is 
activity that she has undertaken in the past (such as volunteering for homeless shelters), 
to help those who have been stepped on. The broader category of “stepped on” evokes a 
number of precedents as potential responses. The category stands in relief against her 
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own moral language which is one that seeks to describe the necessity for a normative 
fairness. This language frames the narrative of everyone being stepped on. Insofar as the 
experience of being stepped on is universal, it is fair in a distributive way. Insofar as the 
notion of being stepped on requires a stepper and a "steppee," the norm of fairness is 
illuminated by its contrast.  
 Because her memory knows what it is to treat and be treated fairly and what it is 
to treat and be treated unfairly, Brenda actively recalls what it means to treat others fairly 
which synthesizes her selection of the category of stepped on when thinking about the 
Palestinians in terms of her moral language of fairness. She is keenly aware that it is 
incumbent upon those in authority to treat others fairly. This insight is reflected in her 
characterization of Abuna’s “righteous anger” about the school’s attempts to be inclusive 
while Jews apparently fail to include Palestinians in their schools in Israel. Fostering a 
tradition of fair treatment requires a customary awareness of the universal memory of 
having been treated fairly and unfairly in order to create a context of inclusion and 
acceptance. 
 Understanding the Israel/Palestine situation by selecting the category of “stepped 
on” requires one to care deeply about others and their circumstances. Ordering life in 
such a way that gauges the level to which others have been treated unfairly is indicative 
of behavior being deemed legitimate only when it indicates a genuine personal interest in 
the other. Living by the rule (or nomos) of personal interest in the other permits and 
perhaps prefers the way Brenda chooses to characterize the Middle East conflict and 
mission of Middle East College. It is also one of the compelling attributes she describes 
about Abuna and his presence.  
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Attractor as Symbol and Model 
Even though Brenda’s – and consequently my – description of Abuna is idealized, 
no doubt he was a flawed human figure. Nevertheless Abuna’s presence became a 
symbol for Brenda. It was a general sense she had about him, but pointed to what she 
termed his greatness, his love, his “righteous anger,” his fairness, gentleness and sense of 
humor. It embodied his taking issues of justice seriously without taking himself too 
seriously. In his presence, Brenda detected living and suffering, a quest for justice and the 
juxtaposition of struggle and a longing for peace. In his presence was captured the 
particularity of a Palestinian man and the Christian priest who embraced others of 
different faiths.  
 In and through the ritual of breakfast, Brenda constructed a meaningful interaction 
between following Abuna’s example of living life by taking a genuine interest in others 
and the symbol of Abuna’s presence. Breakfast, then, models a tradition of fair treatment 
which, in turn, calls upon the common memory of unfair treatment to engender praxis of 
acceptance and inclusion. 
 The patterned practice of meal-sharing, perhaps most meaningfully aligned with 
the institution of religion, offered Brenda more than physical nourishment. It enacted and 
perhaps helped shape or refine her worldview which, I presume, acknowledges injustice 
in the world. This ontological reality differs from her normative belief that the world 
ought to be just.  
 What can possibly reconcile a “life isn’t fair” worldview with an ethos that holds 
it ought to be fair?  Knowledge. Brenda subscribes to a myth (not in the pejorative sense 
of the word) that illuminating the contrasts between the is and the ought will compel 
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people to move the is closer to the ought. Falling just shy of restating that the “truth shall 
make you free,” Brenda wishes to help people connect with knowledge about injustice 
and the resources to address it.  
 
Writing as Transformative Praxis 
While contrasting “hands-on" efforts with her own writing at various points 
during our conversation, she returns to writing as a way for her to do something about the 
Israel/Palestine situation. Writing changes her she says. It helps her get outside herself 
and understand a bigger world. It can also turn people’s minds to what she thinks is 
important and “provide a space to learn about things they wouldn’t have known.”  
Writing, then becomes neither the walk nor the talk, but the synthesis of the two. As 
praxis in the context of the Israel/Palestine violence, it is meaningful activity that will 
help others feel included by drawing on and activating the common memory of being 
stepped on. She can recall from that memory what it means to treat others fairly. Her 
writing becomes the breakfast which nourishes others in the presence of her words which 
take issues more seriously than the author takes herself and which exposes her sincere 
interest in the reader.  
 Brenda’s theme demands that philosophical attitudes oriented toward peace and 
justice be joined with practice. This synthesis, I contend, is the locus of meaning-making 
for any individual. She sees the meaningfulness of Abuna’s words and life as he “works 
his ass off for peace.”  In the course of our conversation, Brenda re-scripted what writing 
means for her. At first a failed entrée into a meeting, it is a way to synthesize the ought 
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and the is, the philosophy and the practice. She could take this new understanding to 
heart and hand and use it to write her ass off for peace. 
 Abuna’s mimetic model as strange attractor begins with working his ass off for 
peace. Brenda encounters this and strives to imitate it. She makes sense of it in terms of 
her encounters with Abuna in terms of her own Moral Meaning Matrix described in detail 
above. The cognition and signification processes she employed had to be read beyond the 
interpersonal level of social complexity. They eventually encountered the moral 
languages inscribed by her experience of religion and education. As she re-writes the 
Moral Meaning Matrix of her life she provides new data for transforming organizations 
and social institutions by mimetically transferring what she learns and means throughout 
the social fractal network of relationship of which she is a part. Abuna’s model privileges 
context and activity, an openness to ontological context and, therefore entropy. In 
privileging the ontological, he provides a model for signification for her that thrives on 
entropy and not on re-establishing the order of a mythically closed system. Further, he 
models a cognitive process for her that provides her the precedent for acting in context 
first and making sense of it later. 
 In the symbol-model complex of the strange attractor, the normative and 
ontological as well as the general and contextual collapse across the span of the Moral 
Meaning Matrix. They collapse into a single point not in a way that obliterates the 
difference among the dimensions and the levels but in a way that keeps the tensions 
between each of the axes vibrant. The strange attractor functions as the initial condition 
which puts the meaning-making pattern in motion for a complex adaptive social system.  
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The influence of a visionary strange attractor is translated throughout the system 
in a way that makes drawing distinctions among the levels of social complexity 
irrelevant. In other words, Cultural Leadership is focused on the creation of meaningful 
patterns that will translate throughout the networked social fractal regardless of the scope 
of initial influence. Cultural Leaders, then, understand their project to be that of creating, 
sustaining, and transmitting meaning rather than creating, sustaining, and transmitting 
societies, institutions, or organizations. While it is important to attend to those levels 
analytically to demonstrate the similarity of the meaning-making processes at each point, 
to identify the particular signification processes on any of those levels, and to show how 
institutions and other social artifacts interact and relate to one another, it is also important 
to realize that Cultural Leaders, as the stewards of culture, engage the levels of social 
complexity as artificial boundaries drawn around social systems, which are, in fact, open. 
Even Weber’s “imperative co-ordination” was end-directed toward the the creation of 
bounded groups of persons working together for common purposes. Such boundary 
drawing is not without its merits, but it meets its limits when it tries to describe the 
system as closed with respect to the influences than can create and evolve patterns of 
meaning. Focusing on the cultural patterns rather than the organizational parameters, 
Cultural Leaders keep social systems open and keep meaningful patterns evolving in 
ways that influence and are influenced by all levels of the social fractal.  
 A visionary strange attractor’s response to liminal situations like the one Brenda 
encountered in Israel/Palestine is rare. As this dissertation has shown, there are many 
more precedents of very well-rehearsed cognitive and moral processes that prescribe 
behavior to resist the entropy of the liminal by attempting to close off systems and sustain 
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order in exothermic or endothermic – but ultimately violent ways. A visionary leader 
stabilizes the system without resorting to violent endothermic or exothermic meaning-
making mechanisms. A visionary leader constantly opens the system to difference and 
acknowledges the system’s inherent irreversibility. The visionary leader is never trying to 
restore order, then, in the mythic ways prescribed by closed systems approaches to 
energy, entropy and leadership. Rather, the visionary leader seeks stability in the 
negentropic flow – the very flow that closed systems leaders deploy power to resist. 
 
Oikos 
 It will take a commitment to cognitive and moral development of leaders to 
reverse the regressive pull of mythically closed systems. Helping leaders progress is key 
to revitalizing social institutions and society. To answer the call of The Good Society and 
foster a spirit of cultivation, I propose a model that explicitly reflects the openness of 
cultures as complex adaptive social systems and that intentionally cultivates the cognitive 
and moral sensibilities of Cultural Leaders to sustain them.  
The Oikos project, named for the Greek root word for economy, ecumenism, and 
ecology will privilege the ontological dimension of context in order to remain open, and 
in that sense must be educational in nature. 511  It must also attend to the ever-changing 
learning, reasoning, and signification patterning of the ontological, normative, and 
meaning dimensions of the social system while sustaining the meaning-making dynamics 
of the system from freely available negentropy. For these reasons, it must be more than 
educational in nature. 
                                                 
511 I co-founded Oikos, Inc. with Mark Y.A. Davies in 2005. It is a non-profit corporation chartered in the 
State of Georgia. 
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In order to remain an open system, Oikos must be: 
1. scale free allowing growth over time to shape the networked 
connections which constitute it.  
2. socially balanced, not privileging the moral language of any one social 
institution over the others in a way that precludes the free-patterning of 
each institution. 
3. able to facilitate the personal growth of leaders whose vision will offer a 
strange attractor alternative to closed-system equilibrium.  
4. fractal-like in order to translate meaningful patterns to and draw 
meaning from multiple levels of social complexity. 
Therefore Oikos will be a scale-free network of persons and organizations whose 
institutional commitments give them access to the moral languages of the normative 
influences of Government/Law/Politics, the ontological openness of Education through 
learning and research, the meaning-making skills of Religion and the resource 
development power of the Market Economy. Oikos will pay attention to the balance of 
institutional influences by giving each an equivalent seat at the table to help resist the 
collapse of one institutional paradigm, and therefore one dimension of meaning-making, 
into the other. Recall the association in chapter four of each of the dimensions of reality 
with the particular institutions which inscribe patterns relevant to that dimension for 
entire societies. This association is rehearsed in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16: Social Institutions as Dimensions of Moral Meaning 
Normative Government/Law/Politics 
Meaning Public Church (Religion) 
Ontological Education 
Dynamic Political (Market) Economy 
 
Oikos forms a networked community. Since it is a community that must be 
intentionally open to the portal of behavior in ontological context, it must be a 
community of actors. Following Taylor’s model, this network must harness the ability to 
learn, know, and mean. Patterns of meaning will dynamically emerge and evolve as 
knowledge recursively makes patterned sense out of the information learned. So the 
network must intentionally increase its cognitive and moral capacities. Cognitive growth 
will come from the consumption of more and more noise screened into information, 
thereby increasing cognitive content. Evolving and maintaining a highly developed 
ability to make meaning out of that content in non-violent ways requires an intentionally 
increasing moral capacity.  
 The Moral Meaning Matrix shows that even an open complex dynamic system 
will create myth to make sense of the discrepancies between the ontological and the 
normative. With this in mind, recall the destructive power of the myth, even if a misread 
myth, that currently dominates, at least, Western thinking. Hall’s work on strange 
attractors and visionary leadership and Taylor’s work with complex adaptive systems 
demonstrate that the emergent patterns, including the patterns of signification, will be 
highly sensitive to the initial conditions of the vision set forth for the network. With an 
assumption that mimesis inheres in any human relationship, it is important that Oikos 
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intentionally de-mythologize violent corollaries to mimesis. While mimesis can be 
constructive for learning, it does not have to entail rivalry. One way to thwart rivalry is 
for Oikos to focus on the objects of desire and their just distribution, at least distribution 
to the point where they meet minimum needs. A necessary component of just distribution 
is depleting as few resources as possible. Finally, if successful, Oikos must intentionally 
search for ways to defuse the energy of rivalries, should they occur, in non-violent ways. 
Even though it may not be possible in a complex adaptive system to predict what 
meaning-making patterns will emerge, it may be possible to set initial conditions on a 
path to demythologize the current violent faith which grips the signification processes. 
By doing so, the initial conditions will put the system on a path of re-mythologizing a 
pattern which will be attentive to the three important areas outlined above: human need, 
sustainability, and non-violence. Orienting the complex adaptive system to consume 
information (or content) around these three areas sets the cognitive patterning off in a 
necessarily re-mythologizing direction.  
 So a network that forms a community of actors around re-mythologizing content 
needs to develop its moral capacity as well. Moral meaning-making occurs in 
relationships and involves the deployment of resources. I have mapped out a vector for 
more and less violent ways to be in relationship with others relative to the deployment of 
resources. Developing capacity suggests a growth vector for the meaning and dynamic 
dimensions of the Moral Meaning Matrix, a vector I have been discussing as leadership 
development. The way leaders respond to and interact with others around the need for 
resources and use of power is at the heart of leadership. Just as signification involves a 
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synthesis of distinct ontological and normative elements, growing the capacity to make 
that meaning requires a vibrant tension between distinct meaning and dynamic elements. 
 This new model of culture, therefore, creates community, seeks out new content, 
and develops capacity. If the model, however, is to have a re-mythologizing effect on a 
community, then the moral capacity must develop beyond an understanding of social 
systems as closed. I propose there are two ways to effect this type of growth, and they 
most likely will have to occur simultaneously. The first way understands development as 
progressive and evolutionary. Within the framework of a closed system and among 
leaders who understand social systems as closed, this model is particularly salient. 
Incremental steps from authoritarian through servant evolve leaders to more and more 
developed ways of understanding the system as increasingly open. This pattern of growth 
also decreases the explicit role of rivalry, and, beyond facilitator, even the frequency of 
sacrifice-based rituals for the meaning-making enterprise. As leaders near the servant 
style of meaning-making, they begin to develop the ability to understand and appreciate 
the value of ontological openness and are prepared to take the next step through the 
entropic liminal into open systems, visionary leadership. 
 Adopting an evolutionary framework for growth, progressive and linear as it is, 
might have salience for most who understand social systems as closed. Of course, my 
analysis reveals that social systems, even if regarded as closed, are, in fact, open. Growth 
does not happen in a linear and progressive fashion but in non-linear shifts and 
patterning. Capacity, like meaning emerges over time. Here Hall’s image of visionary 
leaders and the future as strange attractors combined with an understanding of the 
contagious nature of mimesis describes a mechanism by which a visionary facilitates 
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quantum shifts among others including other leaders with the potential of emerging as 
visionary themselves. Witness the relationship between Brenda and Abuna. 
 The two attractors discussed above are equilibrium and strange. If leaders work 
hard to close social systems, then they engage in endothermic or exothermic meaning-
making processes which are constantly moving to and through equilibrium. The leader’s 
work involves staving off that equilibrium and disrupting it once it sets in. The strange 
attractor of a vision or visionary is better described not as an endpoint but as a pattern 
that emerges in non-linear form after recursive iterations of the initial conditions, which 
set the patterning in motion in the first instance. 
 As discussed earlier, leaders can move in and out of higher cycles of leadership. 
The systems in which they lead might require their operation at an earlier stage of 
development. Or, the system itself might prohibit the leader from operating at that level 
altogether and may pull the leader back into a less developed leadership style. This 
shifting can be understood in linear terms as sliding along a continuum, but it is probably 
best understood in non-linear terms as quantum shifts between attractor states. This calls 
for a mechanism that can effect such shifts. For that mechanism, I propose Oikos turn to a 
leadership development model known as Generative Commitment forwarded by Len 
Leritz. There are discrepancies between Hall’s taxonomy and Leritz’s. Most importantly, 
Leritz’s model is likely to collapse Hall’s collaborator, servant, and visionary into the 
category of generative, Lertiz’s most advanced level of leadership. I will deal with that 
discrepancy in my analysis because the point of reading Hall and Leritz together in this 
way is, ultimately, to help leaders develop to the point of being able to open up systems 
 
   
 307
and facilitate meaning-making processes that thrive on negentropy rather than on re-
inscribing violent signification myths.  
 
Generative Commitment 
 Len Leritz asserts “Any organization is successful to the degree that its members 
are committed and skilled at solving problems and reaching organizational goals 
together.”512 Conversely, the major impediments or problems facing any organization 
“can be traced directly to the lack of commitment and skill in facing and resolving 
issues.”513  Leritz, of the Generative Leadership Institute, characterizes levels of 
commitment along a continuum that is at once developmental in a linear progressive 
sense and descriptive of shifting levels of commitment within individuals at different 
times and within different relational contexts. The five levels of commitment are 
characterized as follows: “Enforcer, Scorekeeper, Peacemaker, Rebel Producer, and 
Generative.”514 The first four he describes as “conditional commitments” that lead to 
undesirable and unhelpful interpersonal interaction and behavior such as “keeping score 
to make sure we get our fair share, and giving pep talks and little lectures, rather than 
listening to people’s needs and facing unpleasant problems.”515 “People operating from a 
Generative commitment are primarily oriented toward facing the truth about 
themselves.…Second, and just as importantly, people operating from their fullest 
capacities listen to and accept others - their needs, strengths and limitations.”516  
                                                 
512Len  Leritz, Real Time Commitment: A Developmental Workshop for Building Generative Relationships 
in the Workplace and Beyond (Location of Publication Unknown: The Generative Leadership Institute, 
2000), 1, emphasis his. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid., 2-5. 
515 Ibid., 5. 
516 Ibid., 6. 
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Commitments on the generator level among individuals finding themselves in the 
management of extreme crisis, for instance, would be, in Leritz's estimation, precisely the 
ones equipped to handle such a situation. “Ultimately this commitment derives from the 
trust that, individually and collectively, we are more than enough, that is, though we will 
not act perfectly, we have everything we need to handle whatever comes up.”517   
The problem with any problem-solving group addressing crisis is that even those 
who have acceded to the generator stage at one time or another may not be operating at 
that level of commitment when the crisis occurs. In fact the crisis itself could create 
impediments that inhibit decision-makers from acting from that level of commitment. 
Leritz contends that individuals do not leave stages behind. Rather, we have the capacity 
to shift in and out of the various modes of commitment through which we have already 
grown.  
The goal, once aware of one’s generative capacities, is to be cognizant of the 
“certain triggers [that] cause us to think and act from different levels” and to “raise the 
level of our thinking, either developmentally over time or in the moment.”518 Each 
moment of relationship, crisis, and decision-making is also a moment of internal effort to 
gauge levels of commitment, fight off that which seduces us into the conditional levels of 
commitment and frees us to operate as generators. If successful, we have clearer lenses 
through which to peer into the commitment of the other(s) to whom we are relating.  
 A limitation of the Leritz model is it sets up a developmental dichotomy, between 
what might be described as adult and child-like behaviors. Four of his relational modes: 
Enforcer, Scorekeeper, Peacemaker, and Rebel-Producer, reflect stages of development 
                                                 
517 Ibid. 
518 Ibid., 14. 
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in childhood that persons carry with them into adulthood. Life stories or “scripts” for 
Leritz create attractor states in one or more of these stages. Leritz’s contention, however, 
is that grown persons have, in addition to the capacities described above, the capacity to 
operate at the generative level, exhibiting adult commitments to problem-solving and 
relationships. On a moment to moment basis, persons can move between (one or more) 
truncated and fully developed sets of behaviors and commitments. What Leritz’s model 
lacks is any subtle distinctions within the adult generative mode itself. He does not 
address whether there are more or less ways of being generative when one is acting with 
adult capacities. Leritz’s generativity has the potential to correspond, in my terms, to both 
closed and open systems leadership styles. Leritz’s model is likely to identify Hall’s 
collaborator and visionary as generative in a way that does not offer a distinction between 
the two.   
 Nevertheless, what Leritz does offer is this image of oscillation between (or 
among) two (or more attractor) states. While this sort of non-linear movement is implicit 
in Hall’s arrangement as well, Leritz’s model trades on the fluidity of movement more 
fully. Combining the fluidity of the Leritz model with the explicit distinctions of the Hall 
model and the differences between open and closed systems yields the possibility of 
understanding leaders and systems that move rapidly among multiple levels of 
development within a closed-system paradigm or between a closed-system understanding 
and an open-system understanding. This latter shift imperils open systems with the threat 
of equilibrium states as well as provides opportunities for growth around visionary 
attractors to closed systems. This might occur in spurts, and an open system might 
devolve again into closed system equilibrium dynamics.  
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Activities 
The question, then, becomes how to sustain generative levels of commitment 
personally and socially, especially generative commitments that understand and respond 
to social systems as open? In order to sustain generative commitments to open systems 
and thereby cultivate cultural leaders, Oikos will facilitate engagement around the 
development of content, capacity and community as described above. 
 
Content 
In order to actively re-mythologize social systems, Oikos participants must learn 
about and research the areas of peace and non-violence, human need and ecological 
sustainability. Broadly speaking these areas address the myths that reinforce the 
conditions for and mythically inscribed the necessity of violence. Learning and reasoning 
about theses areas in a way similar to that advocated by Jackson in the Warwick project 
opens these areas up for constantly evolving new understandings. Opening up these areas, 
in particular, is important. Learning and reasoning about peace holds the potential for 
demythologizing the mechanisms, occasions, and assumptions that inhere in violent 
conflict. Learning and reasoning about human need holds the potential for 
demythologizing economic competition over the resources which provide the meaning-
making power and the desire for which fuels rivalry or the acquisition of resources at the 
expense of others. Learning and reasoning about ecological sustainability hold the 
potential for demythologizing the pre-condition of rivalry, which is the objectification of 
natural and other resources viewed as consumable objects of desire. 
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In order to develop the content knowledge around these three areas of future 
leaders in various fields, Oikos established the Oikos Scholars program at one university 
with the prospect of expanding it to another in the near future and with plans to extend 
the reach by establishing similar programs at multiple colleges and universities around 
the globe.519 The Oikos Scholars program intentionally involves students in service-
learning to privilege ontological context, living and studying abroad to expose students to 
new sources of difference, and in coursework on peace, human need/social justice, and 
ecological sustainability to achieve the learning and reasoning objectives described 
above. 
 
Capacity 
In order to develop the cognitive and moral capacities of persons in positions of 
leadership, Oikos will help its constituents grow through multiple insight-oriented 
seminars and workshops on leadership development based on the work and insights of 
Brian Hall. Hall’s work orients participants along a common vector for long-term 
personal growth. Supplementing Hall’s work with Lertitz’s insight will provide a tool for 
enabling any leader, uninitiated, initiated, or visionary to strive intentionally to lead at his 
or her best as much as possible. Working to cultivate one’s own generative capacity at 
whichever of Hall’s cycles helps the leader prepare for growth into further developed 
cycles of leadership. Ultimately, leaders engaged in this intentional growth process will 
come to understand cultural systems as open systems and how to live in the liminal in  a 
                                                 
519 The model for the Oikos Scholars program was developed initially by Mark Y.A. Davies, co-founder of 
Oikos. Oklahoma City University plans to matriculate its first Oikos Scholars in the Fall of 2007. LaGrange 
College is currently considering the establishment of a similar program. Once these models are established, 
Oikos will have two precedents to offer as models to other colleges and universities.  
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way that can deploy the available negentropy for creating non-violent, yet meaningful 
cultural patterns.  
These leadership development activities will invite participants into an intentional 
and discernable process of personal growth. The growth will trade on an increasing 
awareness of personal values or norms and the extent to which those norms are or are not 
shared. This invites deeper reflection into the way norms are created and shared and links 
that process to the development of personal moral and cognitive capacities to the 
complex adaptive systems described by the Moral Meaning Matrix. Finally, enabling 
leaders to understand how they know what they know and mean what they mean and how 
they participate in knowing and meaning on scalable levels within the social fractal, they 
will have the tools to participate intentionally in the project of social construction and 
influence the reformation of organizations and institutions to create patterns that inscribe 
just, peaceful, and ecologically responsible relationships and behavior. 
Engaged participants who commit to a lifelong process of personal growth and 
development as described above, along with graduates of the Oikos Scholars programs 
who make similar lifelong commitments will form the Oikos Leadership Network (OLN) 
aimed at catalyzing cross-institutional collaboration, mentoring and co-counseling among 
its members.520 By deploying internet-based social networking software, such a network 
could provide members with instantaneous global access to a community of persons with 
diverse experience, shared values, and a common commitment to personal growth and the 
revival of the planet and its inhabitants. Social network technology is evolving rapidly 
and could enable community participants to affiliate and communicate asynchronously 
                                                 
520 Learn more about the Oikos Leadership Network at www.oikosleadership.net. 
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and simultaneously with other participants who share interests, skills, institutional 
sectors, or global regions. 
 
Community 
Few, if any, organizations or social institutions exist to support persons engaged 
in highly sophisticated reflection and action relative to the complex realities which 
challenge the world today. Simply replicating previous organizational structures created 
to accommodate less developed interaction and to address the challenges of a world 
which were, perhaps, less complex, will fail to satisfy the intellectual and emotional 
needs of the persons engaged in this type of collaborative work. Particularly, locating 
Oikos within the sphere of influence of any one organization or within the normative 
framework of any particular social institution, such as education, government, religion, or 
economy, will fail to provide the robust diversity necessary to deal with the challenges 
posed by the interaction of those institutions and will fail to engage authentically multiple 
organizations at once.  
Further, in the twenty-first century, such a project must conceive of itself in 
global terms in order to continually challenge the hegemony of any particular set of 
cultural norms and assumptions, which will inevitably shape the work of the community 
in provincial ways. Oikos, then, will include participants from multiple institutional 
sectors. The organization has adapted Bellah et al.’s categories into: government, service, 
education, religion, and economy. Service serves as a broad category to encompass some 
of the areas The Good Society did not address such as the media, healthcare, non-
governmental organizations, etc. The participants must also come from diverse cultural 
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settings and be capable of and interested in addressing issues of peace and non-violence, 
human need, and ecological sustainability. 
Growing Oikos, therefore, requires the intentional establishment of a series of 
interpersonal relationships which form a self-organizing and self-propagating scale-free 
network over time. Ensuring that the earliest relationships are global and trans-
institutional in scope will provide the best prospects for achieving the envisioned 
community.  
 
Systemic, Sustainable, and Scalable 
For Oikos to cultivate Cultural Leaders as set forth in this dissertation it needs to 
be systemic, sustainable, and scalable. It derives an integrative systemic approach from 
intentionally involving persons in the community from each of the four major social 
institutions outlined by Bellah et al. as well as from a newly-described sector, service. 
Sustainability depends on increasing the content knowledge around issues of ecology, 
human need, and peace and non-violence. Finally, scalability requires careful attention to 
each of the levels of social complexity: interpersonal, group, organizational, institutional, 
societal, universe/global. Scalable in this sense indicates an effort to work at various 
levels of social complexity but still within, confusingly, a scale-free network which 
enables Oikos to behave as a complex adaptive system or real world network and not as 
static or random network. In fact it is the scale-free properties which give the network the 
opportunity to exploit its fractal-like topology to affect multiple levels of social 
complexity at once. On each level, Oikos maps a vector of growth in order for the person 
or groups of persons involved to develop the moral capacity to make meaning in 
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increasingly sustainable and systemic ways and in ways that eventually are capable of 
disregarding the artificially closed distinctions of the levels of social complexity. 
 
Cultural Leadership and Peace 
 “I dream,” says Mark Taylor, “of educational institutions that do as much for the 
imagination as Frank Gehry’s buildings do for the eye….It seems undeniable that the 
currency of education has never been more valuable than in emerging network 
culture.”521 The Cultural Leadership model attempts to respond seriously to the 
epistemological revolution which provides an exceptionally more nuanced view of the 
realities of the way we relate to one another. Any network informed by the Cultural 
Leadership model would provide a forum to allow for the enterprise called for by the 
observers who penned The Good Society. 
Yet if we are fortunate enough to have the gift of faith through which we 
see ourselves as members of the universal community of all being, then 
we bear a special responsibility to bring whatever insights we have to the 
common discussion of new problems, not because we have any superior 
wisdom, but because we can be, as Vaclav Havel defines his role, 
ambassadors of trust in a fearful world.522
 
Heeding Taylor’s dream and The Good Society’s call requires rehabilitation of the 
institution of education, dislodging it from the grips of the economic and political 
influences which have distracted its purpose from an intrinsically meaningful mission. 
The rehabilitation of education, however, requires the re-emergence of the role of religion 
in public life, re-establishing a mechanism for making meaning for other social 
institutions. Religion, regressive and privatized as it has become, will be clumsy in this 
role. But part of religion’s rehabilitation is a steadier flow of reality from the portal of 
                                                 
521 Taylor, 269. 
522 Bellah et al., Good Society, 286. 
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education, encouraging religion and enabling it to adapt and progress into an open 
systems mode of signification. “The culture of people,” according to Clifford Geertz, “is 
an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles.”523 Assembling those texts and, indeed 
writing them, rather than simply reading them, is the role of religion. But it must first 
have new information granted it by education to inscribe on those pages.  
The systems, however, have no hands, minds, and voices, complex and adaptive 
as they are without the persons who enliven and conscientize the processes of learning, 
reasoning, and signification on all levels of human interaction. As Samuel Huntington 
frames it, “The futures of both peace and civilization depend upon understanding and 
cooperation among political, spiritual, and intellectual leaders of the world’s major 
civilizations.”524 Peace depends on it, because our ways of making sense of difference 
and noise are grounded in violent myths about how power is used to make meaning. 
These myths have increasingly destructive weapons at their disposal. Re-writing the 
myths of closed systems and dislodging the violent mechanisms inherently deployed to  
keep such systems alive is essential on the interpersonal and the global levels. “In the 
emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an 
international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguards against world war.”525  
                                                 
523 Geertz, 453. 
524 Huntington, Clash, 321. 
525 Huntington, Clash, 321. Critics accuse Huntington of trying to conjure up new post -Cold War enemies 
for the West intentionally as a mechanism for reinforcing western power and stabilizing global relations 
around stalemate conflicts. These critics paint Huntington as xenophobic on issues as broad-reaching as 
immigration policy and international violence. The critics suggest that Huntington is unjustifiably critical 
of Islam, depicting it as excessively violent relative to other world religions. While the arguments are 
supported by evidence, they attempt to prove his motives and intent which is not empirically verifiable. 
Even if the critics arguments are granted or if the critics are right and Huntington is  (or has the effect of) 
ordering the world instead of describing a new world order, the plausibility of that argument only further 
illustrates my argument and Girard's principle that the creation of a common enemy is a powerful unifying  
force, and religion provides a meaningful and salient way for creating lines of distinction and common 
identity while simultaneously legitimating the conflict and the unity in its own terms. Trumpbour, 89. The 
New Crusades, 89 and Said, on-line.  
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On September 11, 2001, terrorists used global communication and transportation 
networks to carry out their attacks. In so doing they demonstrated the dangers of a world 
in which people, who decades before would have been isolated from one another by 
geography, now live in increased contact. The Good Society observed ten years prior to 
the attacks the perilous dimensions of an increasingly interconnected globe of people who 
are ill-prepared to cope with this evolving social proximity.526  
For several centuries now the great society, particularly in the form of 
division of labor and the exchange economy, but even, ironically, through 
the increase of international violence, has been pushing more and more of 
human society toward an interconnected whole. The process has been 
anything but smooth, causing repeated crises of moral meaning and 
solidarity, as well as breakdowns into extraordinary violence and anger, as 
the units and conditions of life develop unevenly.527  
 
The September 11 attacks challenged the notion that human society is singular, is 
on a path toward an “interconnected whole,” or has any common referent with which to 
define or discern “crises of moral meaning.” However, the attacks alone are not sufficient 
evidence that there is any fissure in a global cultural fabric, if in fact such a fabric exists. 
Indeed outlaws and law-abiders operate within common cultural frameworks. The ability 
to enforce social and legal sanctions defines both outlaw and law-abider as two agents 
within the same culture on some minimal level at least. What is evident in the 2001 
attacks, however, is that there are circles – very large ones – in the world in which the 
terrorist actions are understood by sympathizers, not as crimes, but as legitimate 
activities.  
The attacks were visible manifestations of conflicts occurring around the globe on 
a daily basis. As individuals live in ever closer and increasingly diverse communities, 
                                                 
526 Rowe, on-line. 
527 Bellah et al., The Good Society, 7. 
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interpersonal conflicts escalate to a global scale just as the effects of the globally visible 
and violent attacks of September 11, 2001 ripple into interpersonal relationships. Such 
interpersonal and global violence stems from dysfunctional relationships among social 
institutions, including education and religion, which broadly influence behavioral 
patterns and the processes of meaning-making on personal, interpersonal, organizational, 
and societal levels. Reciprocally, personal patterns of behavior, organizational structures, 
interpersonal relationships, and inter-organizational dynamics influence the broader 
behavioral patterns and processes of meaning-making which shape social institutions, 
society and global relationships. Influencing the positive development of healthy social 
institutions, therefore, may lead to more pacific ways of relating to one another on an 
interpersonal and global level 
An understanding of leadership as drawing on educative and religious processes 
for the deployment of power in order to make meaning with or on behalf of groups of 
people at any level of social complexity suggests that leadership is informed by and can 
inform institutional patterns of behavior and signification just as it informs cultures on 
any level. Understanding leadership style on a developmental continuum between more 
and less violent modes of deploying power simultaneously offers insight into the origin 
of violent social relationships and into a process for creating more pacific ways of 
making meaning. Therefore, providing a path of personal cognitive and moral 
development along this continuum for organizational, institutional, societal and global 
leaders offers one approach to influencing the development of social institutions which, 
in turn, influence the development of leaders, along a mutually formative path toward 
interpersonal and global peace.
 
   
 CONCLUSION 
 
How would cultural leaders make the world more peaceful today? Faced with 
deteriorating conditions in Iraq in which two sects within a single Huntingtonian 
civilization fight for political power and control over precious oil reserves, the United 
States continues its attempts to rescue its foisting of Western-crafted norms of freedom 
and democracy on a reality from which those norms did not emanate and a reality which 
those norms cannot understand. The endothermic means by which the so-called lone 
remnant superpower of the twentieth century imposes its will on Iraq rapidly depletes 
what is left of its global political capital while it runs up record budget deficits by the 
minute. Since before the war, the frontier of US diplomacy has been silent on almost all 
fronts – not just on Iraq. The US has led with military force and wallows in a military 
mindset from which it cannot seem to free itself.  
Responding to the unprecedented liminality of the 2001 attack, the US responded 
with leadership styles that modulated between parental and autocratic. Just a day before 
the attacks New York’s mayor was best known for his heavy-handed tactics in 
eradicating crime as well as a sketchy – at best – record for dealing constructively with 
issues of diversity. One morning changed all that. America needed to be rushed out of a 
burning building – autocracy was the charism of the day. The reviled mayor became the 
revered leader because he had the gifts needed to command and control.
 
   
319
 320
But with the taking of a few breaths and the passing of a few days, all involved 
had the opportunity to bring perspective to an evolving and extremely complex situation. 
Cultural Leaders would have had the wherewithal to invoke autocratic charisms in times 
of need and crisis but would intentionally move into an open style leadership model that 
would have attempted not to control or contain the situation over and over again, but to 
understand that what was unfolding was complex and dynamic. Further Cultural Leaders 
would have set a course for resolution that did not look to scapegoating terrorists and 
dictators as if a few people were the sole source of a complex set of problems that have 
swirled into violent patterns for decades if not millennia. Al Qaeda’s nimble network 
proved to be the pattern that needed to be understood and the world got a glimpse of the 
dynamics of open systems alongside of and interrelated to emerging internet and mass 
media technologies. Now acquainted with terms like cells and network, the United States 
could not respond in kind. Avoiding the complexity of the system, the US 
institutionalized and codified various modes of now legitimated scapegoating through the 
USA PATRIOT Act, palpably closing down US society even more.528
As 2007 opens, the United States, having regressed about as far as it can in terms 
of Hall’s leadership cycles and faced with what is being broadly described as chaos, the 
certainty that liminality is emerging evokes the only response a fully regressed leader can 
employ – more dominance. More troops may indeed restore order, asserting the 
dominance of the United States in the multi-lateral rivalry that is the violent landscape of 
Iraq. In that sense the troop increases may well be effective, but they encode even more 
closed-system thinking on one of the most visibly open systems problems. “Yet,” Bellah 
                                                 
528 B. David Rowe, “Ex-Patriots: The Effects of Anti-Terrorism Legislation,” Thought and Action 18 (Fall 
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et al. observe, “it is easier to repeat old formulas, to comfort oneself with the 
community’s familiar practices, than to risk trusting a new response to new 
conditions.”529
Cultural Leaders resist the pull into closed-systems thinking. Avoiding the zero-
sum mentality enables Cultural Leaders to search for intersubjective ways to build 
partnerships and community. Cultural Leaders dismiss the myth of border security and 
focus energy and attention not on keeping international students out of domestic 
classrooms but look for ways to promote exchange and understanding.530 Like Abuna 
they build schools for the children of their enemies rather than refuse to talk with them or 
their allies. This type of leadership requires risk, deep risk on the part of the persons 
involved and requires the surrendering of amassed power to the energy that comes from 
engaging others in authentic and genuine ways.  
Cultural Leadership requires the development of cognitive and moral capacities. 
Certainly Osama bin Laden has demonstrated a cognitive facility for understanding open 
systems, but he has exploited that understanding by acting out in myriad ways a dynamic 
of rivalry and sacrifice. The same charge might be accurately levied against multi-
national corporations or world financial markets. Many who influence these systems 
understand their openness and are, daily, faced with ethical choices about how those 
corporations and markets affect the livelihoods of millions round the globe relative to 
their own personal financial position.  
The twenty-first century is serving up a sufficient number of open systems 
problems that are outstripping any society’s ability to deal with them in a progressive and 
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non-violent manner. The patterns which have encoded our behavior for so long are in 
much need of reform. As Bellah et al. argue even from the standpoint of the twentieth 
century:  
It is tempting to think the problems we face today, from the homeless in 
our streets and poverty in the Third World to ozone depletion and the 
greenhouse effect, can be solved by technology or technical expertise 
alone. But even to begin to solve these daunting problems, let alone 
problems of emptiness and meaninglessness in our personal lives, requires 
that we greatly improve our capacity to think about our institutions. We 
need to understand how much of our lives is lived in and through 
institutions, and how better institutions are essential if we are to lead better 
lives. In surveying our present situations we need to discern what is 
healthy in them and what needs to be altered, particularly where we have 
begun to destroy the nonrenewable natural and nearly nonrenewable 
human resources upon which our institutions depend.531
 
As an institution, religion is key to the moral development of Cultural Leaders’ abilities 
to not only understand the open systems but to craft meaningful responses to the 
problems they pose. 
We can indeed try to attend to the world around us and to the meanings we 
discover as we interact with that world, and hope to realize in our own 
experience that we are part of a universal community, making sense of our 
lives as deeply connected to each other. As we enlarge our attention to 
include the natural universe and the ultimate ground that it expresses and 
from which it comes, we are sometimes swept with a feeling of 
thankfulness, of grace, to be able to participate in a world that is both 
terrifying and exquisitely beautiful. At such moments we feel like 
celebrating the joy and mystery we participate in. Religions at their best 
help focus that urge to celebrate so that it will include all the meanings we 
can encompass.532
 
Cultural Leadership must draw on religion and education in order to foster the 
cognitive and moral development necessary to grasp and respond to increasingly complex 
challenges. Oikos provides one model of understanding the inter-relatedness of social 
institutions and a method for cultivating personal cognitive and moral development in 
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order to engage those institutions more fully and in a systemic manner. Such an 
experiment – or many – must be launched. To simply analyze and theorize would only 
regress the system of engagement and cultivation into past meanings made. New and 
meaningful responses require real engagement with context. 
 It is in the ontological dimension of reality and in context as Freire and Voyles 
point out that we encounter the differences we need to fuel the patterning work of the 
interlocking complex adaptive cultural systems, which Taylor’s work so vividly 
describes. Open systems thinking provides a radical and necessary departure from the 
classically-informed notions of social systems as being closed. The systems do not need 
opening but leaders must refrain from attempting to close them with mythic institutional 
patterns that legitimate social, political, economic, and military sanctions employing 
various overtly and subtly violent means. Insidiously, even some of our best management 
practices encode scapegoating on a routine basis so that our sensibilities are dulled by the 
practices of our working lives when scapegoating occurs on broader and more destructive 
scales. Hall’s taxonomy read in light of Girard’s theory of mimetic violence shows us 
how common notions of leadership inscribe such violent patterns to the point that the 
patterns, the myths, become hidden from our conscious understanding of the way we 
interact in the world.  
 Barabasi and others demonstrate how a real world network can translate such 
violent patterns of meaning making throughout a web of relationships that form a social 
fractal, which connects seemingly disconnected parts of our social universe. This makes 
it profoundly important to pay attention to the charismatic gifts leaders use to evoke 
change and respond to the threat of entropy brought on by the loss of differentiation in 
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the system or the equilibration of endothermic and exothermic energy transfers. More 
than just a Weberian ideal type of authority, charisma mixes into the leadership style of 
any leader that is able to demonstrate credibly his or her ability to respond to crises. 
These crises, by and large are only perceived crises. My theory of thermodynamics of 
culture and leadership shows how mythically closing a system sets up entropy and 
disorder as threats rather than the fuel of negentropy in myths that understand cultural 
networks as open systems. It is the increasingly developed charisms of initiated leaders 
who can endure the liminal and demonstrate the greatest chance of effectiveness in 
weaving and interpreting myths that legitimate life in the liminal states of Prigogine’s 
dissipative structures. It is there, Turner tells us, that communitas allows for anti-structure 
and structure to give new meaning to life. And meaning, as Geertz emphasizes, is what it 
is all about. As The Good Society concludes, “Meaning is the living fabric that holds us 
together with all things. To participate in it is to know something of what human 
happiness really is.”533
 Leadership is meaning-making and those meanings are preserved and transmitted 
through cultures. The violent ways we have made meaning in the United States have 
translated into violent patterns of meaning across the world, not only in World War I as 
Gruber demonstrates, but through most of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. 
The United States exports good things too, but we do not account for violent modes of 
signification in our trade deficits. In an unusually prominent place in the world and with 
access to military, media, and economic might that outstrips by far what any other society 
can draw upon, our institutional patterns are translated and enforced globally.  
US hegemony is by and large a normative hegemony – one that crushes the other 
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dimensions of reality as shown in the Moral Meaning Matrix into a collusion of 
governmental policies and economic power. The dynamic fuels the onset of the 
normative, and the two social institutions in the United States responsible for encoding 
meaning making and ontological engagement are subsumed. Religion, relegated to an 
untouchable private sphere and education devolving into utilitarian ends that can, on its 
best days, be described in the terms of its institutional subordination as a means to 
produce citizens (in the narrowest sense of the term of taxpayer) or workers for the 
government and economy respectively.  
 The Emory crisis taught us the process for an institution which fails to develop its 
own moral language. In the vacuum other intuitions are quick to reach in and replace the 
normative framework with foreign norms and thus exert the coercive isomorphism the 
neo-institutionalists so aptly named.  
 Education, alas, is left with few resources to help it inscribe new meanings, 
because our “socially organized ways of paying attention can become socially organized 
ways of distraction. [And] nowhere is the dilemma of institutionalization more acute than 
in the realm of religion.”534 Berger’s sacred canopy is no longer aiding the process of 
society creation. In fact, it seems to be inimical to the process altogether. Not only does 
its absence in public discourse keep it from informing progressive ways of making 
meaning for education and the other institutions, its privatization, as described by Bellah 
et al., keeps it from being reformed itself. In the United States, at least, this means that 
the misread myths that Girard demonstrated as being so powerfully violent seem beyond 
the reach of, even the ailing influence of, education to transform.  
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 Berger’s sacred canopy increasingly takes on the character of Frankl's deceptive 
dream and the numbness with which the veiled myth anesthetizes us legitimates, if not 
even makes holy, the cannibalistic frenzy that is religious violence. It is best, it seems, to 
stay lost in the deception of our mythic dream because the reality is too stark and harsh. 
Like Frankl, we are left culturally and existentially naked staring at the showerheads 
protruding through the ceiling of our sacred canopy wondering what they might effuse 
next. What becomes important for Cultural Leaders is not what happens next. It is what 
we do in that moment - before next. In that moment of terror and opportunity, Cultural 
Leaders release their gaze from the showerhead and scan the room. Cultural Leadership 
begins with the profound realization that we are not alone.
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